Safer, faster, better? Evaluating electronic prescribing by Barber, N et al.
Safer, Faster, Better? Evaluating Electronic Prescribing 
 
 
Report to the Patient Safety Research Programme 
(Policy Research Programme of the Department of Health) 
 
 
 
Nick Barber1
Bryony Dean Franklin1,2
Tony Cornford3
Ela Klecun3
Imogen Savage1
 
 
 
1 Department of Practice and Policy, The School of Pharmacy, University of  
London. 
2 Academic Pharmacy Unit, Hammersmith Hospitals NHS Trust. 
3 Department of Information Systems, London School of Economics & Political  
Science. 
 
 
 
Correspondence to: 
 
Prof. Nick Barber  
Department of Practice and Policy 
School of Pharmacy 
Mezzanine Floor, BMA House 
Tavistock Square 
London WC1H 9JP 
 
Tel:  020 7874 1271 
Email: n.barber@pharmacy.ac.uk
 
 
 
Competing Interests: At the time of bidding we already had some funding from the 
manufacturers of ServeRx (MDG Medical, Israel) to evaluate prospectively the ServeRx 
system under an unrestricted grant. We have integrated the two studies and do not 
distinguish between the sources of funding in this report. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
November 2006 
   
   2 
 3
 
Contents 
 
                                                                                                                Page 
 
List of Figures            5 
List of Tables            6 
List of Abbreviations            8 
Executive Summary              9 
1.  Introduction                     13 
    1.1 Background                13 
    1.2 Aims and objectives                                         18 
    1.3 Evaluation framework                                19  
2. Two electronic prescribing systems                                              21 
    2.1 Introduction                                                                                       21 
    2.2 The ServeRx system at Charing Cross Hospital                               21     
    2.3 The Meditech system at Queen’s Hospital                                         25 
    2.4 Discussion                                                             29 
3. Measuring error – summary of existing methods and development of  
    new retrospective methods        30 
     3.1 Introduction          30 
     3.2 Definitions          31 
     3.3 Developing a method for retrospectively identifying medication  
           errors from the medical notes          32 
     3.4 Adapting trigger tool methodology for use in the UK     35 
     3.5 Discussion          36 
4.  The prospective evaluation of electronic prescribing at Charing Cross  
     Hospital                         38 
     4.1 Introduction             38 
     4.2 Setting           39 
     4.3 Study design, sample size calculations and statistical analysis   39 
     4.4 Evaluating the safety and quality of each system     40 
     4.5 Evaluating staff time and system performance for each system   51 
     4.6 Discussion          57 
5.  Retrospective quantitative evaluation of two electronic prescribing systems  60 
     5.1 Introduction          60 
     5.2 Retrospective evaluation at Charing Cross Hospital     60 
     5.3 Retrospective evaluation at Queen’s Hospital     70 
     5.4 Discussion          78 
 4
 
6. Comparing four methods of detecting prescribing errors     80  
    6.1 Introduction          80 
    6.2 Setting and subjects         80 
    6.3 Methods          81 
    6.4 Results           82 
    6.5 Discussion          91 
7. A framework for evaluation of electronic prescribing     96 
    7.1 Introduction          96 
    7.2 A context of evaluation of electronic prescribing    96 
    7.3 Evaluation perspective        99 
    7.4 SPO evaluation framework        102 
    7.5 Applying the framework to electronic prescribing    109 
    7.6 Lessons for EP policy and practice       118 
8. Discussion           122 
Acknowledgements          137 
References           138 
List of Appendices          145 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 5
 
 
List of Figures 
                                                                                     Page 
 
Figure 1:   Framework for IT health technology assessment                                    20                                
Figure 2:   The ServeRx patient medication screen.                                             22 
Figure 3:   Nurse selecting stock medication from drawer in automated cabinet   23  
Figure 4:   One of the two electronic drug trolleys                                                24 
Figure 5:   Overview of the Hospital Information System                        25        
Figure 6:   The Process Orders menu in Meditech                  25 
Figure 7:   A doctor prescribing at the bedside                                   26 
Figure 8:   The Meditech medication order screen                     26 
Figure 9:   A drug round at Queen’s hospital                                             27 
Figure 10: The patient drug administration screen                                            27  
Figure 11: A current medication record showing scheduled and actual  
                 administration times                                                                            28 
Figure 12: Example of a note from pharmacist to prescriber                                28 
Figure 13: Data flow diagram showing the relationships within the RRF  
                 database.          33 
Figure 14: Data flow diagram showing the relationships within the trigger tool                                 
                 database          36  
Figure 15: Relationship between prescribing errors, pharmacists’ interventions  
                 and pharmacists’ prescription endorsements.     41  
Figure 16: The standards used during an audit of patient’s medication charts 
                 to assess adherence to medication policies     43 
Figure 17: Prescribing errors identified in the pre-serveRx cohort    85 
Figure 18: Prescribing errors identifed in the post- ServeRx cohort   85 
Figure 19: The evaluation framework       102 
Figure 20: The ServeRx system (supplier’s description)     147 
Figure 21: Implementation timetable, ServeRx       148 
Figure 22: Principal elements of technology within the system    150 
Figure 23: EP roll out at Queen’s Hospital       190 
Figure 24: Some positive opinions expressed by doctors     199 
Figure 25: Possible design for cross over study of electronic prescibing   253 
Figure 26: Design for randomised two group study of electronic prescribing  254 
Figure 27: Hierarchy of types of decision support, as proposed by Bates (as  264 
                 reported by Franklin, 2003)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 6
 
 
 
List of Tables 
Page 
 
 
Table 1:  Summary of inter-rater reliability test for retrospective review form.  34          
Table 2:  Demographics of patients admitted during an eight-week   44 
               period encompassing the majority of data collection 
               pre and post-ServeRx.                    
Table 3:  Patients’ notes retrieved and medication orders written.    45 
Table 4:  Summary of prescribing errors identified and pharmacists’    45 
               interventions made          
Table 5:  Prescribing errors presented according to stage of the    46 
               prescribing process. 
Table 6:  Breakdown of prescribing errors according to their likely origin.   46 
Table 7:  Examples of prescribing errors identified. The stage of the    47 
               prescribing process is shown in brackets. 
Table 8:  Examples of the medication administration errors identified. The  48 
               type of error is shown in brackets. 
Table 9:  The medication administration errors identified.     48 
Table 10: Adherence to policies relating to medication administration.   49 
Table 11: Adherence to policies relating to prescribing and allergy    50 
                documentation. 
Table 12: Summary of endorsements made and not made.    51 
Table 13: Nursing time spent on medication-related tasks each week.   55 
Table 14: Summary of system performance problems documented   56 
                pre-ServeRx. 
Table 15: Summary of system performance problems documented   56  
                post-Serve Rx. 
Table 16: Summary demographic data.       63 
Table 17: Medication orders written according to stage of patient stay.   63 
Table 18: Medication orders written according to type of medication order.   63 
Table 19: Summary of the results obtained.       64 
Table 20: Prescribing errors identified according to the stage of prescribing  65  
                process.  
Table 21: Prescribing errors presented according to stage of the prescribing  65 
                process.         
Table 22: Availability of information from the medical notes.    67 
Table 23: Initial sampling strategy, based on implementation of different   71 
                Meditech versions at different times. 
Table 24: Summary of demographic data.       73 
Table 25: Medication orders written, presented according to stage of patient      73  
                stay.   
Table 26: Medication orders written, presented according to type of medication  73  
                order.  
Table 27: Summary of results relating to prescribing errors.    74 
Table 28: Prescribing errors identified according to the stage of patient stay.  75  
Table 29: Prescribing errors presented according to stage of the prescribing  75 
                process. 
Table 30: Data sources retrieved pre- and post- implementation of    77 
                electronic prescribing. 
Table 31: Summary of error rates identified using each of the four methods.  84 
 7
 
 
 
Table 32: Comparison of prescribing errors identified using each method   86 
                or  combination of methods, presented according to the stage  
                of the prescribing process, for the pre-ServeRx cohort.  
Table 33: Comparison of prescribing errors identified using each method   86  
                or combination of methods, presented according to the stage of  
                the prescribing process, for the post-ServeRx cohort.  
Table 34: Prescribing errors identified using each method or combination of  87 
                methods, presented according to whether or not the error was  
                rectified before the patient received (or should have received) one or  
                more doses, for the pre-ServeRx cohort.  
Table 35: Prescribing errors identified using each method or combination of   88 
                methods, presented according to whether or not the error was  
                rectified before the patient received (or should have received) one or  
                more doses, for the post-ServeRx cohort.  
Table 36: Prescribing errors identified using each method or combination of  88 
                methods, presented according to stage of patient stay, for the  
                pre-ServeRx cohort.  
Table 37: Prescribing errors identified using each method or combination of  89 
                methods, presented according to stage of patient stay, for the  
                post-ServeRx cohort.  
Table 38: Clinical severity of the prescribing errors identified using each method. 89 
Table 39: Positive triggers and prescribing errors identified.   90 
Table 40: Advantages and disadvantages of each method for the detection  94 
                of prescribing errors. 
Table 41: Charing Cross Hospital: ServeRx system.     105 
Table 42: Queens Hospital: Meditech System.      107 
Table 43:  Prescibing error reduction following electronic prescribing in   134 
                UK studies. 
Table 44: Demographic details of the patients interviewed.     168 
Table 45: Staff interviews and observations (all data).    193                      
Table 46: Patient demographics.        212 
Table 47: Comparing medication incidents identified in interviews and by records    
                review.          236  
Table 48: Patient  sample frame.        241 
Table 49: Values of ),( βαf .        257 
Table 50: Sample sizes for various ICC values, calculated using the formula  258 
                above. 
Table 51: Summary of the decision support available and actually in use for each 265  
                system.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 8
 
 
List of Abbreviations 
 
ANT         Actor Network Theory 
CD    Controlled Drug 
CI        Confidence Interval 
COE    Care of the Elderly 
CPOE    Computerised Physician Order Entry 
CXH    Charing Cross Hospital 
EP        Electronic Prescribing 
GEE     Generalised Estimating Equation  
HCP   Health Care Professional 
HIS    Hospital Information System 
ICC   Intra-class Correlation Coefficient 
ICT     Information and Communication Technology 
ICU   Intensive Care Unit 
INR     International Normalised Ratio 
MAE     Medication Administration Error 
NPSA   National Patient Safety Agency 
NPV  Net Present Value 
OE    Opportunities for Error 
OR     Ratio of Odds 
PACS   Picture Archiving and Communications Systems 
PCA   Patient Controlled Analgesia  
PODs   Patients’ Own Drugs  
PRN   Pro Re Nata (when required) 
QALY  Quality of Life Year 
QHB   Queen’s Hospital, Burton on Trent 
RCT  Randomised Controlled Trial 
RRF  Retrospective Review Form 
S/HO   Senior/ House Officer 
SPO   Structure/ Process/Outcome 
STAT    Statim (immediately) 
TTA/O  To Take Away/Out (Discharge medication) 
 
 
 
 
 9
 
Executive summary 
 
 
1. The project’s purpose was to develop and pilot ways of evaluating, 
prospectively and retrospectively, the impact of hospital electronic prescribing 
(EP) systems on patient safety.  Given this purpose the report is structured 
around methodological issues. 
 
2. We have used an evaluation framework which can be adapted to any stage of 
EP development. It is based on a matrix of structure/process/outcome and the 
perspectives of technology, stakeholders and the organisation. 
 
3. A set of definitions and research methods that allow the quantitative, 
prospective study of medication errors is presented.  We developed a data set 
suitable for the study of the incidence of prescribing errors and associated harm 
in retrospective studies of patient notes.  We also adapted trigger tool, a method 
of detecting adverse drug events, for the UK context. 
 
4. Two EP systems were studied: the introduction of ServeRx to a surgical ward 
in a London teaching hospital (Charing Cross Hospital, CXH), and Meditech, a 
system long established and now in hospital wide use at a general hospital 
(Queen’s Hospital, Burton upon Trent, QHB).  ServeRx is a “closed-loop” system 
which combines EP with electronically controlled stock cupboards, linked to 
electronic drug trolleys which use bar coded patient identification to allow drug 
administration.  Meditech is an EP system using wireless laptop computers 
operating as part of a powerful Hospital Information System.  
 
5. At CXH, pre-ServeRx, we compared four ways of detecting prescribing errors 
in the same set of patients: prospective daily detection by pharmacists; 
retrospective review of the patients’ notes; trigger tool and spontaneous reporting.  
93 patients had 1258 medicines prescribed, there were 135 errors detected in 
total and no cases of harm.  Prospective collection found 48 of the errors (36%), 
retrospective review found 93 (69%), spontaneous reporting found one and 
trigger tool found none but generated many false positives.   Only seven errors 
were found by both prospective and retrospective means, suggesting that they 
mainly detect different types of prescribing error. 
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6. At CHX the ServeRx system was studied prospectively before and after 
implementation to examine its effects on prescribing error (detected by 
pharmacists’ daily inspection), medication administration error (MAE, detected by 
observation), checking of patient identity (observed), and compliance with several 
other protocols and areas of good practice.  Staff use of time was also measured.  
The summary results are: 
 
a. 4803 prescriptions were studied and prescribing errors were reduced 
from 3.8% to 2.0% (95% CI difference -0.9 to -2.7%) 
b. 2822 drug administrations were observed and administration errors 
(excluding intravenous errors) fell from 7% to 4.3% (95% CI difference 
-0.9 to -4.5%) 
c. Checking of patient identity before administering medicines rose from 
17% to 81% 
d. Staff time on medication related activities increased significantly for all 
professions.  
  
7. Both EP systems were studied, by retrospective review of patients’ notes to 
detect prescribing errors, before and after each system was implemented.  The 
purpose was to pilot the methodology, it was not powered to detect an effect.  93 
patients were studied before the introduction of ServeRx and 114 after (a total of 
2872 prescriptions), the prescribing error rate was 7.4% pre- and 6.5% post-
implementation (95% CI difference -2.8 to +1.0).  Meditech was studied across 
four wards which introduced it at different times.  Records from the earliest 
admissions could not be accessed on the EP system. 150 patients (2872 
prescriptions) were studied.  There were 8.6% prescribing errors before 
implementation, 8.8% after. 
 
8. Pooling all studies of patients’ notes (two sites, pre and post EP) we reviewed 
357 admissions and found 8 cases of harm (2.2%) resulting from prescribing 
errors. 
 
9. Each system was evaluated qualitatively.  Although the hospitals, EP systems 
and their stage of development were very different, several common issues 
emerged: 
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a. EP needs to be addressed as a sociotechnical innovation, not just a 
technical solution “there for the taking”.   
b. An extended implementation period needs to be resourced to provide 
support and to help good new practices embed. 
c. Emergent change should be expected and be managed. This  can be 
quite profound, for example, EP could lead to a reduction in interaction 
with patients and between other professionals.   
d. Technical systems are never perfect; they should continue to be 
developed both to improve performance and to embody new and 
changing understanding.  For example, the extra staff time on 
ServeRx could be reduced by software changes. 
e. Hence, software should be specified so it is possible to adapt it locally, 
and so that the data held are easily accessible for multiple purposes.  
f. Decision support is not straight forward; the purpose and limitations of 
decision support needs to be clear to all concerned. 
 
10. The combination of quantitative findings and the understanding of why they 
are so, allows organisational learning to take place. Our evaluation framework 
worked well for both EP systems, and produced a rounded picture in which 
quantitative findings are set against the context in which they were produced.  
This serves not only the interpretation of the specific findings, but also allows 
better estimates of their generalisability to other settings and guidance for better 
subsequent implementations.  
  
11. A research agenda emerges from this work which includes: 
 
a. The setting up of a patient database for “in vitro” testing of future EP 
systems before being used with patients. 
b. Systematic evaluation of EP systems being trialled at present to 
provide shared learning. 
c. The extent of harm caused by medication error, and the relationship 
between error and harm need further exploration.  Costing the 
consequences of harm would then be the foundation for the economic 
evaluation of EP. 
d. Decision support in this area is under theorised. 
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12. Our findings, taken overall, tentatively suggest that for every 100 prescriptions 
written in a hospital there will be around 10 errors; the introduction of an 
electronic prescribing system, at the current stage of development, would avoid 
two or three of them. 
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1. Introduction 
 
1.1 Background 
 
Medication error is arguably the most prevalent type of medical error in both 
primary and secondary care.  In the USA it kills 7000 patients a year 1 and 
accounts for nearly 1 in 20 hospital admissions; a similar admission rate to that of 
cancer 2. 
  
In the UK, the incidence and consequences of medication error in secondary care 
seem to be similar to those in the USA: errors occur in hospitals in at least 1.5% of 
prescriptions 3, and 3-8% of medication administration is incorrect 4. Indeed, the 
work presented in this report suggests the frequency of prescription error 
(depending on the method used) may be as much as three times higher than 
previous research shows.  We also know that one month after discharge from 
hospital around half of all patients are not taking the right medicine in the right 
way5.  
 
Given figures such as those above it is not the surprising that the NHS plan for 
patient safety, "Building a safer NHS for patients." has the reduction of harm from 
medication error as two of its four firm targets 6.  
 
     In both the USA and UK, the use of information and communication technology 
(ICT) to reduce errors is seen as a major element of strategy.  Medication errors, it 
is argued, can be reduced by electronic prescribing with decision support, 
electronic medication administration records, robots, automated pharmacy 
systems, bar coding, smart IV pumps, electronic discharge prescriptions and 
targeted patient information7.  The gains, it is suggested, could be spectacular - at 
one hospital electronic prescribing with decision support reduced serious 
medication errors by 88% 8 and saved $5-$10m each year 9.  
 
Consequently, electronic prescribing (called Computerized Physician Order Entry, 
CPOE, in the USA) has been (1) proposed in "Building a Safer NHS" as a method 
of quickly improving patient safety, (2) a part of the NHS information strategy  
(which originally committing to electronic prescribing in all acute hospitals by 
200510) , and  (3)  recommended by the Audit Commission 11.  The NHS is 
currently asking local service providers to provide a solution to electronic 
prescribing in hospitals by 2008 to 2010.  
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     With the current policy being to move to electronic prescribing (EP) in all 
hospitals, it is important that EP’s potential effectiveness is understood through 
appropriate evaluation activities (note plural to indicate need for multiple 
approaches). This is important to ensure that the various benefits it might deliver 
are well understood, that appropriate and robust technical systems are developed 
and available, but also to understand the appropriate ways in which such technical 
systems can be implemented in health care settings and come to be used so as to 
serve the best ends of the individual NHS institutions (wards, hospitals), patients, 
and the service as a whole.   
 
The work reported here pursues these goals, but it does so recognising two 
particular confounding issues that need to be addressed.   First, the evaluation of 
complex ICT systems that reshape work processes is itself a complex and 
problematic activity – there are no easy routes to deliver simple solid answers.  
Following from this we find that the evidence base that supports the policy of 
adoption of electronic prescribing has little generalisability to hospital wide 
commercial systems in the UK, drawing as it largely does on experience in the 
significantly different context of US health care.   
 
The limited generalisability of the available literature comes from many sources: 
 
1. The benefit of new innovations with electronic prescribing depends to a large 
part on how effective the human systems of work and the human actors were 
in the original setting before any intervention.  Studies in the literature seldom 
compare their control data to other studies to establish how well the human 
system was working in their specific context before electronic prescribing. 
 
2. The effectiveness of an electronic prescribing system will be specific to the 
institutional context in which it is embedded.  For example, in the USA a large 
source of error is identified in transcribing of the prescription by nursing staff 
and clerks.  Electronic prescribing can eliminate this step, and hence 
significantly reduce one aspect of the observed error rate.  However, the 
same benefit would be limited in UK hospitals in which there is little 
transcribing, and that done by pharmacists. 
 
3. Most studies which show electronic prescribing has significant benefits are of 
"home-grown" systems which have been developed in-house over many 
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years.  Examples are the Brigham and Women's Hospital, the decision 
support system in Salt Lake City and the renal system in Birmingham, UK.  In 
these cases the electronic prescribing system has been designed specifically 
to solve local problems at that hospital (or ward within it), and is likely to have 
had a great deal of local support and commitment.   
 
4. In contrast, there has been little evaluation of “commercial off the shelf” 
systems; we conjecture that experience in such cases will be substantially 
different. There have been several small studies of commercial and other 
systems, however they are limited because they did not use standard 
methodology, or give sufficient detail of their methodology and definitions for 
the data to be interpreted with great confidence. 
 
More recently a number of studies have emerged which question whether 
electronic prescribing when it is implemented is delivering the expected benefits.  
The UK was a world leader in the introduction of electronic prescribing into 
primary care; however, when compared to other countries we seem to have 
similar rates of non-adherence and admission to hospital as a result of 
preventable adverse drug events 2.  Recent work 12 has shown significant 
limitations in the current computer programmes used by GPs, and in Australia 
electronic prescribing has been associated with a marked increase in unwanted 
antibiotic prescriptions, estimated at potentially half a million a year 13.   
 
In 2005 two significant papers emerged which described errors following the 
introduction of CPOE.  Koppel at al. 14, conducted research in a US teaching 
hospital using a standard package, which raises a number of substantial questions 
as to the ability of such a system to actually facilitate error: for example, errors in 
dosing, antibiotic renewal and in medication discontinuation.  Nebeker et al 15 
report high rates of adverse drug events (27% caused by medical error) following 
implementation of CPOE.  Neither study included a quantitative comparison with 
pre-implementation prescribing and in general we must acknowledge that the 
evidence base to suggest problems with electronic prescribing in hospitals has 
similar weaknesses to the evidence base suggesting its benefits. 
 
We do not see it as remarkable, or treasonous, to suggest that computer systems 
may increase error and harm. This evidently may be the case simply if the 
technical system is poorly designed, works with inadequate data or has a poor 
user interface. But beyond such considerations, it is also worth considering how 
 16
important it is that the people who work with such a system understand its 
functionality and work in balance with it.  For example, in health care there have 
been a number of deaths related to the use of computers in radiotherapy.  At the 
North Staffordshire Royal Infirmary around 1000 cancer patients were under 
dosed with radiotherapy over nine years.  Staff were unaware that the software 
contained a decision support system that reduced the dose of radiation in certain 
circumstances, so calculated the dose reduction manually and applied it again.  
Patients thus received twice the reduction needed and tens of patients are 
estimated to have died 16.  In the USA the Therac 25 computer controlled radiation 
therapy machine killed several patients and burned many more.  If the operator 
made a mistake and corrected it in under eight seconds, then, unintentionally, a 
protective shield was withdrawn and a dose of radiation 120 times that required 
was administered 16,17. 
 
The considerations introduced above do not mean that the UK policy to pursue 
electronic prescribing is wrong or ill-founded, but they do underline the importance 
of undertaking extensive evaluation in the UK so as to better understand the 
issues being addressed, the benefits expected, and the appropriate ways to 
ensure that they are delivered or surpassed. Our view is that, given the above, it is 
legitimate, and even essential, that we ask both whether electronic prescribing 
systems in the UK will significantly reduce various forms of medication errors, but 
also if they might introduce some new ones.  We need to ask whether all technical 
systems can do it to the same extent or whether some are more relevant and 
perform better than others. How do those that focus on prescribing compare with 
those that focus on administration, or those that link to other systems (for 
example, tests, medical records etc.), or closed loop versions that seek to 
integrate the medicines use process?  Finally, we need to be able to recommend 
how these systems could be introduced and, over time, improved or expanded so 
as to give more of the desired benefits.   
 
There are significant barriers to answering each of these questions, and to 
generating a credible, generalisable, evidence base upon which to base decisions.  
This brings us to the central question of this report, how electronic prescribing 
systems should be evaluated.  What are the practical and methodological 
difficulties in delivering and analysing prospective and retrospective evaluations, 
and what is the best way to establish the baseline data to work from, including the 
rate of medication errors, but also the quality of the human system and its ability to 
successfully engage with new technical systems? 
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     As is well understood and extensively discussed in the literature, the evaluation of 
Information Systems in health care settings poses a number of problems, and the 
systems themselves are prone to failure 18,19.  While medical research provides 
clear guidelines on evaluative activity for medical innovations, such as new drugs, 
for example in a phased process (toxicity studies, phase 1, 2 and 3 trials 
culminating in large-scale randomised controlled trials and pharmacovigilance), 
there is far less consensus as to appropriate ways to evaluate ICT based 
innovations in health care settings.   
 
In contrast to a drug, evaluation of ICT based interventions, with their diverse aims 
and the extensive and visible ways in which they are experienced as they are 
tested, piloted and rolled out, must be carefully considered – the blinded, 
randomised controlled trial is almost impossible to achieve.  In contrast to a drug, 
technology may (indeed will) change its characteristics over time, as software is 
updated, optional modules are purchased, hardware is replaced and local users 
learn a system’s quirks and adapt the system to their local needs.  Over time we 
should expect things to change, including structures, work processes and 
individual and group attitudes. For this reason a system assessed in 2005 may 
well perform differently (better or worse) in 2007, and the reasons for such a shift 
must be incorporated into our understanding.  Thus such systems must be 
understood as taking their form and achieving their outcomes in intimate relations 
with their local context; recognising distinctive and different organisational cultures 
and structures and variations in local work practices. Study of the context, and the 
potential to accept change, then becomes fundamental in explaining consequent 
change and outcomes.   
  
For these reasons careful attention needs to be paid to how technology based 
systems come to be aligned with particular organisational goals, existing work 
practices and the interests of diverse stakeholder groups.  These contextual and 
temporal elements to any information system implementation pose problems for 
the generalisability of findings from any particular study beyond its unique time 
and place.  A study in one context may prove very misleading as a guide to 
experience or outcomes in another, even if at first sight the two contexts are very 
similar.  We therefore see qualitative and ethnographic work as being required 
(alongside more structured assessments) to help people to interpret and translate 
any local evaluation across different contexts. In this way we believe we can start 
to enhance the generalisability of findings and build the evidence base.   
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The shifting properties of the technology, and the shifting sands of the context in 
which it is embedded, mean that it is important to adopt both formative and 
summative approaches.  
 
This suggests to us that we should listen carefully to the distinguished software 
engineer David Parnas "As a rule software systems do not work well until they 
have been used, and have failed repeatedly, in real applications." 20. Electronic 
prescribing systems for hospitals in the UK are at an early-stage of development 
(at the time of bidding for this grant they only existed across a whole hospital at 
three sites).  We must be vigilant for their harmful as well as beneficial effects, 
particularly in the development phase. 
 
 
1.2 Aims and objectives 
 
Our proposal was for a study to pilot evaluations of electronic prescribing based 
on the framework of Cornford et al 21. We gave the following aim and objectives: 
 
Aim:  
In the pilot we wish to show the feasibility and practicality of the proposed 
framework of evaluation, and of methods used to conduct prospective and 
retrospective studies. 
 
Objectives: 
1. To recommend a framework for the evaluation of electronic prescribing, and to 
evaluate our initial framework of Cornford et al 21.  
2. To pilot a prospective evaluation of the Serve Rx system at Charing Cross 
Hospital.  
3. To pilot a retrospective evaluation of the electronic prescribing system at 
Queens Hospital, Burton upon Trent. 
4. To establish the practical issues in retrieving information from the notes and 
from the different computer systems, sites and ward types.  
5. To adapt and apply trigger tool methodology from the USA to a selection of 
patients’ notes; to establish its specificity and sensitivity, and make suggestions 
for change if necessary.  
 19
6. To develop methods, based on the patients’ notes, to identify the incidence, 
nature and severity of medication errors.  
7. To compare the incidence and nature of medication errors detected 
prospectively from observation, and retrospectively, from the notes, in the same 
cohorts of patients. 
8. To describe the decision support software in each system, and assess aspects 
of it. 
9. To establish the nature and accessibility of data required for an economic 
evaluation of electronic prescribing. 
 
In order to help meet these aims we evaluated two electronic prescribing systems.  
First was ServeRx which was being introduced to a general surgical ward at 
Charing Cross hospital.  Second was the Meditech system at Queen’s Hospital, 
Burton upon Trent; one of only three hospitals in the country which had 
implemented a hospital-wide system at the time of the study.  At the time of 
bidding for this study we already had some funding to prospectively evaluate the 
ServeRx system from the manufacturer of ServeRx (MDG Medical, Israel) under 
an unrestricted grant.  We have integrated the two studies and do not distinguish 
between the sources of funding in this report.   
 
 
1.3 Evaluation framework 
 
     Our approach has been to apply Cornford’s structure for the evaluation of ICT 
(Figure 1).  We examine and evaluate this later in the project; however we 
introduce it here as it underlies the structure of the subsequent evaluations.  The 
framework was chosen because it brings together the structure/process/outcome 
approach to quality (a commonly used model in health care) with three key 
perspectives – those of the technology, of the humans that use it, and the 
organisation that adopts it.  This dimension can be mapped onto Reason’s model 
of accident causation, and hence has the potential to be particularly useful in 
evaluating systems designed to reduce error. As Reason argues, to understand 
error, one must look beyond the technical system, and beyond the individual 
“guilty” party, to the distributed work processes and organisational setting.  
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 Systems function Human 
perspectives 
Health care system 
Structure 
 
Technology 
Detailed description 
of each system, 
including flow 
diagrams 
Work practice 
Description of work 
practices, process 
variation 
Sustainable 
Interviews with key 
managers  
Process 
 
Processing 
Pharmacists’ 
interventions, time 
measurement, stock 
control, system 
performance  
Social interaction 
Description of 
communication 
patterns– between 
HCPs and between 
HCPs and patients 
Consequent change 
Adherence to Trust 
medication policies 
Outcome 
 
Correct 
Prescribing errors, 
supply and 
administration errors 
Quality service 
Delays while patients 
wait for discharge 
medication 
Contribution to 
strategy 
Interviews with 
managers, availability 
audit data  
Figure 1.  Framework for IT health technology assessment (Cornford et al, 21). 
Text in italics refers to examples of the outcome measures included in the 
present study that relate to each element of the framework; HCPs = Health Care 
Professionals 
 
The rest of the report is divided into chapters which describe the computer 
systems then cover:  
• Chapter 3: methodology, including the devising of new tools and data 
collecting programme 
• Chapter 4: the prospective study of the ServeRx system at Charing Cross 
Hospital 
• Chapter 5: the retrospective evaluations of the Serve Rx system, and of the 
Meditech system at Queen’s Hospital, Burton upon Trent 
• Chapter 6:  comparison of four methods of detecting prescribing error 
• Chapter 7:  review of the evaluation framework and qualitative findings  
• Chapter 8: discussion and recommendations 
 
As the body of this report is limited to 50,000 words there are also substantial 
appendices, including  qualitative evaluations of ServeRx (Appendix A), and of 
Meditech (Appendix B), and invited essays of issues in economic evaluation of EP  
(by Professor Buxton) and of statistical and design considerations (from Dr 
Carpenter). 
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 2  Two electronic prescribing systems: ServeRx and Meditech  
 
  2.1 Introduction 
 
This Chapter gives a brief description of the two electronic prescribing systems 
studied.   
 
Ethics approval for the evaluation at Charing Cross Hospital was obtained from 
Riverside local research ethics committee (LREC); approval for the Queen’s Hospital 
study was obtained from South East Staffordshire LREC. The relevant local 
Research and Development offices also gave their approval. 
 
   2.2 The ServeRx system at Charing Cross Hospital 
 
The ServeRx system (MDG Medical, Israel) went live in June 2003 as a beta test on 
a 28-bed general surgery ward in Charing Cross Hospital, part of Hammersmith 
Hospitals NHS Trust, in West London.  Different versions of the system were 
introduced at different stages, as various upgrades were put into place.  The post-
implementation evaluation was conducted while version 1:13 was in use.   
 
ServeRx is a closed-loop system, comprising the following three elements:  
 
1. Electronic prescribing, scheduling and administration software; 
2. Ward-based automated dispensing; 
3. Electronic drug trolleys. 
 
Each of these will be described in turn. 
 
Electronic prescribing, scheduling and administration software 
There were two prescribing terminals on the study ward, plus one in the pharmacy 
department. There were also two hand-held tablet computers on the study ward 
which can be taken from patient to patient and used to view, prescribe and 
discontinue medication orders. These had to be synchronised with the ward-based 
server via a docking station before and after each use.  The software used on the 
prescribing terminals and hand-held computers was windows-based; the patient 
medication screen was intended to resemble an inpatient drug chart (Figure 2).   
  
22. 
When prescribing, a doctor could access pull-down lists of all drug products stocked 
on the ward, all drug products in the Trust’s formulary and all products in the drug 
dictionary. Prescribing was by product (aspirin 75mg soluble tablets) rather than by 
drug (aspirin).  Default doses were suggested for most products; decision support will 
be discussed in more detail in Appendix E.  If the patient had any allergies entered, 
these were displayed on the prescribing screen.  When patients were transferred 
from other wards, pharmacists were authorised to transcribe their existing medication 
orders onto the computer system. When patients were transferred from the study 
ward to other wards, their medication was printed out in a format representing the 
Trust’s standard medication chart, which allowed a further three days of medication 
administration to be documented.   The prescription of intravenous fluids remained 
on paper drug charts, as did warfarin and patient controlled analgesia. “Dummy” 
orders for the latter two items were prescribed on ServeRx to act as a reminder that a 
separate paper chart was in use. 
 
Once drugs were prescribed, a nurse (or less often, a pharmacist or doctor) 
scheduled the doses to specific drug round times and indicated the drug round at 
which the first dose is to be given.   
 
Pharmacists checked and approved medication orders from a separate pharmacy 
screen, which indicated unapproved medication orders. Medication orders did not 
have to be approved before they could be administered by nursing staff. At the 
approval stage, pharmacists could enter additional instructions relating to 
Figure 2: the ServeRx patient medication screen.This image is 
taken from the ServeRx user manual; at Charing Cross 
Hospital, Generic drug names and lower case letters are used.  
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administration; further instructions cannot be entered once orders have been 
approved.   
 
The facility for prescribing discharge medication was not in use at the time of this 
study; discharge medication was therefore prescribed on the Trust’s standard paper 
discharge prescription. 
 
Ward-based automated dispensing 
The majority of medication was stored in large automated cabinets; the doses 
required were transferred by nursing staff to an electronic drug trolley at each drug 
round (Figure 3). The automated cabinets, containing computer-controlled drawers 
and a touch-sensitive non-Windows based computer screen, were situated in the 
ward’s treatment room. Products that were ward stock were in product-specific 
drawers containing only that product, in original packs.  Non-stock medication 
dispensed for individual patients was stored in patient-specific drawers, which could 
contain several products dispensed for that patient. The patient’s name was indicated 
on the drawer using a liquid crystal display. The computer screen indicated the 
patients for whom doses were due in the next two hours.  To prepare for a drug 
round, the nurse selected each patient using the touch-sensitive screen and was 
then presented with a list of the doses due.  On selecting each dose, the relevant 
drawer in the cabinet opened so that the nurse could take the number of dosage 
forms required and place these in the electronic drug trolley.  It was not possible for 
the nurse to view details of previous 
medication administration from this 
screen. 
 
Nursing staff were able access 
medication that was not currently 
prescribed using a “stat” facility; this 
was used if medication was needed in 
an emergency or was prescribed on a 
paper drug chart that had not yet been 
transcribed onto ServeRx. 
 
To restock the cabinet, a pharmacy 
technician printed a list of products below the specified reorder level. Barcodes on 
each drug product were used to confirm the identity of the medication loaded into 
Figure 3: Nurse selecting stock 
medication from drawer in automated 
cabinet. The patient-specific drawers 
can be seen below the open drawer, 
and the screen to the right.  
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each drawer.  Non-stock medication was ordered by nursing staff via the ward 
pharmacist. 
 
Electronic drug trolleys  
There were two electronic drug trolleys (Figure 4), one for each half of the ward. 
Each contained twenty drawers and docked with the automated cabinet. When 
medication was being prepared for a drug round, one drawer in the drug trolley 
opened at a time, and the patient’s name indicated on the drawer’s liquid crystal 
display.  When all medication for a given patient had been prepared, the system 
instructed the nurse to close that patient’s drawer in the drug trolley before 
medication for the next patient could be prepared. Once all medication had been 
prepared for a given drug round, the trolley could be disconnected from the main 
system and taken around the ward. The barcode on each patient’s wristband was 
scanned which triggered the system to open that patient’s drawer in the trolley so 
that the medication could be administered.  The nurse confirmed administration using 
a touch-sensitive screen on the trolley, and entered the reasons for any doses not 
given. It was not possible to view details of 
drugs due at other times of day, or of previous 
doses administered or omitted. 
 
On completion of the drug round, details of all 
doses administered and reasons for any 
omitted were uploaded to the main server once 
the trolley was docked. 
 
Medication prescribed to be given “when 
required” was generally given separately 
outside of the main drug rounds. 
 
Training and security 
All users required a username and password to 
access the system; further confirmation of the 
password was needed whenever any action 
was carried out.  Different staff groups had 
access to different features of the system.  Staff 
were given a username following completion of 
training, which was provided by the pharmacy computer services team. 
 
Figure 4: One of the two 
electronic drug trolleys.  One 
drawer is allocated to each 
patient for whom medication is 
due and their name shown on 
the liquid crystal display. The 
barcode scanner is on the top 
of the trolley. 
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2.3 The Meditech system at Queen’s Hospital  
 
Electronic Prescribing at Queen’s 
Hospital was part of the wider Meditech 
Hospital Information System (HIS) 
(Figure 5).  Medical notes were 
maintained in the traditional paper 
format but all other records were made 
and stored electronically. The intensive 
care unit, theatres, outpatients and the 
private ward were the only departments 
not to use EP at the time of the study.  
 
The HIS allowed all authorised staff  
involved in patient care access to any 
type of record and supporting 
information (Figure 6). The gateway into 
the system was through the Patient 
Care Inquiry module, which allowed the 
patient to be identified. To enter the 
system, staff must key in a personal 
identification number (PIN), which 
changes every 3 months, and a 
password, which does not change. Staff 
had to be trained before they could 
receive a PIN. Two full-time trainers 
provided training for all new medical and nursing staff. Pharmacy training was done 
within the department by members of the core implementation team. 
 
Within the hospital, the HIS could be accessed almost anywhere using mobile 
wireless laptops or static computers or older “dumb” terminals. Most wards had three 
static terminals and two laptops. Senior staff could also access the system from 
home. The system had been extensively developed and customised since the initial 
pilots between 1994 and 1996, and there had been three software upgrades by the 
time of our study. Version 4.8, which ran on a non-Windows platform and did not 
require use of a mouse, was in use at the time of this evaluation. Navigation was by 
Order Entry
Nurse
Management
Theatre
Scheduling
Departmental
Billing
Maternity
Accident &
Emergency
Executive
Support
System
Magic
Office
Patient
Administration
Admissions,
Discharges &
Transfers
Outpatient
Scheduling
Medical
Records
Radiology
Laboratory
Patient Care
Inquiry
Abstracting
Nurse Care
Planning
Pharmacy
MASTER PATIENT
INDEX
Contracting
General 
Ledger
Accounts 
Payable Materials
Management
Wait List
Electronic
Prescribing
Catering
Fig 5: Overview of the HIS    
Fig 6: The Process Orders menu in Meditech 
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function keys, often in combination with shift and arrow keys. The functions assigned 
to “F keys” could vary depending on the type of static terminal used.  
 
Prescribing 
The EP prescribing (order entry) screen 
followed the logic of the paper drug 
chart, listing drug, route, dose, times, 
start and stop dates, administration 
dates and times (Figures 7 and 8). 
There were “look-up” functions for drug 
names, doses and routes, and a print 
monograph option for individual drugs. 
There were some decision support 
rules (see Appendix E for details) but dose checking was not routine at the time of 
this evaluation. The aide memoire given to newly trained prescribers warned that 
checking for allergies or incorrect doses was their responsibility. Coloured pop-up 
boxes warned if certain information (such as a stop date for an antibiotic) had not 
been entered or if a particular caution applied. Full interaction checking was carried 
out. 
 
There were two types of once-only 
orders: ONE, which was a single 
dose and STAT which indicated a 
dose to be given straight away.  
These had default start and stop 
dates entered automatically. 
Regular medicines were allocated 
times corresponding to ward 
medicine rounds, with a 2-hour 
window around the scheduled time 
to allow for variation in practice.  
 
A patient’s current medicines could 
be listed to screen; paging down 
gave the details of who prescribed, who gave, and where relevant, who dispensed, 
the medication. This was called the order history. Discharge medication had to be 
flagged by the prescriber, then “converted” from inpatient orders in the pharmacy 
Fig 8: The Meditech medication order screen 
Fig 7: A doctor prescribing at the bedside 
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before dispensing. These electronic 
prescription orders were called down by 
the pharmacy system in batches, at a 
frequency set by the dispensary manager. 
Discharge medication information could 
be imported automatically into an 
electronic discharge summary, a printed 
version of which was sent to patients’ 
general practitioners. 
 
Medicine administration 
The laptop was usually placed on the 
shelf on the side of a conventional drug trolley, where paper drug charts/clip boards 
or files would rest in other hospitals (Figure 9). The nurse picked the patient name 
from the list of current admissions, then checked the patient’s identity in the 
traditional way by reading the patient’s wristband. 
 
The drug administration screen for a patient (Figure 10) resembled a compressed 
drug chart, with medication orders listed on left-hand side of screen and a series of 
columns to the right.  As required and stat medication orders were listed after all 
other regular medication. New orders for drugs which are not carried as ward stock 
were flagged *NS*. These items would be picked up by the pharmacy system during 
regular scans for new 
orders.  
 
Drugs due at the 
current round were 
highlighted on the 
screen. The nurse 
selected each 
medication to 
administer by selecting 
a tick mark in the 
relevant column. The 
screen flagged up any 
doses which were 
scheduled, but not given on 
Fig 9: A drug round at Queen’s hospital 
Fig 10:  The patient drug administration screen  
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a previous round.  Nurses could view the order history screen to see the reason why 
previous doses were not given, and can add comments themselves.  
 
The recording of each drug administration was signed off separately, as it would be 
on a paper chart. The system records the actual administration time, and the 
theoretical “drug round time” (Figure 11). 
 
Pharmacy review 
Pharmacists could access and review patient medication orders from anywhere in 
the hospital. They had the same access as prescribers. However, they normally 
limited themselves to changes in dose form or dose if these were incorrect, and 
contacted the prescriber if the drug itself needed changing. They could do this 
electronically by writing free text notes for prescribers and nurses into the patient 
record (see Figure 12). 
 
Each pharmacist carried out a daily prescription review of their allotted wards or 
consultant firms using the Meditech system.  Prescription screening activity was 
targeted to newly prescribed items, and those which required monitoring.  
 
 New orders 
which had not 
been reviewed by 
a pharmacist are 
marked *UNR*.  
Orders for which 
pharmacists have 
made an intervention are 
flagged *I*; these could 
be audited in detail.  
Fig 11: A current medication record showing scheduled and actual 
administration times 
Fig 12:  Example of a note from pharmacist to 
prescriber 
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2.4 Discussion 
 
There were many differences between the two systems studied. A detailed 
comparison is outside the scope of this report. However, some of the key differences 
included the other systems with which the electronic prescribing system was linked, 
the computer platform, the extent of use within the study site and the way in which 
doses were scheduled.  
 
ServeRx was a closed loop system that incorporated ward-based automated 
dispensing, electronic drug trolleys and barcode patient identification as well as 
electronic prescribing and administration. The system that we studied was linked only 
to the Trust’s patient administration system for transfer of basic patient demographic 
data; there were no links to the pharmacy computer system or to laboratory data.   In 
contrast, the Meditech electronic prescribing and administration system was one 
module in a wider hospital-wide Meditech system and was therefore linked to all 
other patient and laboratory data.  The system comprised only electronic prescribing 
and administration; the drug trolleys were of traditional NHS design and barcode 
technology was not used to identify products or patients at the time of our study.   
 
The ServeRx and Meditech systems ran on different platforms, and so differed 
dramatically in screen layout and navigation.  ServeRx was window-based and used 
touch-screens and a mouse; Meditech version 4.8 was not windows-based; 
navigation across fields and screens was with a combination of function, shift and 
control keys.  Users’ views on this are explored in more detail in Appendices A and 
B.  
 
ServeRx was a pilot system on one ward; the Meditech electronic prescribing system 
was used throughout the majority of the hospital. 
 
Finally, there were differences in the way that prescribed doses were scheduled for 
administration. Using ServeRx, this was done after prescribing as a separate stage, 
usually by nursing staff; in contrast, scheduling was done at the same time using the 
same screen with Meditech. Similarities and differences in decision support functions 
will be discussed in Appendix E. 
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3.  Measuring error – definitions and development of new  
retrospective methods 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The reported incidence of medical error in general and medication error in particular 
is enormously influenced by the definition of an error used and the method of 
detection.  Combinations of these factors can alter the reported incidence of error by 
several orders of magnitude.  In this Chapter we report and justify the definitions we 
have used, and explain how we have developed, and incorporated into computer 
software, two ways (new to the UK) of retrospectively identifying prescribing errors. 
 
We were specifically asked by the funding body to use three methods of prescribing 
error detection: prospective, retrospective and use of a “trigger tool”.  In the context 
of prescribing errors, prospective detection refers to health care professionals, 
usually pharmacists, recording the errors identified in the course of their daily 
prescription monitoring 3,22. Retrospective detection refers to studying patients’ 
medical records to identify prescribing errors; this approach has been widely used to 
identify iatrogenic injury in general but there are few reports 23 of its use to study 
medication errors.  Finally, a trigger tool is a collection of indicators such as abnormal 
laboratory values and drugs that may be prescribed as antidotes, used to trigger 
more extensive investigation into whether medication-related harm has occurred. 
Various trigger tools, for both prospective and retrospective use, have been 
developed in the US to identify medication-related harm 24,25.  However, there are no 
reports of their use in the UK, and no reports of their use to study prescribing errors 
in particular rather than medication-related harm in general. 
 
The study’s objectives relating to this Chapter were:  
 
• To develop a retrospective method to identify the incidence, nature and 
severity of medication errors from patients’ medical notes;  
• To adapt trigger tool methodology to a UK context, to establish the 
specificity and sensitivity of the triggers used, and make suggestions for change if 
necessary. 
 
 
 
  
31
3.2 Definitions 
 
Broadly speaking, medication errors can be divided into two main types. These are 
prescribing errors and administration errors. While the majority of this study focuses 
on prescribing errors, we also examined medication administration errors in the 
prospective study of the electronic prescribing system at Charing Cross Hospital 
described in Chapter 4.  
 
Prescribing errors  
Prescribing errors were defined relative to normal medical practice, using a 
practitioner-derived definition that has previously been used in research 3,26,27,28,29 and 
cited by the Department of Health 30.  
 
A prescribing error was defined as a prescribing decision or prescription-writing 
process that results in an unintentional, significant: (i) reduction in the probability of 
treatment being timely and effective or (ii) increase in the risk of harm, when 
compared to generally accepted practice 31.  The definition is accompanied by lists of 
events that should and should not be included as prescribing errors 31, and includes 
errors originating in both prescription writing and the prescribing decision. 
 
We used two denominators to express prescribing error rates in this study.  These 
were the number of medication orders written, and the number of patient days. The 
first gives a measure of the risk associated with each prescribing act; the second 
presents risk to individual patients. It was assumed that each medication order could 
be associated with only one prescribing error. 
 
Medication administration errors 
A medication administration error (MAE) was defined as any dose of medication 
administered (or omitted) that deviated from the patient’s medication order as 
specified on their drug chart or electronic prescription 32,33.   
 
Pharmacists’ endorsements to clarify medication orders were considered to be part 
of the medication order.  Administration of medication in relation to food was not 
assessed, and failure to follow hospital procedures was not in itself considered an 
MAE. Doses not administered because they were unavailable on the ward, because 
the drug chart could not be found, or because nursing staff could not find the drugs 
concerned or interpret the order were included as MAEs.   In common with most 
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other MAE studies the time at which doses were administered was not considered a 
source of error, unless this was grossly incorrect for a drug where the time of day 
was important. Errors prevented by the observer or the patient were included as 
MAEs; those prevented by other health care professionals were not.  
 
The denominator used to express the MAE rate was the number of opportunities for 
error (OE), defined as all doses given plus any doses omitted that the observer could 
classify as being either correct or incorrect. 
 
 
3.3 Developing a method for retrospectively identifying medication errors 
from the medical notes 
 
Methods 
Developing the method 
We initially conducted pilot work in which ten investigators each assessed two sets of 
medical notes for prescribing errors using our definition of a prescribing error.  
However, we found enormous variation in the numbers of errors identified by the 
different investigators, ranging from one to ten errors for the first patient (relating to 
25 different errors), and two to eleven for the second (22 different errors).  On 
discussion, the research team agreed that six of the events identified for the first 
patient met the study’s definition of a prescribing error, and 11 for the second.  
 
We therefore decided that a more formal approach was needed to improve 
consistency, and developed a method for the retrospective identification of 
medication errors based on that used previously in a UK study of iatrogenic injury 34. 
The original data collection form was amended to focus on medication rather than 
iatrogenic injury, and to include all medication errors, whether or not they resulted in 
harm.  
 
The resulting retrospective review form (RRF) consisted of five main sections:  
 
• summary of the data sources available; 
• reviewer information; 
• patient information; 
• current medication; 
• details of any errors identified, including any harm caused.   
  
33
 
The form was originally used in paper form (Appendix F) but subsequently 
transformed into electronic format, so that data could be entered directly into an 
Access database. The data flow diagram showing the relationships within the 
database is given in Figure 13. The database is designed so as to guide the reviewer 
through the stages of data collection and collect all relevant information. The RRF 
was designed for the identification of all types of medication error, including 
administration errors; however, only the aspects relating to prescribing errors will be 
considered in this report. 
 
 
Figure 13: Data flow diagram showing the relationships within the RRF 
database. 
 
Inter-rater reliability 
Inter-rater reliability was explored for five patients.  Two pharmacists each 
independently applied the RRF to each of these sets of medical notes, and compared 
the results.   
 
Results 
Inter-rater reliability 
The results relating to inter-rater reliability are summarised in Table 1.  
 
 
  
34
Prescribing errors detected Patient 
Reviewer 1 Reviewer 2 On discussion 
1 5  1 3 
2 2  5  4 
3 12  9 15  
4 3  2  3 
5 2  2  3 
TOTAL 25 21 28 
Table 1: Summary of inter-rater reliability test for retrospective review form 
 
There was considerable variation between the two reviewers.  The prescribing errors 
initially detected by only one of the two reviewers, but subsequently agreed to be 
errors, were:  
• Two errors involving “when required” medication, where the prescribed 
dosing frequency could allow the total daily dose to be exceeded; 
• Morphine and metoclopramide prescribed intramuscularly in a patient with 
liver impairment, an international normalised ratio (INR) of 6 and haematomas; 
• Warfarin 3mg prescribed in a patient with an INR of 5.0; 
• Enoxaparin 20mg once daily by subcutaneous injection prescribed for an 
obese medical patient.  The dose should have been 40mg once daily as patient is 
at higher risk of thrombosis.   
• Oxygen not prescribed for a patient who required (and was being given) 
oxygen; 
• Two errors where an asthmatic patient was not prescribed a salbutamol 
inhaler on admission; 
• Patient prescribed fluticasone inhaler 125 micrograms once daily, when 
twice daily dosing is required; 
• Tramadol 50mg capsules (which cannot be split) prescribed to be given in a 
dose of 25mg every 6 hours when required;  
• Patient on ciclosporin prescribed trimethoprim, which increases the risk of 
nephrotoxicity; 
• Ciprofloxacin 500mg twice daily prescribed in a patient on warfarin; 
• Omeprazole 40mg daily prescribed in a patient on warfarin. 
 
The ensuing discussion of these cases was used to further clarify the methods and 
definition used for the remainder of the study.   
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 3.4 Adapting trigger tool methodology for use in the UK 
 
Methods 
We adapted a published US trigger tool 24 for UK use. The 24 US triggers were 
reviewed for their applicability to the UK. Reference ranges were changed to reflect 
the units used in the UK, and where the drugs used reflected differences in practice 
between the USA and the UK, UK equivalents were suggested. The original US 
triggers alongside proposed UK equivalents were then sent to three clinical 
pharmacologists, two clinical pharmacists and a senior medication safety expert at 
the National Patient Safety Agency for comment and approval. Some minor 
comments were incorporated and the final UK version agreed. Again, a paper data 
collection form (Appendix G) was designed, which was then transferred to an Access 
database (Figure 14).  
 
As for the RRF, the trigger tool was designed for the identification of all types of 
medication error; however, only the results relating to prescribing errors will be 
considered in this report. 
 
Inter-rater reliability 
Inter-observer reliability was explored in the same five patients as for the RRF.  Two 
research pharmacists each independently applied the trigger tool to each of these 
sets of medical notes, and the results compared.   
 
 
Results  
Inter-rater reliability 
When reliability was explored, neither reviewer identified any prescribing errors in the 
five patients reviewed.  However, since each trigger was an objective measure, such 
as a drug being prescribed or levels being outside a fixed range, we would not expect 
difference between assessors. 
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Figure 14. Data flow diagram showing the relationships within the trigger tool 
database. 
 
 
3.5 Discussion 
 
In this Chapter we have described the development of the first method for 
retrospectively reviewing patients’ medical notes to identify prescribing errors (and 
other types of error) suitable for use in the UK, and the first UK-specific trigger tool 
for the identification of prescribing errors and other types of adverse drug event.  
Access databases were also developed for each of these to allow direct data entry 
into a laptop computer, and to facilitate automated reporting of key outcome 
measures. 
 
While the RRF was designed to facilitate consistent identification of prescribing 
errors, when two investigators assessed the same sets of medical notes, different 
errors were identified.  We used these findings as part of the development work to 
clarify the methods and definition used for the remainder of the study and therefore 
did not formally test inter-rater reliability.  However, we would recommend that this be 
formally tested in future work of this type.  
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Chapter 5 describes the use of these two methods to identify prescribing errors 
before and after the introduction of electronic prescribing in two different hospitals.  
Chapter 6 then compares the results obtained using four methods of detecting 
prescribing error: the RRF, trigger tool, prospective recording by the ward 
pharmacist, and spontaneous reporting. 
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4. The prospective quantitative evaluation of electronic    
prescribing at Charing Cross Hospital 
  
4.1 Introduction 
 
This Chapter describes the prospective, quantitative, evaluation of a closed-loop 
electronic prescribing system at Charing Cross Hospital.  The qualitative evaluation 
of this same system is presented in Appendix A . 
 
The objective of this part of the study was to prospectively evaluate the impact of a 
closed-loop electronic prescribing and automated dispensing system (“ServeRx”), 
using quantitative methods.  The outcome measures explored were: 
 
Safety and quality 
• Incidence of prescribing errors and potential for harm;  
• Incidence of medication administration errors and potential for harm;  
• Interventions and prescription endorsements made by pharmacy staff; 
• Actual patient harm resulting from medication errors;  
• Adherence to the trust’s medication policies; 
• Completeness of allergy documentation; 
• Timeliness of drug administration; 
• Percentage of doses for which administration or non-administration was 
correctly documented. 
 
Staff time and system performance 
• Amount of staff time spent on different medication and system-related 
activities; 
• Measures of system performance; 
• Efficiency of stock control; 
• Delays to discharge caused by patients waiting for discharge medication. 
 
The remainder of this chapter is presented in two main sections.  The first describes 
the methods used to evaluate the outcome measures relating to safety and quality, 
together with the results obtained; the second section presents the methods and 
results relating to staff time and system performance. However, first we briefly 
describe the setting, the study design and our sample size calculations. 
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4.2 Setting 
 
We studied a 28-bed general surgery ward at Charing Cross hospital, part of 
Hammersmith Hospitals NHS Trust. Scheduled drug rounds took place four times 
each day with one round serving one half of the ward; there were therefore eight 
rounds each day.  In general, one nurse carried out the majority of medication-related 
tasks on each half of the ward. The ward received a pharmacy service typical of that 
in UK hospitals, with a daily visit from the ward pharmacist on weekdays and a short 
visit on Saturdays. In line with policy in the study hospital, the ward pharmacist made 
a “chart-focused” visit on Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays, checking all drug 
charts, resolving urgent issues and identifying less-urgent issues for follow-up.  On 
Tuesdays and Thursdays the ward pharmacist conducted a “patient-focused visit”, 
resolving less-urgent issues, and checking patients’ medication histories.  Prior to the 
introduction of ServeRx, medication orders were prescribed on paper drug charts and 
medication stored in two drug trolleys plus stock cupboards. ServeRx is described in 
detail in Chapter 2; in brief, it is a closed-loop system comprising electronic 
prescribing, automated ward-based dispensing, barcode patient identification and 
electronic medication administration records.   
  
4.3 Study design, sample size calculations and statistical analysis 
 
We used a before and after design, and collected data on all outcome measures 3-6 
months before, and 6-12 months after the introduction of ServeRx. To compare these 
two periods, we collected demographic data for all patients admitted during an eight-
week period pre- and post-ServeRx.  These eight-week periods encompassed data 
collection for all outcomes except prescribing errors; basic demographic data were 
therefore recorded and compared separately for the prescribing error studies.  
 
The primary outcome measures were the prescribing error and medication 
administration error rates.  The sample size for the prescribing error study was 2,319 
newly written medication orders pre-ServeRx and 2,319 post-ServeRx. This was 
based on being able to identify a reduction in the prescribing error rate from 2% 3 to 
1% ; we estimated that four weeks’ data collection would achieve this sample size.    
The sample size for the medication administration error study was 906 opportunities 
for error (doses observed plus any doses omitted) pre-ServeRx and 906 post-
ServeRx, based on being able to identify a reduction from 5% 35 to 2.5%.  We 
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estimated that observation of 56 drug rounds would achieve this.  Both calculations 
were based on two-sided tests using α of 0.05 and β of 0.2.   Nominal data were 
compared using the chi square test and continuous data by the unpaired t-test or 
Mann-Whitney test for parametric and non-parametric data respectively. The 95% 
confidence intervals (CI) were calculated for differences. 
 
4.4 Evaluating the safety and quality of each system 
 
In this section, we consider prescribing errors and pharmacists’ interventions, 
medication administration errors, adherence to the Trust’s medication policies, and 
pharmacists’ prescription endorsements.  The methods relating to each of these will 
be described in turn, before presenting the results obtained. 
 
Methods 
Prescribing errors and pharmacists’ interventions 
Figure 15 illustrates the relationship between prescribing errors and interventions. 
Prescribing errors were defined as in Chapter 3 31 and classified as previously 3.  An 
intervention was defined as any proactive or reactive (in response to a question from 
another health care professional) activity undertaken by the pharmacist to suggest 
changes in drug therapy or monitoring, which involved contacting medical or nursing 
staff.   
 
The same ward pharmacist (with the exception of five days pre and two days post-
ServeRx, when different pharmacists provided cover) identified prescribing errors 
and recorded interventions on the study ward during a four-week period using 
methods developed previously 3.  However, in addition, a second investigator 
checked for prescribing errors once a week to help identify any that had not been 
documented by the ward pharmacist.  We also recorded whether or not errors were 
rectified before the patient received any doses, and whether we judged the error to 
have arisen in the prescribing decision or in medication order writing 3.  We avoided 
the first two months after a change of junior medical staff. To obtain a denominator, 
we retrieved the medical notes for patients who were on the ward at any time during 
each study period 3 and counted the number of medication orders written during that  
time.  Where patients’ medical notes could not be located, we extrapolated the total 
number of medication orders written based on the notes retrieved.  
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Figure 15: Relationship between prescribing errors, pharmacists’ interventions 
and pharmacists’ prescription endorsements.   
Those events falling within one or both of the two bold circles were included in this aspect of 
the evaluation. Prescription endorsements are addressed separately in a later section. 
 
 
The potential severity of the errors identified was assessed by five judges 36 using a 
scale from 0 (no harm) to 10 (death), and the mean severity score calculated, based 
on methods described and validated previously 37.  According to this method, a mean 
severity score of less than 3 indicates an error of minor severity, a score between 3 
and 7 inclusive indicates moderate severity and a score of more than 7 major 
severity. 
 
Medication administration errors (MAEs) 
Pharmacists observed a sample of 56 drug rounds during a two-week period, using 
validated methods 32,33.  Rounds conducted during night shifts and weekends were 
included. The denominator was the number of opportunities for error (OE), defined as 
all doses administered plus any doses omitted, that we could classify as either 
correct or incorrect. Each observed IV dose comprised two OE, one for preparation 
and one for administration 33. An MAE was defined as any dose of medication that 
deviated from the patient’s current medication orders; timing and documentation 
errors were excluded. The severity of the MAEs identified was assessed by four 
judges using a scale from 0 (no harm) to 10 (death), and the mean severity score 
calculated, as previously 37.  
 
Adherence to the trust’s medication policies  
Adherence to policies relating to drug administration was assessed during the 
observation of MAEs; policies relating to allergy documentation, the wearing of wrist-
bands and prescribing were assessed during an audit of patients’ medication charts.   
 
Prescribing 
errors 
Pharmacists’  
Interventions 
Prescribing errors that 
result in interventions 
Prescription 
endorsements 
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During the observation of MAEs, for each patient to whom medication was 
administered, we recorded whether or not their identity was checked, defined as 
visually checking or scanning the patient’s wristband, or asking them to state their 
name and date of birth.  We also recorded the time of administration and whether or 
not nursing staff observed the patient take the dose. Finally, we recorded how each 
dose was documented as well as whether or not it was given and the reason for any 
omissions.  “Potentially significant” documentation discrepancies were also identified, 
defined as any case where the action documented (drug given versus not given) was 
opposite to that observed.  
 
To assess standards relating to allergy documentation, wearing of wrist-bands and 
prescribing, we audited about 50 patients and their paper or electronic medication 
charts both pre- and post-ServeRx. A series of audit standards were selected from 
the Trust’s Medication and Drugs Transfusion Policy, the Formulary and Clinical 
Management Guidelines, and the pharmacy endorsement standards (Figure 16). 
Medication orders for dietary supplements, oxygen, anti-thromboembolism stockings, 
blood products, anaesthetic agents and other medication prescribed on anaesthetic 
charts, patient-controlled analgesia (PCA), and continuous intravenous infusion 
therapy were excluded. The monograph heading in the British National Formulary 
was taken as the approved name with the exception of nifedipine, diltiazem, 
theophylline and lithium, for which prescribing by either brand or generic name was 
considered acceptable.  
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Patient-specific standards  
1. All patients’ drug charts or ServeRx records should indicate their allergy status. 
2. All patients should be wearing a hospital wristband (pre-ServeRx), or a ServeRx 
wristband (post-ServeRx).  
 
Medication order-specific standards 
1. All medication should be prescribed by approved name. 
2. All medication orders should have the dose units (eg “micrograms”) and dose 
quantity (eg “10”) written correctly.  
3. All medication orders should be complete. 
4. No medication orders should be changed by amending the original medication 
order. 
5. All medication orders should be legible.  
6. For all medication orders, the prescriber should be identifiable.  
7. All medication orders for treatment courses of anti-infectives should be given stop 
dates.  
8. All anti-infectives on the trust’s reserved list should have appropriate 
documentation added by the pharmacist, stating whether or not they are approved for 
use. 
Figure 16: The standards used during an audit of patient’s medication charts to 
assess adherence to medication policies 
 
Pharmacists’ prescription endorsements 
An endorsement was defined as any clarification required to an regular or “when 
required” inpatient medication order, according to the Trust’s ward pharmacy 
procedures. These included clarifying generic names and counselling instructions 
(such as taking with food), the approval status for reserved anti-infectives and 
maximum frequencies if not already specified. One medication order could require 
more than one endorsement.  Supply endorsements were not included, and the 
number of days’ treatment with anti-infectives was included as a required 
endorsement pre-ServeRx, but not post-ServeRx.  This is because it had been 
decided at the time of implementation that this feature was not necessary with the 
ServeRx system. The denominator was the total number of current regular and 
“when required” medication orders assessed.  Dietary supplements, oxygen, anti-
thromboembolism stockings and patient controlled analgesia were excluded. Data 
were collected on four separate days, at least two weeks apart.  On each occasion, 
the investigator recorded all endorsements made by the ward pharmacist as well as 
all endorsements that should have been made but were not.  All data collection took 
place on a Tuesday or Thursday to ensure that the ward pharmacist would have 
seen the drug charts or computer records on the previous day. 
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Results 
Demographics 
Demographic data were similar in each phase of the study (Table 2); the only 
difference was in mean patient age. 
 
Demographic factor Pre-
ServeRx 
Post- 
ServeRx 
Statistical analysis 
Total number of admissions  
(mean number per week) 
188 
(23.5) 
201 
(25.1) 
- 
Mean length of patient stay  7.4 days 
(n*=185) 
7.2 days 
(n=192) 
P = 0.73 (Mann 
Whitney test) 
Mean patient age  59.7 years 
(n=187) 
53.4 years 
(n=179) 
P = 0.002 
(unpaired t test) 
Percentage male  62.2% 
(n=188) 
52.0% 
(n=200) 
P = 0.05 
(chi square test) 
Percentage emergency 
admissions  
31.4% 
(n=188) 
30.0% 
(n=103) 
P = 0.92 
(chi square test) 
Percentage outliers  21.8% 
(n=179) 
24.9% 
(n=185) 
P = 0.57 
(chi square test) 
Table 2: Demographics of patients admitted during an eight-week period 
encompassing the majority of data collection pre and post-ServeRx 
*  In some cases, data were incomplete; results are presented for the patients for whom we 
had complete data (“n”).   
 
Prescribing errors and pharmacists’ interventions 
Table 3 presents a summary of the medication orders written during the pre and 
post-ServeRx data collection periods; Appendix H gives more detail. Fewer 
medication orders were written per patient post-ServeRx, but total numbers were 
similar. More discharge items were prescribed pre-ServeRx, and more regular 
inpatient medication orders post-ServeRx. More medication orders were transcribed 
onto ServeRx than rewritten on paper drug charts. 
 
There was a statistically significant reduction in the number of prescribing errors 
identified post-ServeRx; the absolute difference in the prescribing error rate was  
-1.8% (95% CI  -0.9 to -2.7%). Post-ServeRx, more prescribing errors were rectified 
before one or more doses were administered to the patient, but this difference did not 
meet statistical significance.  There was no difference in the mean clinical severity 
scores of the errors identified. Pre-ServeRx the ratio of errors of 
minor:moderate:major severity was 18:73:3.   Post-ServeRx this was 9:33:6. 
 
Table 4 summarises the prescribing errors identified and the pharmacists’ 
interventions made. 
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 Pre-
ServeRx 
Post-
ServeRx 
Statistical 
analysis 
Medication orders written  
Patients on ward for some or all 
of study period 
129 147 - 
Patients for whom notes retrieved 
(% of all patients) 
113 
(88%) 
126 
(86%) 
p = 0.78; chi 
square test 
Number of medication orders 
written for patients whose notes 
retrieved 
2156 2024 - 
Projected number of medication 
orders written for all patients 
2450 2353 - 
Median number of medication 
orders per patient during study 
period 
16 10 p = 0.009; Mann-
Whitney test 
Table 3:  Patients’ notes retrieved and medication orders written 
 
 Pre-
ServeRx 
Post-
ServeRx 
Statistical 
analysis 
Prescribing errors  
Prescribing errors identified  
(% of projected number of 
medication orders written) 
93 
(3.8%) 
48 
(2.0%) 
p = 0.0004; chi 
square test 
Errors rectified before dose given 
(% of prescribing errors) 
45 
(48%) 
32 
(67%) 
p =  0.06; chi 
square test 
Mean severity score 4.2 4.6 p = 0.24; unpaired 
t test 
Pharmacists’ interventions 
Interventions made in response 
to prescribing error (% of 
prescribing errors) 
38 
(40%) 
27 
(56%) 
p =  0.12; chi 
square test 
Other interventions made  35 18 - 
Total interventions made (% of 
projected number of medication 
orders written) 
73 
(3.0%) 
45 
(1.9%) 
p = 0.02; chi 
square test 
Table 4:  Summary of prescribing errors identified and pharmacists’ 
interventions made 
 
Table 5 summarises the types of prescribing error; most types were reduced.  Table 
6 presents the prescribing errors according to whether they occurred in the 
prescribing decision or in medication order writing.  The reduction in errors arising in 
medication order writing is statistically significant (1.3%; 95% CI 0.5 to 2.1%) 
whereas the reduction in errors arising in the prescribing decision is not (0.4%; 95% 
CI  -0.1 to 0.9%). 
 
Table 7 gives examples of the errors identified.  We did not identify any cases of 
actual harm resulting from prescribing errors using this prospective method. 
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Stage of prescribing 
process 
Pre-ServeRx number 
of errors (% of 
medication orders) 
Post-ServeRx number 
of errors (% of 
medication orders) 
20 12 Need for drug therapy 0.8% 0.5% 
2 0 Select specific drug 0.1% - 
45 29 Select drug dose 1.8% 1.2% 
3 5 Select formulation 0.1% 0.2% 
13 0 Give instructions for 
supply of product 0.5% - 
10 2 Give administration 
instructions 0.4% 0.1% 
93 48 Total 3.8% 2.0% 
Table 5:  Prescribing errors presented according to stage of the prescribing 
process 
 
 
Origin of prescribing 
error 
Pre-ServeRx 
(% of all medication 
orders written) 
Post-ServeRx 
(% of all medication 
orders written) 
Prescribing decision 32 (1.1%) 16 (0.7%) 
Writing medication order* 66 (2.7%) 32 (1.4%) 
Total  94 (3.8%) 48 (2.1%)** 
Table 6: Breakdown of prescribing errors according to their likely origin 
* The reduction in errors arising in medication order writing is statistically significant (1.3%; 
95% CI 0.5 to 2.1%)  ** Total is more than 2.0% due to rounding
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Pre-ServeRx Post-ServeRx 
• Patient usually takes simvastatin 
20mg at night, but not prescribed on 
admission (need for drug therapy) 
• “Vitamin B12 co strong” 
prescribed when “vitamin B tablets 
compound strong” intended (select 
specific drug) 
• Bendroflumethiazide 20mg once 
daily prescribed when 5mg intended 
(select drug dose) 
• Dipyridamole 200mg twice daily 
prescribed for secondary prevention 
of ischaemic stroke, without 
specifying that modified release 
required (select formulation) 
• Beclometasone inhaler prescribed 
with no strength specified (give 
instructions for supply) 
• Prednisolone 10mg prescribed 
without specifying time or frequency 
of administration (give administration 
instructions) 
• Tinzaparin and enoxaparin both 
prescribed (need for drug therapy) 
• Cyclizine 50mg tablets prescribed 
to be given one-hourly when required 
(select drug dose) 
• A dose of ciclosporin 150mg was 
prescribed to be given using the 
100mg capsules rather than the 
50mg capsules (select formulation) 
• Trimipramine 50mg four times 
daily prescribed for a patient who 
usually takes 200mg at night (give 
administration instructions)  
Table 7: Examples of prescribing errors identified. The stage of the prescribing 
process is shown in brackets. 
 
 
Medication administration errors (MAEs) 
We observed 56 drug rounds and 1644 OE pre-ServeRx, and 55 drug rounds and 
1178 OE afterwards.  MAEs fell after the introduction of ServeRx from 8.6% (141 
MAEs) to 4.4% (53 MAEs). The difference in MAE rates was 4.2% (95% CI -2.4 to -
6.0%; p = 0.00003).  The main reductions were in omission and wrong dose errors. 
Table 8 gives examples and Table 9 the types of MAE; there was a reduction in 
errors involving the wrong drug, wrong patient, wrong dose, and omission for reasons 
other than unavailability. There was no difference in omissions due to unavailability. 
Three of the five wrong dose MAEs post-ServeRx involved medication stored outside 
the automated cabinet. The post-ServeRx wrong route errors were paracetamol 
given orally when the rectal route was prescribed and vice versa.  MAE rates were 
highest for IV doses, mainly involving excessively fast administration of IV bolus 
doses.  A potential source of bias was that fewer IV OE were observed post-ServeRx 
(171 pre-ServeRx; 39 post-ServeRx) because the use of electronic medication 
records allows one nurse to prepare IV medication while another administers oral 
medication.  However, MAE rates for non-IV doses also fell significantly after the 
introduction of ServeRx, from 7.0% pre- to 4.3% post-ServeRx (a difference of 2.7%; 
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95% CI -0.9 to -4.5%; p=0.005). The mean severity score for all MAEs did not 
change significantly after the introduction of ServeRx: pre- it was 2.7; post-ServeRx it 
was 2.5 (p=0.39; t-test). We did not identify any cases of actual harm resulting from 
MAEs. 
 
Pre-ServeRx Post-ServeRx 
• Levothyroxine 25mcg omitted as 
could not find medication (omission) 
• Thiamine 100mg prescribed. 
Observer intervened to prevent 
levothyroxine 100mcg being given 
(wrong drug) 
• Ciprofloxacin 500mg administered 
when 250mg prescribed (wrong 
dose) 
• Norfloxacin 400mg given twice as 
first dose was not signed for (extra 
dose) 
 
• Propranolol 160mg not given as 
not available on ward (omission due 
to unavailability) 
• Salbutamol 5mg nebule 
administered when 2.5mg prescribed 
(wrong dose) 
• Administration of Tazocin® 4.5g 
IV over 30 seconds instead of 3-5 
minutes (fast administration IV bolus) 
• Administration of paracetamol 1g 
orally when rectal route was 
prescribed (wrong route) 
Table 8: Examples of the medication administration errors identified. The type 
of error is shown in brackets. 
 
Pre-ServeRx Post-ServeRx 
Type of error Number 
identified 
% of OE Number 
identified 
% of OE 
Wrong drug 2 0.1% - - 
Wrong dose 29 1.8% 5 0.4% 
Wrong patient 5 0.3% - - 
Wrong route 2 0.1% 6 0.5% 
Wrong form - - - - 
Wrong time - - 1 0.1% 
Extra dose 2 0.1% - - 
Expired drug 1 0.1% - - 
Omission due to 
unavailability 26 1.6% 25 2.1% 
Other omission 42 2.6% 11 0.9% 
Wrong diluent 1 0.1% - - 
Fast 
administration IV 
bolus 
31 1.9% 5 0.4% 
TOTAL 141 8.6% 53 4.4% 
Table 9:  The medication administration errors identified 
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Adherence to the Trust’s medication policies  
The results relating to medication administration are presented in Table 10. Post-
ServeRx, there was a dramatic increase (from 17% to 81%) in the percentage of 
patients whose identity was checked prior to administration, and an increase in the 
doses whose consumption was observed by the nurse (4% to 24%). Medication 
administration was more timely.  However, while there was no significant difference 
in the percentage of doses documented correctly, there was an increase in the 
incidence of potentially significant documentation discrepancies. This was largely due 
to doses being recorded as unavailable because they were not in the automated 
cabinet, whereas the patient had a supply at their bedside and did receive the dose.  
 
 
 Pre-ServeRx Post- ServeRx 
Statistical 
analysis 
Quality of documentation 
Doses assessed 2167 1623 - 
Doses documented correctly (% 
of doses assessed) 
2086 (96.3%) 1557 (95.9%) p = 0.66; chi 
square test 
Potentially significant 
documentation discrepancies (% 
of all doses) 
5 (0.23%) 33 (2.03%) p < 0.0001; chi 
square test 
Identity Checking 
Doses assessed 1344 1291 - 
Doses for which identity checked 
(% of doses assessed) 
234 (17.4%) 1047 (81.1%) p < 0.0001; chi 
square test 
Observing patients taking the dose 
Doses assessed 1031 1009 - 
Doses for which administration 
observed by nurse (% of doses 
assessed) 
45 (4%) 243 (24%) p < 0.0001; chi 
square test 
Time difference between time prescribed & time administered 
Doses assessed 2188 1678  
< 1 hour 1719 (79%) 1475 (89%) 
1 – 2 hours 422 (19%) 203 (11%) 
> 2 hours 47 (2%) 0 (0%) 
p < 0.0001; chi 
square test 
Table 10:  Adherence to policies relating to medication administration  
 
During the audit of medication charts, we collected data on 47 patients (561 
medication orders) pre-ServeRx, and 53 patients (564 medication orders) post-
ServeRx. The results are presented in Table 11. There was no significant difference 
in the percentage of patients with allergy status documented or who were wearing 
wristbands.  However, there were significant (although sometimes small) 
improvements in prescribing by approved name, completeness of medication orders, 
medication orders being rewritten rather than amended, legibility, identification of the 
prescriber and the use of stop dates for anti-infectives.  Incorrectly written doses 
were more common post-ServeRx; these related mainly to selection of confusing 
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doses or volumes such as orders for 50ml of 50mg/ml cyclizine injection to be given 
orally, and 1,000 co-codamol tablets to be given when required. Documentation of 
the approval status of reserved anti-infectives was also worse post-ServeRx.  
 
 Pre-
ServeRx 
Post-
ServeRx 
Statistical 
analysis 
Patient-specific audit standards  
All patients’ drug charts or 
ServeRx records should indicate 
their allergy status  
83% 
(n = 47) 
94% 
(n = 53) 
p = 0.14; chi 
square test 
All patients should be wearing a 
hospital wristband (pre-ServeRx), 
or a ServeRx wristband (post-
ServeRx)  
94% 
(n = 47) 
92% 
(n = 51) 
p = 0.91; chi 
square test 
Medication order-related audit standards 
All medication should be 
prescribed by approved name 
84% 
(n = 561) 
97% 
(n = 564) 
p < 0.0001; chi 
square test 
All medication orders should have 
the dose units (eg “micrograms”) 
written correctly 
91% 
(n = 539) 
91% 
(n = 564) 
p = 0.92; chi 
square test 
All medication orders should have 
the dose quantity (eg “10”) written 
correctly 
99.8% 
(n = 561) 
97% 
(n = 564) 
p = 0.0005; chi 
square test 
All medication orders should be 
complete 
63% 
(n = 561) 
99.9% 
(n = 564) 
p < 0.0001; chi 
square test 
No medication orders should be 
changed by amending the original 
medication order 
87% 
(n = 561) 
100% 
(n = 564) 
p < 0.0001; chi 
square test 
All medication orders should be 
legible 
96% 
(n = 561) 
100% 
(n = 564) 
p < 0.0001; chi 
square test 
For all medication orders, the 
prescriber should be identifiable 
73% 
(n = 561) 
87% 
(n = 473) 
p < 0.0001; chi 
square test 
All medication orders for 
treatment courses of anti-
infectives should be given stop 
dates 
8% 
(n = 64) 
99% 
(n = 68) 
p < 0.0001; chi 
square test 
All 'reserved’ anti-infectives 
should have appropriate 
documentation added by the 
pharmacist, stating whether or 
not they are approved for use 
36% 
(n = 14) 
0% 
(n = 26) 
p = 0.006; chi 
square test 
Table 11:  Adherence to policies relating to prescribing and allergy 
documentation Percentages are presented according to the relevant number (n) assessed. 
 
 
Pharmacists’ prescription endorsements 
During the four pre-ServeRx endorsement data collection periods, only 87 (78%) of a 
total of 112 patients’ drug charts were included as a result of patients being in 
theatre, having investigations or their charts otherwise being unavailable.  During the 
post-ServeRx data collection periods, all 106 patients (100%) were included, as it is 
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possible to view patients’ medication orders regardless of whether or not the patient 
is physically present on the ward.   
 
A total of 787 (mean 9.0 per patient) and 897 (mean 8.0 per patient) regular and 
“when required” medication orders were reviewed in the pre- and post-ServeRx 
periods respectively.  Table 12 summarises the endorsement opportunities identified 
in each phase of the study.    
 
 Pre-
ServeRx 
Post-
ServeRx 
Statistical 
analysis 
Drugs charts/electronic records 
examined 
87 106 - 
Medication orders examined  
(mean number per patient) 
787 
(9.0) 
897 
(8.0) 
- 
Total endorsement opportunities 
(% of all medication orders) 
390 
(50%) 
190 
(21%) 
p < 0.0001; chi 
square test 
Endorsements made  
(% of all endorsement 
opportunities) 
214 
(55%) 
57 
(30%) 
p < 0.0001; chi 
square test 
Table 12: Summary of endorsements made and not made 
 
Following the introduction of ServeRx, fewer endorsements were required.  However, 
the ward pharmacist made endorsements for only 30% of these, compared with 55% 
pre-ServeRx. Pre-ServeRx, the most common types of endorsements required were 
the addition of generic names, strengths, and full names for drugs prescribed using 
abbreviations or chemical symbols. These endorsements were not required following 
the introduction of ServeRx.   In both phases of the study, other endorsements 
commonly required involved counselling or administration instructions. 
 
 
4.5 Evaluating staff time and system performance for each system 
 
In this section, we consider medical staff time, pharmacy staff time, nursing staff 
time, delays to discharge, system performance and stock control. Again, the methods 
relating to each of these will be described in turn. 
 
Methods 
Medical staff time 
We observed staff prescribing regular inpatient medication orders and recorded the 
start and finish time for each.  Where several medication orders were written or 
transcribed together for the same patient, mean time per medication order was 
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calculated. In the post-ServeRx data collection period, both doctors' prescribing and 
pharmacists' transcribing of orders onto the computer system were timed.   
 
Pharmacy staff time  
The ward pharmacist self-reported the time taken to provide a clinical pharmacy 
service to the study ward each weekday for four weeks, and pharmacy distribution 
staff recorded the time taken to restock the study ward for six weeks.  A more 
detailed observation-based study of the ward pharmacist’s activities was carried out 
for two weeks, during which the ward pharmacist was observed and her activities 
recorded using two-dimensional activity sampling based on methods described 
previously 38. A signalling device was used to identify 32 random time samples each 
hour when the pharmacist’s activity was recorded.   The two dimensions were 
"activity" (11 categories) and "contact" (5 categories).  
 
Nursing staff time  
To assess nursing time, the time required to carry out each scheduled non-IV drug 
round was observed during the MAE study.  We then used activity sampling 38. to 
evaluate the proportion of nursing time spent on medication-related activities in 
between scheduled drug rounds.  Ten data collection periods were therefore selected 
both pre- and post-intervention, on different days and shifts, during which a research 
pharmacist shadowed the nurse responsible for medication-related activities on one 
half of the ward. A signalling device was used to identify 32 random time samples 
each hour when the nurse’s activity was recorded.   
 
Delays to discharge 
Data on delays in dispensing discharge medication (TTAs) and delays to patients’ 
discharges were collected for six weeks. We contacted the nurse in charge of the 
study ward on a daily basis, and asked for details of any patients whose discharge 
had been delayed in the last 24 hours (72 hours at weekends) due to a delay in the 
dispensing of their discharge medication.  
 
System performance 
System performance problems were investigated by leaving data collection forms on 
each drug trolley for a six-week period pre- and post-ServeRx.  Nursing staff were 
asked to note down “any problems encountered with the system of medication 
prescribing, supply and administration”.  Following the introduction of ServeRx, the 
pharmacy-based project nurse also routinely recorded problems of which she was 
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made aware.  Her records were analysed for the same post-ServeRx six-week 
period.   
 
Stock control 
The numbers of medication lines on the stock list, the value of the stock list, and the 
total value of stock and non-stock medication physically on the study ward, were 
determined. All stock and non-stock medication on the ward was counted manually.  
Any medication that had exceeded its expiry date was also noted.  Intravenous fluids, 
dietary products, chemical testing strips and devices, and medication stored at the 
patient’s bedside were all excluded.  Controlled drugs (CDs) were included, using the 
stock levels documented in the CD register. 
 
Pre-ServeRx, this count took place on a single day, the day before the once-weekly 
pharmacy top-up. Details of the items subsequently supplied as the top-up were also 
recorded.  Post-ServeRx, data were collected over a one-week period. At the time of 
this stock count, there were two pharmacy top-ups carried out each week (Tuesdays 
and Fridays).  These therefore took place during the week of the stock-count.  
 
Results 
Medical staff time 
Pre-ServeRx, 32 regular inpatient medication orders were timed, almost all of which 
were written by house officers or senior house officers. There were 32 new orders 
timed post-ServeRx, of which 15 were prescribed by house officers or senior house 
officers, and 17 transcribed by pharmacists.  Prescribing increased from a mean of 
15 seconds per medication order pre-ServeRx to 47 seconds post-ServeRx (p = 
0.001).  If only medication orders prescribed by medical staff are compared, these 
took a mean of 15 seconds pre-ServeRx and 39 seconds post-ServeRx (p = 0.03; t-
test), a difference of 24 seconds (95% confidence internal 3 to 45 seconds). 
 
Pharmacy staff time  
The time taken to provide a weekday ward pharmacy service to the study ward rose 
from a mean of 68 minutes each day, to 98 minutes (p = 0.001; t-test). The 
percentage of time spent on the following activities increased following ServeRx: 
changing therapy / monitoring (increase from 4% to 7% of total time), giving advice 
(9% to 19%), prescription monitoring (16% to 23%) and non-productive time (6% to 
11%). Time spent on the following decreased: looking for charts (3% to 0%), 
checking patients’ own drugs (5% to 0%), supply (23% to 14%), and travel (7% to 
4%). Time spent on information gathering and prescription annotation remained 
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about the same.  In terms of contact, there was an increase in the percentage of time 
spent with doctors and a decrease with nurses. Percentages of time spent with 
patients, pharmacy staff, self and others remained similar, although since the total 
time providing a ward pharmacy service was greater following ServeRx, each of 
these increased in real terms. Full details of these results are given in Appendix I.  
Pre-ServeRx the mean time taken to restock the ward each week was 1 hour 18 
minutes; post ServeRx it was 1 hour 14 minutes. 
 
Nursing staff time 
Results relating to nursing time are shown in Table 13. Drug rounds were shorter, but 
a higher percentage of time was spent on medication-related tasks in between drug 
rounds (an increase of 7.6%; 95% CI 2.4 to 12.8%); this included scheduling newly 
prescribed medication for the appropriate drug rounds and administering medication 
prescribed to be given when required. 
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 Pre-ServeRx 
 
Post-ServeRx Statistical 
analysis 
Drug rounds per week 56 56 - 
Mean time spent on each 
drug round (range) 
50 mins 
(15 –105 mins) 
40 mins* 
(16 – 78 mins) 
p = 0.006; unpaired 
t test 
Total time spent on drug 
rounds each week 
46 hours 54 mins 38 hours 16 mins - 
Total time observed  
outside of drug rounds 
16 hours 43 mins 16 hours 11 mins - 
Activity samples recorded 
outside of drug rounds 
521 537  
Medication related activity 
samples outside of drug 
rounds (%) 
110 
(21.1%) 
154 
(28.7%) 
p = 0.006; chi 
square test 
Table 13: Nursing time spent on medication-related tasks each week 
*Post-intervention drug rounds comprised a mean 15 minutes preparation time (range 6 
minutes to 35 minutes) and 25 minutes administration time (range 8 minutes to 53 minutes). 
 
 
Delays to discharge 
Unfortunately we were unable to collect data on this outcome measure, as nursing 
staff were rarely able to give us any details of patients whose discharges were 
delayed. A more robust method of investigating this outcome will be required for any 
future work of this type. 
 
System performance 
Pre-ServeRx, the system performance questionnaire was completed on 22 
occasions.  The most commonly noted problem was the non-availability of non-stock 
medication on the ward (8 cases); the second most common was nurses not re-filling 
the drug trolley after use, leading to non-availability of stock medication in the trolley 
(6 cases).  More details are given in Table 14. 
 
Post-ServeRx, nurses completed the data collection forms on only six occasions.  
These comprised six different problems.  The project nurse’s records had 37 entries 
recorded for the same six-week period. The most common problems recorded were 
cart battery failure (10 cases) and software bugs (7 cases).  More details are given in 
Table 15.  There was no overlap between the problems recorded pre- and post-
ServeRx. 
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Problem encountered Number of reports 
Non-stock medication not available on ward 8 (36%) 
Stock medication not replaced in drug trolley 6 (27%) 
Product packaging has changed (delay in finding medication) 2 (9%) 
Awaiting drug chart to be rewritten 1 (5%) 
Stock medication not available on ward 1 (5%) 
Prescription written incorrectly 1 (5%) 
Chart annotated incorrectly by pharmacist 1 (5%) 
Non-stock medication written after pharmacist’s daily visit 1 (5%) 
Interruption during drug round 1 (5%) 
Total 22 (102*%) 
Table 14 Summary of system performance problems documented pre-ServeRx 
*Numbers add up to more than 100% due to rounding 
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Cart problem 1 (17%) 4 (11%) 5 (12%) 
Prescribing error 1 (17%)  1 (2%) 
Cart battery failure 1 (17%) 9 (24%) 10 (23%) 
Scheduling problem 1 (17%)  1 (2%) 
Patient “locked” 1 (17%)  1 (2%) 
Drawer in cabinet wouldn’t open 1 (17%)  1 (2%) 
Software bug   7 (19%) 7 (9%) 
Pen-tablet problem  5 (14%) 5 (12%) 
Hardware failure  3 (8%) 3 (7%) 
Nurse station exception error   2 (5%) 2 (5%) 
Cabinet problem  2 (5%) 2 (5%) 
Bar code printer  1 (3%) 1 (2%) 
Database setting  1 (3%) 1 (2%) 
File locked  1 (3%) 1 (2%) 
Unable to generate transfer reports  1 (3%) 1 (2%) 
Insufficient drawers for narcotics  1 (3%) 1 (2%) 
Total 6 (102*%) 37 (100%) 43 (100%) 
Table 15 Summary of system performance problems documented post-Serve 
Rx. *Numbers add up to more than 100% due to rounding 
 
Stock control 
There were 183 lines on the pre-ServeRx stock list, and 211 post-ServeRx. The 
value of the stock list pre-ServeRx was £2310.49; the respective value post-ServeRx 
was £2326.93.   
 
Pre-ServeRx, the total value of goods on the study ward on the day of data collection 
was found to be £3287.22.  There were some expired goods, most of which were 
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ward stock in the drug trolley, valued at £29.47. The value of the ward top-up was 
£285.12, giving an estimated maximum value of all goods on the ward of £3572.34.  
The average value during the course of a week can be estimated to be £3429.78. 
 
Post-ServeRx, the total value of the medication on the ward was £2880.93. Of this, 
expired medication was valued at £23.20. The figure of £2880.93 represents a 16% 
reduction in the average stock-holding on the ward. 
 
4.6 Discussion 
 
This prospective evaluation suggests that ServeRx reduced prescribing and 
administration errors, increased adherence to most medicines policies, and reduced 
stock holding on the ward. However, it resulted in some increases in the staff time 
required for various medication-related tasks. 
 
Impact on safety and quality 
Using a prospective method to identify prescribing errors, we found that ServeRx 
reduced prescribing errors by 47%.  This supports existing US 8,9,39 and some  
UK40,41 data suggesting that computerisation can reduce prescribing errors.  The 
majority of the reduction was in errors of medication order writing; a further reduction 
may be possible with decision support. Our baseline figure of 3.8% was higher than 
the 1.5% previously identified across a range of wards using the same definitions and 
similar methods 3. This may be partly accounted for by the additional check by the 
principal investigator, who recorded more than a third of the errors in the present 
study.  We believe that this is the first study to have also recorded whether or not 
errors were rectified before the patient received any doses; this is an important 
differentiation.  We found that pre-ServeRx, almost half of all prescribing errors were 
rectified prior to administration. This percentage increased to 76% post-ServeRx, 
although this increase was not statistically significant.   
 
ServeRx reduced non-IV MAEs by 39%, predominantly reducing wrong dose and 
omission errors. Our baseline non-IV figure of 7.0% is in line with previous UK  
data35,42,43,44,45,46,47,48  The improvement seems likely to be due the design of the 
automated dispensing system and drug trolley; instead of a drug trolley containing 
many different drugs, strengths and formulations, the system gives nursing staff 
access only to the products prescribed.  A previous UK comparison of a hospital 
using electronic prescribing and a hospital using paper-based prescribing found no 
difference in MAEs 42.  
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In line with the reduction in prescribing errors, fewer interventions were made by the 
ward pharmacist post-ServeRx. There were also fewer endorsements required, but 
fewer of the endorsements required were actually made.  This is likely to be because 
ServeRx only allows pharmacists’ comments to be added on approval of the 
medication order and not subsequently. 
 
ServeRx improved adherence to the majority of medication-related policies audited. 
Most prescribing-related standards were improved, with medication orders legible 
and complete. The only standard that was more often met with the paper system was 
the writing of doses; this was due to selection from ServeRx menus of inappropriate 
doses such as “1,000 tablets”. ServeRx dramatically increased the percentage of 
doses for which the patient’s identity was checked prior to administration.  However, 
100% compliance was not achieved; this was due to informal practices such as 
sticking barcodes to patients’ furniture for ease of scanning, which were scanned 
instead of the patient’s wristband. There was no significant difference in the 
percentage of doses documented correctly, but more “potentially significant” 
documentation errors post-ServeRx. Medication administration was also more timely. 
 
Impact on staff time and system performance 
ServeRx increased ward pharmacist and medical staff time required for medication-
related tasks.  Nursing time spent on drug rounds decreased, which allowed staff 
more flexibility over planning their time. This is in spite of increasing the amount of 
time spent checking patients’ identities. However, more time was required for other 
tasks in between drug rounds; these included scheduling of medication, liaison with 
medical staff and stock control. The increase in the pharmacist’s time may be partly 
due to more patients’ medication charts being seen each day, as they were no longer 
unavailable when patients were in theatre or having investigations, and partly due to 
the time required to move between different screens to approve medication orders 
and see an overview of treatment.  Prescribing using the computer took longer than 
on a paper chart; however medication orders were clearly written and associated with 
fewer errors.  
 
There was a 16% decrease in the value of medication held on the study ward; this 
was largely due to the removal of the traditional drug trolleys which held large 
amounts of medication in addition to that in the stock cupboards.   
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A range of system performance issues were identified both pre and post-ServeRx 
which could be used to improve the system. 
 
Limitations 
We used a before-and-after study design, which has the inherent limitation of not 
controlling for changes in the outcome measures that may arise from external 
factors. However, we are not aware of any changes to practice that could have 
affected the results obtained and patient demographics were similar both pre- and 
post-ServeRx.  
 
Other limitations relate to the specific methods used.  In particular, studying the 
impact of system changes on nursing time is notoriously difficult, as we would ideally 
need to observe all nurses simultaneously. Further work may therefore be required in 
this area.  We relied on the ward pharmacist to identify and record prescribing errors, 
together with a second check by another pharmacist; however, it is likely that some 
errors may have been missed.  This will be explored in more detail in Chapter 6, 
where we compare different methods of identifying prescribing errors.  In contrast, we 
feel that the methods used for identifying medication administration errors and 
assessing adherence to medication related policies are robust. 
 
Wider issues relating to the limited generalisability of a study conducted on one ward, 
using one system, at one point in time, will be discussed in more detail later in this 
report. 
 
Conclusions 
This is the most comprehensive UK evaluation of an electronic prescribing system, 
and the first of a closed-loop system incorporating automated dispensing, barcode 
patient identification and electronic medication administration records. Our study has 
shown a reduction in errors and an increase in patient safety, but at the expense of 
some increases in staff time.  Other interventions, involving equivalent increases in 
staff time, may also reduce errors without the purchase of costly electronic systems.  
Further studies of such technologies should therefore include economic analyses 
where possible 49, as well as a range of outcome measures, to explore these benefits 
and costs in more detail.  Further work is also required to find out whether our results 
are generalisable to different systems and different sites. The contextual information 
in Chapter 7 is designed to help with this process. 
 
  
60
5. Retrospective quantitative evaluation of two electronic 
prescribing systems 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
This section of the report describes the use of the retrospective review method, as 
described in Chapter 3, to identify prescribing errors before and after the 
implementation of electronic prescribing systems at two different sites (described in 
Chapter 2).  
 
The objective of this part of the study, as specified in our original protocol, was to 
assess the feasibility of measuring the incidence of prescribing errors from a 
retrospective review of patients’ medical notes at two hospital sites (Charing Cross 
Hospital and Queen’s Hospital), both before and after the introduction of electronic 
prescribing. 
 
The outcome measures explored were: 
 
• The incidence of prescribing errors and the harm caused, before and after 
implementation of electronic prescribing;  
• The proportion of medical notes found and completeness of information, 
before and after implementation. 
  
The evaluation of the systems at Charing Cross and Queen’s hospitals will next be 
described in turn, then the common lessons drawn in a final discussion. 
 
 
5.2 Retrospective evaluation at Charing Cross Hospital 
 
Methods 
Prescribing errors were retrospectively identified for two four-week periods, one 
about two months before the introduction of ServeRx and one about six months 
afterwards.  These were the same periods as those studied in the prospective 
evaluation of prescribing errors described in Chapter 4. The pre-ServeRx period was 
31 March to 27 April 2003; the post-ServeRx period was 24 November to 21 
December 2003 inclusive. Where patients were on the study ward prior to the 
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beginning of the relevant period, or remained on the ward at the end of the period, 
only those medication orders written and prescribing errors made between the index 
dates were studied.   
 
Data collection 
Retrieval of medical notes and all data collection took place between September 
2004 and January 2005.  Inpatients who were on the study ward at any time during 
either four-week data collection period were identified retrospectively from the ward’s 
admission book and their medical notes retrieved from the medical records library.  
Where patients’ medical notes were not initially available, repeated attempts were 
made to retrieve them throughout the study.  
 
For each patient whose medical notes were retrieved, a research pharmacist 
completed the retrospective review form (RRF) for the medication orders written and 
any prescribing errors that occurred during the relevant period.  The RRF was 
completed in paper form for patients reviewed during the first part of the study and 
then entered retrospectively into the Access database (Chapter 3); later reviews were 
entered directly. Laboratory data were examined only if considered relevant in 
relation to the patient’s medication or clinical condition, and only the relevant 
parameters checked.  If the patient’s weight was not available in the medical notes, 
an estimated weight of 65kg for females and 80 kg for males was used and a record 
made that this was an estimate.  The serum creatinine measured nearest to the 
patient’s date of admission to the study ward was used to estimate their creatinine 
clearance using the Cockcroft and Gault equation.  The number of medication orders 
written during the study period was recorded to provide a denominator.  
 
Details were recorded of any prescribing errors identified, including the type of 
medication order in which the error occurred, the stage of the patient’s stay, the 
number of doses received before the error was corrected, and any harm that was 
judged to have resulted. Harm was defined very broadly as any identifiable 
physiological or physical changes that were likely to have resulted from the error 
concerned.  
 
Assessing the clinical severity of the errors identified 
Any prescribing errors that had also been identified by the ward pharmacist had 
already been assessed, as described in Chapter 4.  Of those that had not been 
identified by the ward pharmacist, we assessed the potential severity of all errors that 
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appeared to have resulted in harm and a 1 in 3 sample of those that did not.  Errors 
were assessed by an expert panel, using the methods described in Chapter 4 37. 
 
Establishing the practical issues in retrieving information retrospectively 
The numbers of patients’ notes retrieved, and the availability of key documents within 
these notes, were documented.   Other problems experienced in retrieving 
information from both the paper-based medical records and the computerised 
prescribing system were documented as field notes. Finally, we documented the time 
taken to complete each RRF. 
 
Results 
Demographic data 
Numbers of medical notes reviewed, medication orders written and the patient days 
in each study period are summarised in Table 16.  The two study periods were 
similar in all of these respects.  More details of the medication orders written are 
given in Tables 17 and 18. More medication orders were classified as being 
transcribed onto ServeRx than for rewriting drug charts pre-ServeRx, and post-
ServeRx, fewer medication orders were classified as being written on admission.  
These differences are likely to be due to changes in working practice that occurred 
as a result of ServeRx, rather than differences between the two patient populations.  
Post-ServeRx, orders written on admission would be likely to be written initially on a 
paper drug chart and then transcribed onto ServeRx.  In contrast, patients in the pre-
ServeRx cohort would only need an inpatient drug chart to be rewritten if they were in 
hospital for two weeks or more. 
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 Pre- 
ServeRx 
Post-
ServeRx 
Statistical 
analysis 
Patients listed in admissions book 129 147 - 
Patients notes reviewed  
(% of patients listed) 
93  
(72%) 
114  
(78%) 
p = 0.37 (chi 
square test) 
Medication orders written during 
study period (mean per patient) 
1258  
(13.5) 
1614 
(14.2) 
p = 0.77 (t-
test) 
Patient days in study period  
(mean per patient) 
438 
(4.7) 
501 
(4.4) 
p = 0.66 (t-
test) 
Table 16 Summary demographic data 
 
Prescribing Stage Pre- 
ServeRx 
Post-
ServeRx 
Statistical 
analysis 
On Admission  399 (31.7%) 274 (17.0%) 
During stay 620 (49.3%) 882 (54.6%) 
Re-writing drug chart/ transcribing 
onto ServeRx 
110 (8.7%) 353 (21.9%) 
Writing discharge prescription 129 (10.4%) 105 (6.5%) 
TOTAL 1258 (100%) 1614 (100%) 
p < 0.0001; 
chi square 
test 
Table 17: Medication orders written according to stage of patient stay 
 
 
Prescription type Pre-ServeRx Post-
ServeRx 
Statistical 
analysis 
Regular 609 (48.4%) 858 (53.2%) 
Intravenous fluids 360 (28.6%) 396 (24.5%) 
Once only 86 (6.8%) 86 (5.3%) 
When required 203 (16.1%) 274 (17.0%) 
TOTAL 1258 (100%) 1614 (100%) 
p = 0.01; chi 
square test 
Table 18: Medication orders written according to type of medication order   
 
Prescribing errors identified using the RRF 
Table 19 summarises the numbers of prescribing errors identified. A prescribing error 
was identified in 7.4% of all medication orders pre-ServeRx, and in 6.5% post-
ServeRx. The difference of 0.9% is not statistically significant (95% confidence 
interval (CI) –2.8 to 1.0%).  When expressed per patient day, the number of errors 
was the same pre- and post-ServeRx.  There was no statistically significant 
difference in the proportion of errors that were rectified prior to administration. 
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 Pre-
ServeRx 
Post- 
ServeRx 
Statistical 
analysis 
Prescribing errors identified (% of 
medication orders written) 
93 
(7.4%) 
105 
(6.5%) 
p = 0.39 (chi 
square test) 
Prescribing errors per patient day 0.21 0.21 - 
Prescribing errors that resulted in 
harm (% of medication orders written) 
0 
(0%) 
4 
(0.25%) 
p = 0.14 
(Fisher’s 
exact test) 
Prescribing errors that resulted in 
harm per patient day 
0 0.008 - 
Prescribing errors rectified before the 
patient received any doses (excluding 
cases where outcome unknown) 
26 of 76  
(34%) 
18 of 67  
(27%) 
p = 0.44 (chi 
square test) 
Table 19: Summary of the results obtained 
 
Four prescribing errors that resulted in harm were identified in the post-ServeRx 
patient cohort. None of these would appear to be specifically related to ServeRx.  
The errors were as follows: 
 
1. A patient on warfarin with a target international normalised ratio (INR) of 2-3 had 
an INR of 3.4, and then was prescribed ciprofloxacin 500mg twice daily with no 
reduction in warfarin dose.  The enhanced anticoagulant effect resulted in an INR 
of 6.1 the following day. 
2. A patient was prescribed a total of 120 mmol potassium in their intravenous fluids 
over a three day period, without checking a recent serum potassium level. This 
resulted in a serum potassium of 4.6 mmol/L (desired range 3.5 – 5 mmol/L) on 
day 2, and 6.7 mmol/L by day 3, which required treatment with calcium resonium.  
3. A patient’s usual ferrous sulphate tablets were not prescribed on admission, 
resulting in their haemoglobin dropping from 10.9 to 9.8 g/dL two days after 
admission.  
4. A patient usually took moxonidine 300mcg twice daily, which was not prescribed 
on admission. Their blood pressure increased from 111/77 on admission to 
215/120 the following day, when the error was identified and the drug prescribed. 
 
Table 20 presents the prescribing errors identified according to the stage of patient 
stay.  There was a statistically significant difference pre- and post-ServeRx, with 
relatively more errors occurring on admission pre-ServeRx, and more occurring 
during the patient stay and on transcribing post-ServeRx. However, this may be 
partly accounted for by the different numbers of medication orders written in each of 
these categories. When the error rates are presented according to the number of 
medication orders of that type, error rates are similar pre- and post-ServeRx.  
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Prescribing Stage Pre- 
ServeRx 
Post- 
ServeRx 
Statistical 
analyis 
On Admission  52 (13.0%) 43 (15.7%) 
During stay 22 (3.5%) 32 (3.6%) 
Re-writing drug chart 
/Transcribing onto ServeRx 
4 (3.6%) 15 (4.2%) 
Writing discharge 
prescription 
15 (11.6%) 15 (14.3%) 
TOTAL 93 (7.4%) 105 (6.5%) 
p = 0.04; chi 
square test 
Table 20: Prescribing errors identified according to the stage of prescribing 
process. Percentages are calculated as a percentage of all medication orders 
of that type. 
 
Table 21 presents the errors identified according to the stage of the drug use 
process. Numbers are too small to permit statistical analysis, but the only obvious 
difference is in the number of errors involving the provision of sufficient instructions to 
permit supply of the correct product. These errors, usually involving specification of 
strengths and formulations for products available in more than one of these, appear 
to have been reduced post-ServeRx.  
 
Stage of prescribing 
process 
Pre-ServeRx 
(n = 1258 medication 
orders) 
Post-ServeRx 
(n = 1614 medication 
orders) 
Need for drug 39 (3.1%) 45 (2.8%) 
Selection of drug  3 (0.2%) 6 (0.3%) 
Selection of drug dose 34 (2.7%) 43 (2.7%) 
Selection of formulation 2 (0.1%) 2 (0.1%) 
Give instructions for supply 9 (0.7%) 1 (0.06%) 
Give administration 
instructions 
6 (0.5%) 8 (0.5%) 
TOTAL 93 (7.4%) 105 (6.5%) 
Table 21: Prescribing errors presented according to stage of the prescribing 
process. Percentages are expressed as a percentage of all medication orders 
written.  
 
Clinical severity of the prescribing errors identified 
The mean severity score for the sample of errors assessed pre-ServeRx was 4.1; 
post-ServeRx it was 4.6. This difference was not significant (p = 0.4; t-test for 
unequal variances). There was one error with a score of more than 7 (representing a 
“serious” error) pre-ServeRx, and six post-ServeRx. The four errors that resulted in 
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harm were given scores of 5.6, 6.4, 2.4 and 4.6 respectively. Removing these from 
the post-ServeRx error scores does not affect the mean score. 
 
Practical issues in retrieving information retrospectively 
In terms of the time taken, application of the RRF took a mean of 40 minutes pre-
ServeRx and 46 minutes post-ServeRx (p = 0.08; t-test). The overall mean time was 
44 minutes.  However, this excludes the time taken to identify and retrieve the 
medical notes; in practice we were only able to review an average of four patients’ 
records each day.   
 
We identified a range of practical issues with the retrospective retrieval of 
information. These related to retrieving the medical notes, availability of information 
within the medical notes, retrospective access to electronic data post-ServeRx, and 
the retrospective interpretation of information. Each of these will be addressed in 
turn. 
 
First, we were not able to retrieve all of the relevant medical notes in the sample. Of 
those patients listed in the ward admissions book, for some there was no record of 
admission to the study ward or to the hospital in their medical notes (one patient pre-
ServeRx and ten post-ServeRx).  We are not sure whether these patients were 
admitted to the study ward and a temporary set of medical notes used, or whether 
they were anticipated admissions who were not then admitted to the study ward at 
all.  For another six patients (four pre-ServeRx and two post-ServeRx), while a record 
of admission existed, there was insufficient information in the medical notes to be 
able to carry out a review.  Finally, for another 31 patients pre-ServeRx and 21 post-
ServeRx, the medical notes could not be retrieved as they were booked out to other 
clinical areas. Notes relating to admission to the study ward were therefore examined 
for only 93 (72%) of 129 patients listed in the admissions book pre-ServeRx, and 114 
(78%) of 147 post-ServeRx.  
 
Second, not all of the information required was available within the notes retrieved. 
For those patients whose medical notes were examined, the availability of the 
various sources of information is summarised in Table 22.  
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Document Pre-ServeRx 
n = 93 
Post-ServeRx 
n = 114 
Initial Medical Assessment 83 (89%) 102 (89%) 
Medical progress notes 88 (95%) 104 (91%) 
Nursing/midwifery progress notes 85 (91%) 103 (90%) 
Laboratory/Pathology reports 81 (87%) 97 (85%) 
Prescription Report N/A 58# (51%) 
Administrations Report N/A 67$ (59%) 
Transfer Prescription Record N/A 40* (46%) 
ServeRx computer record of stopped 
medication 
N/A 40** (82%) 
Current medication chart 85 (91%) N/A 
Previous medication chart(s) 
(not applicable for all patients) 
15 (16%) 62 (54%) 
Discharge Summary 38 (41%) 46 (40%) 
Table 22: Availability of information from the medical notes 
N/A: Not applicable 
#For four patients, one or more pages were missing from this report. 
$For two patients, one or more pages were missing from this report. 
*Not applicable for 27 patients, percentage therefore calculated based on n = 87. For five 
patients, one or more pages were missing from the report. 
**Not applicable for 65 patients, percentage therefore calculated based on n = 49 
 
It can be seen that there were particular problems with the availability of ServeRx 
printouts, which should be filed in patients’ medical notes on discharge or transfer to 
another ward. We also suspect that paper IV fluid charts were often not filed in 
patients’ medical notes post-ServeRx, although we cannot identify those patients for 
whom they should have been present.   We identified some patients for whom pages 
were missing from the printed ServeRx records. However, it was impossible to 
identify whether or not pages at the end of these reports were present; this was 
because, with the exception of the transfer summary, the page numbering does not 
state the total number of pages.  
 
Third, some key data could not be accessed retrospectively from ServeRx. While it 
was possible to access prescribing information, users cannot access administration 
data retrospectively. We did subsequently obtain a report of doses administered to 
patients in the study after requesting this from the manufacturer of ServeRx.  We 
were therefore able to access administration data for patients reviewed after 8 
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November 2004, even if the administration report was not filed in their medical 
record. We were not able to examine administration data for patients reviewed before 
this date unless a paper copy was available. This is unlikely to have affected the 
identification of prescribing errors, but had we been studying medication 
administration errors this would have been a significant limitation.   Additionally, 
information entered on the ServeRx “patient notes” screen does not appear on the 
printouts filed in patients’ notes.  Pharmacists use this field to record information on 
drug histories checked, interventions made and doses confirmed, which we were 
unable to view retrospectively. This type of information could easily be seen on the 
paper drug charts reviewed.  
 
Finally, we identified other potential limitations with the retrospective interpretation of 
information.  For example, it was often impossible to identify the date and time on 
which medication orders were initiated or discontinued on paper drug charts, and so 
the researcher had to use her judgement as to whether or not certain drugs were 
prescribed simultaneously.  Medication orders may also have been written with 
information missing. However, provided this information was completed before the 
drug chart was filed, any such prescribing errors would not have been apparent to a 
retrospective reviewer.  
 
Discussion 
Using this retrospective method, we identified higher error rates than those identified 
using prospective methods (Chapter 4); in contrast, we did not see any effect of the 
introduction of electronic prescribing.  This disparity will be explored in more detail in 
Chapter 6.  
 
Did the introduction of electronic prescribing alter the data collected? 
There were several ways in which data collection was changed following the 
introduction of ServeRx, although in this study we do not think these were a 
significant source of bias.  There were some differences in the types of medication 
orders written, with more medication orders being classified as being transcribed 
onto ServeRx than rewritten onto paper drug charts, and fewer medication orders 
being classified as being written on admission post-ServeRx. This is likely to be 
because orders written on admission would be written on a paper drug chart, and 
then transcribed onto ServeRx on the study ward.  This difference therefore reflects 
the system of work being changed, rather than any underlying changes in patient 
demographics. 
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Two issues were also raised relating to collecting comparable data on numbers of 
medication orders written pre- and post-ServeRx.   First, for patients in the post-
ServeRx cohort, we identified a small number of situations where two or more 
medication orders were written where only one would have been needed on a paper 
chart.  For example, levothyroxine 75 micrograms could be prescribed in two ways 
on ServeRx. If one 50 microgram tablet plus one 25 microgram tablet are required, 
two separate medication orders have to be prescribed.  Alternatively, three 25 
microgram tablets could be prescribed, which would only necessitate one medication 
order.  The number of post-ServeRx medication orders recorded may therefore be 
slightly inflated.  Second, when counting post-ServeRx medication orders, it was 
often not possible to determine whether medication orders recorded as “stat” were 
prescribed by a doctor or represented nurses using this function to access medicines 
that had not yet been transcribed on to ServeRx. With the exception of warfarin, 
which is prescribed separately on paper charts and routinely accessed by nursing 
staff using the “stat” function, all of the “stat” medication orders were included in the 
count. Again, this may also have artificially inflated the number of medication orders 
written post-ServeRx. However, the overall number of once-only medication orders 
was very similar pre- and post-ServeRx, suggesting that this did not have a major 
influence.  
 
Overall, it would appear that the two data collection periods were largely comparable, 
and any differences are likely to be due to differences in work patterns that arose 
following the introduction of ServeRx.  
 
Was there any difference in the errors identified pre- and post-ServeRx? 
We did not identify any impact of ServeRx on the incidence of prescribing errors, 
whether expressed per medication order or per patient day, using either the RRF or 
the trigger tool.   However, being a pilot study, this aspect of our study was not 
powered to detect a difference and used less data than was used in the prospective 
study.  
 
There was no difference in the proportion of errors rectified prior to administration, 
and error rates were similar with respect to the stages of patient stay in which they 
occurred.  The sample size was not sufficient to have identified differences in the 
types of errors that occurred, but we did notice a potential reduction in errors 
involving provision of information for product supply.  ServeRx appears to have 
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reduced errors involving failure to specify strength or formulation for products where 
more than one of these is available, as prescribers must choose from the options 
available.  
 
A more general discussion of the issues relating to retrospective data collection 
appears at the end of this chapter. 
 
Conclusions 
Using the RRF, we did not identify any impact of ServeRx on the incidence of 
prescribing errors, whether expressed per medication order or per patient day. Errors 
were identified in 7.4% of medication orders pre-ServeRx and in 6.5% post-ServeRx.    
Four errors that resulted in harm were identified post-ServeRx, and none pre-
ServeRx. None of the four appeared to be related to ServeRx.  
 
 
5.3 Retrospective evaluation at Queen’s Hospital 
 
Methods 
Methods were very similar to those used at Charing Cross Hospital, as described 
above, however the sampling strategy was different.   Since different versions of 
Meditech’s electronic prescribing system had been introduced gradually over the 
course of a decade, we wanted our post-implementation sample to include a range of 
different versions of software.  Throughout the rest of this chapter, “post-Meditech” 
refers to the data collected following the implementation of the Meditech electronic 
prescribing module; other modules of the Meditech system were already in place 
before the electronic prescribing module was introduced. 
 
Sampling strategy 
This part of the pilot was designed to study the issues involved in evaluating well 
established systems which had often grown relatively slowly, usually starting with the 
less clinically challenging wards and then moving to more difficult environments more 
recently.  We sampled patients from four different wards, one each from the 
specialties of general medicine, general surgery, paediatrics and medicine for the 
elderly, each of which had different versions of the software introduced at different 
times, as summarised in Table 23.   
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For each selected ward, data were collected for 25 randomly selected patients 
admitted in the calendar month six months before implementation of Meditech, and 
for 25 patients admitted in the calendar month six months afterwards (Table 23). 
 
Speciality & Ward Software version 
and date of 
implementation 
Pre-Meditech 
sample 
 
Post-Meditech 
sample 
Paediatrics 
   (Ward 1)  
version 4.8 
June 2002  
25 patients admitted 
in December 2001 
25 patients admitted 
in December 2002 
General Surgery 
   (Ward 3) 
version 4.6 
November 1999  
25 patients admitted 
in May 1999 
25 patients admitted 
in May 2000 
General Medical 
   (Ward 8) 
version 4.6 
June 1999  
25 patients admitted 
in December 1998 
25 patients admitted 
in December 1999 
Care of the Elderly 
     (Wards A, B, C) 
version 4.4 
December 1996  
25 patients admitted 
in June 1996 
25 patients admitted 
in June 1997 
Care of the Elderly  
     (Ward 5, 6) 
version 4.4 
March 1997  
25 patients admitted 
in September 1996 
25 patients admitted 
in September 1997 
Table 23: Initial sampling strategy, based on implementation of different 
Meditech versions at different times 
 
Data collection 
Inpatients admitted to the study ward in each specified month were identified from 
the hospital’s information system, and 25 patients randomly selected.  Where 
patients’ notes could not be retrieved from the medical records library, additional 
patients were randomly selected in order to achieve the desired sample size.  
 
For each patient whose medical notes were retrieved, a research pharmacist 
completed the retrospective review form (RRF) for the medication orders written 
throughout their entire stay on the study ward.  This was a methodological difference 
compared to Charing Cross hospital, where we collected data only on medication 
orders written during a four-week study period.  An additional difference was that 
laboratory data were examined for all patients in Queen’s Hospital, regardless of the 
medication they were taking.  All other methodological details were identical.  Details 
were recorded of any prescribing errors identified, including any harm that resulted. 
The number of medication orders written for each patient during his or her stay on 
the study ward was also recorded.   
 
Assessing the clinical severity of the errors identified 
We assessed the clinical severity of all errors that caused harm and a 1 in 3 sample 
of those that did not, using the same methods as described for Charing Cross 
Hospital.  
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Establishing the practical issues in retrieving information retrospectively 
As for Charing Cross Hospital, we documented any problems experienced in 
retrieving information from both the paper-based records and the electronic 
prescribing system.   
 
Results 
Demographic data 
We found that it was not possible to retrieve certain prescribing and pharmacy 
information for version 4.4, the version introduced on the medicine for the elderly 
wards; this was due to a reporting utility that had been removed.  It was therefore not 
possible to include any patients from this specialty in the study, and data were 
subsequently collected only from a general medicine, a general surgery and a 
paediatric ward.  
 
A total of 75 patients’ medical notes were therefore reviewed pre-Meditech, and 75 
post-Meditech, rather than the planned 100. The numbers of medication orders 
written for these patients are summarised in Table 24.  Patient stays were longer 
post-Meditech for the general medical and paediatric specialties, and shorter for 
surgery.  Similar numbers of medication orders were written for each patient pre- and 
post-Meditech. More details of the medication orders written are given in Tables 25 
and 26. There was no difference between the pre- and post-Meditech periods in 
terms of the stage of patient stay in which medication orders were written (p = 0.12; 
chi square test).  However, the types of medication order differed (p = 0.03; chi 
square test) with proportionally more “when required” orders being written post-
Meditech. It is not known why this was the case. 
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General Medicine General Surgery Paediatrics  
Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post 
Total  
Pre-
Meditech 
Total 
Post-
Meditech
Patients admitted 
in study month 
82 71 190 187 209 221 481 479 
Patients’ notes 
reviewed (% of 
patients admitted 
in study month) 
25 
(30.5%) 
25 
(35.2%)
25 
(13.2%)
25 
(13.4%) 
25 
(11.9%) 
25 
(11.3%) 
75  
(15.6%) 
75 
(15.7%) 
Medication 
orders written 
(mean per 
patient) 
384 
(15.4) 
422 
(16.9) 
337 
(13.5) 
297 
(11.9) 
115 
(4.6) 
161 
(6.4) 
836 
(11.2) 
880 
(11.7) 
Patient days  
(mean per 
patient) 
117 
(4.7) 
232 
(9.3) 
96 
(3.8) 
66 
(2.6) 
35 
(1.4) 
55 
(2.2) 
248 
(3.3) 
353 
(4.7) 
Table 24: Summary of demographic data 
 
 
Stage of  
Patient Stay 
General 
Medicine 
General 
Surgery 
Paediatrics 
 Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post 
Total  
Pre-
Meditech 
Total 
Post-
Meditech 
On Admission 146 149 106 84 35 43 287 276 
During stay 160 171 196 164 53 90 409 425 
Re-writing drug 
chart* 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Writing Discharge 
Prescription 
78 102 35 49 27 28 140 179 
Grand Total 384 422 337 297 115 161 836 880 
Table 25: Medication orders written, presented according to stage of patient 
stay 
*Rewriting the drug chart was not relevant at this site, as no examples were identified where 
patients’ inpatient drug charts were re-written.  Instead, a copy of the administration section of 
the drug chart was attached to the original chart for patients with longer lengths of stay.   
 
 
 
General 
Medicine 
General 
Surgery 
Paediatrics Prescription Type 
Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post
Total  
Pre-
Meditech 
Total  
Post-
Meditech 
Regular 239 272 129 97 45 47 413 416 
IV infusion 67 65 104 76 4 9 175 150 
Stat 29 33 27 28 12 19 68 80 
When required 49 52 77 96 54 86 180 234 
Grand Total 384 422 337 297 115 161 836 880 
Table 26: Medication orders written, presented according to type of medication 
order  
 
Prescribing errors identified using the RRF 
Table 27 summarises the prescribing errors identified. A prescribing error was 
identified in 8.6% of all medication orders pre-Meditech, and in 8.8% post-Meditech.  
This difference of 0.2% is not statistically significant (95% CI –2.5 to 2.9%).  When 
presented according to patient day, prescribing error rates were 0.29 pre-Meditech, 
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and 0.22 afterwards. Sample sizes for individual specialties are too small to permit 
statistical analysis. 
 
General 
Medicine 
General 
Surgery 
Paediatrics  
Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post 
Total  
Pre-
Meditech 
Total 
Post-
Meditech 
Prescribing errors 
identified (% of 
medication orders 
written) 
34 
(8.9%) 
29 
(6.9%) 
22 
(6.5%) 
17 
(5.7%) 
16 
(13.9%)
31 
(19.3%) 
72 
(8.6%) 
77 
(8.8%) 
Prescribing errors 
per patient day 
0.29 0.13 0.23 0.26 0.46 0.56 0.29 0.22 
Prescribing errors 
that resulted in 
harm (% of 
medication orders 
written) 
1 
(0.3%) 
3 
(0.7%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
1 
(0.1%) 
3 
(0.3%) 
Prescribing errors 
that resulted in 
harm per patient 
day 
0.008 0.013 0 0 0 0 0.004 0.0085 
Table 27: Summary of results relating to prescribing errors 
 
We identified four errors that resulted in patient harm.  All were in patients admitted 
to the medical ward, one was pre-Meditech and three afterwards; none of which 
appeared to be specifically related to electronic prescribing. 
 
The errors were as follows: 
1. A patient on regular aminophylline 225mg twice daily was prescribed 
clarithromycin, which inhibits the metabolism of theophylline and can result in 
raised theophylline levels.  Two days later, the patient complained that his “heart 
felt funny”. Theophylline levels were not checked.  
2. A patient admitted from a nursing home following a collapse and the onset of 
acute renal failure, was prescribed his usual dose of digoxin 125 micrograms 
once daily on admission without dose reduction. This resulted in a digoxin level of 
2.7 micrograms/litre (desired range 1 – 2 micrograms/litre) two days later and the 
drug was stopped. 
3. A patient was prescribed acitretin 25mg daily for the treatment of pityriasis rubra 
pilaris, in spite of having renal impairment (estimated creatinine clearance 27 
ml/min).   Acitretin is contraindicated in renal impairment as this can increase the 
risk of toxicity.  The post-mortem report in the patient’s medical notes indicates 
that acitretin toxicity was thought to have contributed to this patient’s death, 
although further details are not given.  
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4. A patient was admitted on a dose of digoxin 250mcg daily with an estimated 
creatinine clearance of 11ml/minute. The digoxin dose was not reduced or 
stopped.  When the digoxin level was checked the following day, it was reported 
as being 6 mcg/L (desired range 1 – 2 micrograms/litre). 
 
Table 28 presents the prescribing errors identified according to the stage of patient 
stay, and Table 29 according to the stage of the prescribing process. There was no 
difference in the proportions of errors identified at each stage of patient stay (p = 
0.66; chi square test). 
 
Stage of Patient Stay 
Total Pre- 
Meditech 
Total  
Post-Meditech 
On Admission 29 27 
During stay 33 41 
Re-writing drug chart 0 0 
Writing Discharge Prescription 10 9 
Total 72 77 
Table 28: Prescribing errors identified according to the stage of patient stay 
 
Stage of Prescribing Process Total Pre- 
Meditech 
Total  
Post-Meditech 
Need for drug 15 
(1.8%) 
22 
(2.5%) 
Selection of drug 0 
(0%) 
5 
(0.4%) 
Selection of drug dose 42 
(5.0%) 
46 
(5.2%) 
Selection of formulation 2 
(0.2%) 
2 
(0.2%) 
Instructions for supply 12 
(1.4%) 
1 
(0.1%) 
Instructions for admin.  1 
(0.1%) 
1 
(0.1%) 
TOTAL 72 
(8.6%) 
77 
(8.8%) 
Table 29: Prescribing errors presented according to stage of the prescribing 
process 
Percentages are expressed as a percentage of all medication orders written 
 
This suggests that there was a reduction in errors involving provision of instructions 
for supply following the introduction of Meditech, but few other differences.  However, 
the sample sizes are too small to allow any firm conclusions to be drawn. 
 
Clinical severity of the prescribing errors identified 
The mean severity score for the sample of errors assessed pre-Meditech was 4.4; 
post-Meditech it was 5.0. This difference was not significant (p = 0.11; t-test). There 
  
76
were two errors with a score of more than 7 (representing a “serious” error), one of 
which was pre- and one post-Meditech. The four errors that resulted in harm were 
given scores of 5.4, 7.0, 4.0 and 7.2 retrospectively.   
 
Practical issues in retrieving information from the medical notes and a computerised 
prescribing system 
The mean time taken to complete the RRF was 46 minutes for the pre-Meditech 
patients and 57 minutes afterwards. This difference is statistically significant (p = 
0.004; t-test).  Overall, the mean time was 51 minutes (range 10 to 145 minutes). 
These times are similar to those reported for Charing Cross Hospital (40 minutes and 
46 minutes pre and post-ServeRx respectively). Again, this excluded the time taken 
to retrieve medical notes and other information; an average of four patients could be 
reviewed each day. 
 
Various issues were identified in relation to retrieving information from both the 
paper-based and the computer-based records. Some of these were similar to the 
issues documented for Charing Cross Hospital; others were site-specific.   
 
First, we could not retrospectively retrieve sufficient prescribing and pharmacy 
information from Meditech version 4.4, and were not able to sample any patients 
from the care of the elderly wards as initially specified in our sampling strategy.  We 
therefore reviewed 75 patients pre- and 75 post-Meditech, rather than our target of 
200 in total. 
 
Second, for the 150 patients who were studied, not all of the medical notes initially 
requested could be retrieved.  In total, 217 sets of medical notes were requested, of 
which 37 (17%) were not available as they were issued to other clinics or 
departments.  
  
Third, for some patients whose notes were retrieved, not all of the required 
documents were available (Table 30).  It is also possible that some additional drug 
charts may have been missing, as for the Charing Cross study, although a higher 
percentage of documents were retrieved at Queen’s Hospital.   
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General 
Medicine 
General 
Surgery 
Paediatrics  
Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post 
Total  
Pre-
Meditech 
Total 
Post-
Meditech 
Initial 
Assessment 
25 25 25 25 25 25 75 
(100%) 
75 
(100%) 
Medical Progress 
Notes 
25 25 25 25 25 25 75 
(100%) 
75 
(100%) 
Nursing/ 
Midwifery Notes 
25 24  
(1N)  
24  
(1N) 
20  
(5N) 
22  
(3N/A) 
23  
(2N) 
71 
(99%) 
67 
(89%) 
Laboratory/ 
Pathology data 
25 25 25 21  
(2N/A, 
2N) 
18  
(6N/A, 
1N) 
23  
(2N) 
68 
(99%) 
69 
(75%) 
Current 
Medication Chart 
25 25 24  
(1N) 
25 18  
(5N/A, 
2N) 
23  
(2N/A)
67 
(96%) 
73 
(75%) 
Discharge 
Prescription 
19  
(6N/A) 
17  
(8N/A)
17  
(5N/A, 
3N) 
19  
(6N/A)
13  
(10N/A, 
2N) 
16  
(9N/A)
49 
(91%) 
52 
(100%) 
Table 30: Data sources retrieved pre- and post- implementation of electronic 
prescribing 
N = Not retrieved; N/A= Not applicable/Not required; percentages are calculated excluding 
those patients where data source was not applicable. 
 
 
Finally, there were additional issues relating to the retrieval of electronic nursing 
notes and laboratory data from the main Meditech system, even for patients studied 
prior to the introduction of electronic prescribing. Nursing notes were not always 
accessible via the patient care inquiry system, although it was possible to retrieve 
them directly from the Meditech nursing module. Similarly, laboratory data had to be 
accessed from the hospital patient information system, which could not always be 
accessed. There were often problems retrieving information stored on the optical disk 
storage system, particularly when several individuals were trying to retrieve data at 
the same time.  In many cases, several attempts were required to access the 
information required. Interestingly, for the pre-Meditech data collection period on the 
general medical ward, nursing notes were printed and filed in the paper notes in most 
cases, whereas this was not the case for any of the other data collection periods 
either pre- or post- Meditech.   
 
Discussion  
In contrast to the Charing Cross Hospital study, there did not seem to have been any 
system-related changes in prescribing patterns at Queen’s Hospital. This may be 
because the Meditech electronic prescribing system was almost hospital-wide at the 
time of our study, whereas ServeRx was a one-ward pilot. 
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Was there any difference in the errors identified pre- and post-Meditech? 
We did not identify any impact of Meditech on the incidence of prescribing errors, 
whether expressed per medication order or per patient day, using either the RRF or 
the trigger tool.   However, the study was not formally powered to be able to identify a 
difference.   
 
Error rates were similar with respect to the stages of patient stay in which they 
occurred.  The sample size was not sufficient to have identified differences in the 
types of errors that occurred, but as for Charing Cross, we did notice a potential 
reduction in errors involving provision of information for product supply.   
 
Conclusions 
Using the RRF, we identified prescribing error rates of 8.6% and 8.8% pre- and post-
Meditech, respectively. Four errors resulted in harm. 
 
 
5.4 Discussion  
 
As far as we are aware, these pilot studies represent the first retrospective study of 
prescribing errors in the UK for 30 years, and the only one to study errors before and 
after the introduction of electronic prescribing.  
 
We found that it was possible to assess prescribing errors retrospectively using the 
RRF, although there were a number of practical issues encountered. These related 
to patient identification, retrieval of both paper-based and electronic medical records, 
and completeness of information filed in the medical notes.  We also experienced a 
number of difficulties in retrospectively interpreting information. First, we realised that 
there had often been changes in clinical practice in the time period between a 
patient’s hospital stay and the review of their medical records. For some of the 
patients at Queen’s Hospital, this was almost ten years.  We therefore tried to assess 
potential prescribing errors based on clinical practice at the time of the patient’s stay; 
however, this was difficult in some cases.  Second, it was often difficult to assess 
whether or not apparent harm had been caused by a prescribing error. Previous 
retrospective studies of iatrogenic injury have included an assessment of the 
likelihood of harm having resulted from a particular error; we would recommend that 
this be included in further retrospective studies of prescribing errors.  Third, we 
intentionally used a broad definition of “harm”; it could be argued that some of the 
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errors classified as having caused harm resulted only in laboratory tests being 
outside of the desired ranges and would have had no consequences for the patient. 
Had the tests not been done, no “harm” may have been identified.  In future studies, 
it may therefore be useful to define different levels of harm.  Finally, our early inter-
rater reliability tests, as described in Chapter 3, suggested that two different 
researchers identified different errors; more work is needed to explore the reliability 
of this method of error identification.  As a result of such issues, we found that our 
research pharmacists could each only assess an average of four sets of medical 
notes each day. 
 
Our results suggest that prescribing errors occurred in 7.4% of medication orders 
pre- and 6.5% post-ServeRx, and 8.6% pre- and 8.8% post Meditech. These 
retrospective studies were pilot studies and not powered to have been able to detect 
differences. However, our findings may be useful in performing sample size 
calculations for future studies of this type.  Our data suggest that the only type of 
error that may have been reduced with electronic prescribing is the provision of 
instructions for supply of the correct product. This is perhaps not surprising, as the 
two systems studied both required medication orders to be complete and for specific 
dosage forms to be selected.  
 
The error rates identified were higher than those previously reported using 
prospective reporting by ward pharmacists. The next chapter explores this 
discrepancy in more detail, and further discusses the advantages and disadvantages 
of different methods for identifying prescribing errors. 
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6. Comparing four methods of detecting prescribing errors 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
This Chapter describes the comparison of four different methods for the detection of 
prescribing errors in the same set of patients at Charing Cross Hospital.  Chapters 4 
and 5 have already presented the results relating to prescribing errors before and 
after the introduction of ServeRx at Charing Cross, when studied both prospectively 
and retrospectively.  Using a prospective method, we identified prescribing errors in 
3.8% of medication orders pre-ServeRx, and in 2.0% post-ServeRx.  In contrast, 
using the retrospective review form (RRF), we identified prescribing errors in 7.4% of 
medication orders pre-ServeRx and in 6.5% post-ServeRx.  Furthermore, using the 
RRF, we identified four errors that resulted in some degree of patient harm.  In this 
Chapter, we explore the potential reasons for the discrepancies in these results, as 
well as presenting and comparing the results obtained using two further methods: the 
trigger tool and spontaneous incident reports.   
 
The objective of this part of the study was to compare, in the same set of patients, 
four methods of detecting prescribing errors: 
a) Prospective detection by pharmacists; 
b) Retrospective detection from medical notes using the retrospective review 
form (RRF); 
c) Retrospective use of the trigger tool; 
d) Spontaneous reporting. 
 
6.2 Setting and subjects 
 
As explained in previous chapters, data on prescribing errors were collected on a 
surgical ward at Charing Cross Hospital during two four-week periods. The first data 
collection period was about three months before the introduction of ServeRx (April 
2003); the second was six months after its introduction (November / December 
2003). Where patients were on the study ward prior to the beginning of the relevant 
period, or remained on the ward at the end of the period, only those medication 
orders written within the study period were included. We collected data using each of 
the four methods for these same two periods. 
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6.3 Methods 
 
Before describing how the methods were compared, we will give brief details of the 
four methods used.   
 
The four methods used 
a) Prospective data collection by the ward pharmacist 
As explained in more detail in Chapter 4, the same ward pharmacist prospectively 
identified prescribing errors on the study ward during the two four-week periods, 
using methods published previously 3. In addition, one of the investigators (BDF) 
checked for prescribing errors once a week to help identify any that had not been 
documented by the ward pharmacist.  
 
b) Retrospective data collection from the medical notes using the RRF 
As discussed in Chapter 5, we recorded details of any prescribing errors identified 
using the RRF in those patients whose medical notes were retrieved.  The number of 
medication orders written for each patient during the study period was also 
documented.  
 
c) Retrospective data collection using the trigger tool  
For each patient whose medical notes were retrieved, we also applied the trigger 
tool, as described in Chapter 3, after completion of the RRF.  Details of any 
prescribing errors identified in medication orders written within the study period were 
recorded. 
 
d) Spontaneous reporting 
The Trust operated a medication and blood transfusion incident reporting system, 
and all pharmacy, nursing and medical staff were encouraged to report any 
medication errors identified either electronically or via paper forms.  About 1,000 
reports are received each year, details of which are held in a central database. For 
the purposes of this study, we retrieved details of all reports relating to prescribing 
errors on the study ward in either of the two study periods. 
 
Establishing denominators 
We used two denominators, as explained in Chapter 3. The first was the number of 
medication orders written during the study period for the patients reviewed; the 
second was the number of patient days during the relevant study period for the 
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patients reviewed. Both of these were determined during the retrospective review of 
the medical notes using the RRF, as described in Chapter 5.  
 
Comparing the four methods 
For the purposes of this comparison, we included only those errors identified, by any 
method, in patients whose medical notes were reviewed for the retrospective part of 
the study.  Only prescribing errors were studied.  Separate comparisons were made 
for the pre- and post-ServeRx cohorts of patients. 
 
Prescribing errors identified using each method were classified according to type, the 
stage of patient stay in which they occurred, and whether or not they were rectified 
before the patient received one or more doses. All errors identified were checked by 
BDF to ensure that they met the study’s definition of a prescribing error and that they 
were classified correctly.  
 
Assessing the clinical severity of the errors identified 
We assessed the severity of all prescribing errors identified prospectively, all 
prescribing errors that resulted in harm, and a 1 in 3 sample of those identified by 
other methods but not prospectively.  Errors were assessed by an expert panel, 
using the methods described in Chapter 4 37. 
 
Specificity of the triggers within the trigger tool 
For each of the 23 triggers, we calculated the specificity of that individual trigger 
when compared to the prescribing errors identified by the trigger tool overall.  
 
6.4 Results 
 
As reported in Chapter 5, we reviewed the medical notes for 93 (72%) of the 129 
patients on the study ward during the pre-ServeRx data collection period, and 114 
(78%) of 147 patients post-ServeRx. The remainder of these results relate only to 
those patients whose notes were reviewed.  
 
A total of 1258 medication orders were written for these patients pre-ServeRx (mean 
13.5 per patient), and 1614 post-ServeRx (mean 14.2). There were 438 patient days 
in the pre-ServeRx data collection period (mean 4.7 per patient), and 501 post-
ServeRx (mean 4.4).  
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a) Prospective data collection by the ward pharmacist 
In those patients included in the comparison, 48 prescribing errors were identified 
pre-ServeRx (3.8% of medication orders written), and 30 post-ServeRx (1.9% of 
medication orders written).  Although in a smaller subset of patients, these 
percentage error rates are very similar to those identified for the entire population, as 
described in Chapter 4.  Error rates per patient day were 0.11 and 0.06 pre- and 
post-ServeRx, respectively. 
 
b) Retrospective data collection from the medical notes 
Completion of the RRF took about an average of 44 minutes per patient, as well as 
the time taken to retrieve the medical notes. As presented in Chapter 5, we identified 
93 prescribing errors pre-ServeRx (7.4% of all medication orders written) and 105 
post-ServeRx (6.5% of all medication orders written). These figures both relate to 
0.21 prescribing errors per patient day.  In the pre-ServeRx data collection period, no 
errors resulting in harm were identified; there were four in the post-ServeRx data 
collection period, none of which appeared to be associated with ServeRx.   
 
c). Retrospective data collection using the trigger tool 
Application of the trigger tool following the RRF took about 4 minutes per patient. We 
did not identify any errors using the trigger tool in the pre-ServeRx data collection 
period. Two prescribing errors were identified in the post-ServeRx data collection 
period.  These were two of the prescribing errors resulting in harm identified using 
the RRF (errors 1 and 2 as listed in Chapter 5). These two errors relate to an error 
rate of 0.1% of all medication orders written, or 0.004 errors per patient day, in the 
post-ServeRx study period. 
 
d) Spontaneous reporting 
For the patients included in the analysis, there was one prescribing error reported on 
the Trust’s database in the pre-ServeRx period, and one post–ServeRx.  The pre-
ServeRx error was a medication order for modified release nifedipine with no start 
date; the post-ServeRx error was a prescriber’s selection of metformin instead of 
metronidazole from the medication list.  
 
Table 31 summarises the error rates identified using each method. 
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Pre-ServeRx Post-ServeRx 
Method Per medication 
orders written 
Per patient 
day 
Per medication 
orders written 
Per patient 
day 
Ward pharmacist 
(prospective) 
3.8% 0.11 1.9% 0.06 
Retrospective review 
form 
7.4% 0.21 6.5% 0.21 
Retrospective use of 
trigger tool  
0 0 0.1% 0.004 
Spontaneous 
reporting 
0.1% 0.002 0.1% 0.002 
Table 31: Summary of error rates identified using each of the four methods 
Results apply only to those patients included in the comparative analysis 
 
No errors resulting in harm were identified pre-ServeRx, and a total of four were 
identified post-ServeRx. Of these four, two (50%) were also identified using the 
trigger tool. 
 
Total numbers of errors identified 
Using all four methods, a total of 135 different prescribing errors were identified pre-
ServeRx (10.7% of all medication orders written; 0.31 errors per patient day), and 
127 post-ServeRx (7.9% of all medication orders written; 0.25 errors per patient day).  
The difference in prescribing errors presented according to the number of medication 
orders written is statistically significant (p = 0.01; chi square test; 95% CI for the 
difference - 0.6% to - 5.0%), while those presented per patient day are not (p = 0.07; 
chi square test).  
 
Comparing the four methods 
Figures 17 and 18 summarise the errors identified by each method and the extent of 
overlap between the different methods, for the pre- and post-ServeRx cohorts 
respectively. It can be seen that few errors were identified by more than one method. 
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Figure 17: Prescribing errors identified in the pre-ServeRx cohort (n = 93 
patients; 135 errors). No errors were identified using the trigger tool. 
RRF = retrospective review form 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 18: Prescribing errors identified in the post-ServeRx cohort (n = 114 
patients; 127 errors).  
RRF = retrospective review form 
 
 
Tables 32 and 33 present the prescribing errors identified using each method, 
according to stages of the prescribing process, for the pre- and post-ServeRx cohorts 
respectively.  Regardless of whether they were identified by retrospective or 
prospective methods, most errors related to the stages of “need for drug therapy” and 
“select specific dose”.  The highest proportion of the errors identified using the RRF 
alone related to “need for drug therapy”. 
 
 
 
RRF (n = 93)
Pharmacist (n = 48)
Spontaneous report (n = 1)
RRF (n = 105)
Pharmacist (n = 30)
Spontaneous report (n = 1)
trigger tool  
(n = 2) 
7 
9 
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Methods used to identify errors Stage of 
prescribing 
process 
Pharmacist 
alone 
RRF 
alone 
Pharmacist 
and RRF 
Spont. 
report alone 
Total errors 
detected 
Need for drug 
therapy 
9 39 0 0 48 
Select specific drug 
 
1 3 0 0 4 
Select drug dose 
 
17 28 6 0 51 
Select formulation 
 
1 2 0 0 3 
Give instructions for 
product supply  
6 8 1 1 16 
Give administration 
instructions 
7 6 0 0 13 
TOTAL 
(% of all errors) 
41 
(30.4%) 
86 
(63.7%)
7 
(5.2%) 
1 
(0.7%) 
135 
(100%) 
Table 32: Comparison of prescribing errors identified using each method or 
combination of methods, presented according to the stage of the prescribing 
process, for the pre-ServeRx cohort.  
RRF = Retrospective Review Form. No errors were detected using the trigger tool 
 
 
 
 
Methods used to identify errors Stage of 
prescribing 
process 
Pharmacist 
alone 
RRF 
alone 
Pharmacist 
and RRF 
Spont. 
report alone 
Total errors 
detected 
Need for drug 
therapy 
10 44 1 0 55 
Select specific drug 
 
0 6* 0 1 7 
Select drug dose 
 
9 38* 5 0 52 
Select formulation 
 
1 1 1 0 3 
Give instructions for 
product supply  
0 1 0 0 1 
Give administration 
instructions 
1 6 2 0 9 
TOTAL  
(% of all errors) 
21 
(16.5%) 
96 
(75.6%)
9 
(7.1%) 
1 
(0.8%) 
127 
(100%) 
Table 33:  Comparison of prescribing errors identified using each method or 
combination of methods, presented according to the stage of the prescribing 
process, for the post-ServeRx cohort.  
RRF = Retrospective Review Form.  
* In each case, one of these errors was identified by the trigger tool method as well as the 
RRF.  
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To further explore the differences in the types of error identified, a more detailed 
analysis of the types of error was carried out. The results are presented in Appendix 
J. In general the omission of medication on admission, from the discharge 
prescription and other types of omission were best identified by the RRF; duplication 
of medication and prescription of medication for which there was no indication was 
best identified by the pharmacist.   Selection of the incorrect drug was best identified 
by the RRF; a range of different wrong dose errors were identified by the pharmacist 
and the RRF. Errors involving specification of correct strength and formulation on 
paper drug charts were identified equally by the pharmacist and RRF, although 
different errors were identified.  
 
Tables 34 and 35 present the prescribing errors according to whether or not they 
were rectified prior to administration, for the pre- and post-ServeRx cohorts 
respectively. Perhaps not surprisingly, errors identified by the pharmacist were more 
likely to have been rectified prior to administration, particularly in the post-ServeRx 
cohort. 
 
It was noted that for some RRF errors (16 pre-ServeRx and 11 post-ServeRx), there 
was evidence in the medical notes that the pharmacist had identified and rectified the 
error, but the errors were not reported as such by the pharmacist.  
 
Methods used to identify errors Was error rectified 
before patient 
received doses?  
Pharmacist 
alone 
RRF 
alone 
Pharmacist 
and RRF 
Spont. 
report alone 
Total errors 
detected 
Yes 18  
(49%) 
24 
(35%) 
2 
(33%) 
0 44 
(39%) 
No 19  
(51%) 
45 
(65%) 
4 
(66%) 
0 68 
(61%) 
Not known 4 
  
17 1 1 23 
TOTAL 41 86 7 1 135 
Table 34: Prescribing errors identified using each method or combination of 
methods, presented according to whether or not the error was rectified before 
the patient received (or should have received) one or more doses, for the pre-
ServeRx cohort.  
Percentages are the percentage of errors identified using this method for which the outcome 
was known. 
RRF = Retrospective Review Form. No errors were detected using the trigger tool 
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Methods used to identify errors Was error rectified 
before patient 
received doses?  
Pharmacist 
alone 
RRF 
alone 
Pharmacist 
and RRF 
Spont. 
report alone 
Total errors 
detected 
Yes 12 
(57%) 
13 
(22%) 
6 
(86%) 
1 
(100%) 
32 
(36%) 
No 9 
(43%) 
46* 
(78%) 
1 
(14%) 
0 
(0%) 
56 
(64%) 
Not known 0 
 
37 2 0 39 
TOTAL 21 96 9 1 127 
Table 35: Prescribing errors identified using each method or combination of 
methods, presented according to whether or not the error was rectified before 
the patient received (or should have received) one or more doses, for the post-
ServeRx cohort.  
Percentages are the percentage of errors identified using this method for which the outcome 
was known. 
RRF = Retrospective Review Form. 
* In each case, one of these errors was identified by the trigger tool method as well as the 
RRF. 
 
Tables 36 and 37 present the results according to the stage of patient stay in which 
the error occurred. The RRF identified more errors at the admission and discharge 
stages.  The pharmacist identified more errors on transcription of inpatient drug 
charts in the pre-ServeRx cohort, while the RRF identified more arising during 
transcription onto ServeRx.  Similar numbers of errors arising during the patient stay 
were identified by the RRF and pharmacist pre-ServeRx, while the RRF identified 
more post-ServeRx.   
 
 
Methods used to identify errors Stage of patient 
stay  Pharmacist alone 
RRF 
alone 
Pharmacist 
and RRF 
Spont. 
report alone 
Total errors 
detected 
Admission 
 
17 49 3 0 69 
During Stay 
 
14 18 4 1 37 
Transcribing on new 
drug chart / ServeRx 
8 4 0 0 12 
Writing TTA 
 
2 15 0 0 17 
TOTAL 41 86 7 1 135 
Table 36: Prescribing errors identified using each method or combination of 
methods, presented according to stage of patient stay, for the pre-ServeRx 
cohort.  
RRF = Retrospective Review Form. No errors were detected using the trigger tool 
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Methods used to identify errors Stage of patient 
stay Pharmacist alone 
RRF 
alone 
Pharmacist 
and RRF 
Spont. 
report alone 
Total errors 
detected 
Admission 
 
9 41 2 0 52 
During Stay 
 
9 27 5 0 41 
Transcribing on new 
drug chart / ServeRx 
2 13 2 1 18 
Writing TTA 
 
1 15 0 0 16 
TOTAL 21 96 9 1 127 
Table 37: Prescribing errors identified using each method or combination of 
methods, presented according to stage of patient stay, for the post-ServeRx 
cohort.  
RRF = Retrospective Review Form. 
 
 
Clinical severity of the prescribing errors identified 
Table 38 summarises the clinical severity scores for the prescribing errors identified 
using the different methods. This suggests that there was no difference in clinical 
severity between errors identified by the ward pharmacist and the RRF, but there is 
some indication that those identified by the trigger tool were of a higher severity. 
 
Method Severity scores 
Ward pharmacist (prospective) (n = 78) Mean score 4.4 
Retrospective review form (n = 57 in sample) Mean score 4.4  
Retrospective use of trigger tool (n = 2) Mean score 6.0 (scores of 5.6 and 6.4) 
Spontaneous reporting (n = 2) Not assessed 
Table 38: Clinical severity of the prescribing errors identified using each 
method. Prescribing errors identified both pre- and post-ServeRx are presented together 
 
Specificity of the triggers within the trigger tool 
Table 39 summarises the numbers of individual triggers that were positive for all 207 
patients studied, the percentage of these that related to a prescribing error and their 
specificity. The specificity of each trigger is also shown in Table 39; this ranged from 
0.54 (trigger T4) to 1.0 (triggers T7 and T9). 
 
Overall, at least one trigger was positive for 127 (61%) of the 207 patients studied.  
Of these 127 patients, examination of the positive triggers led to the identification of 
two (1.6%) patients with prescribing errors that resulted in harm.  There were a total  
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Drug chart data 
Code UK trigger Potential problem 
identified 
Positive? 
(% pts; 
specificity) 
Error? 
(% of +ve) 
 Notes  
T1 Chlorphenamine / loratadine / 
hydrocortisone 
Hypersensitivity reaction of 
drug effect 
9  
(4%; 0.94) 
0 Some not needed; non-
preventable ADRs 
T2 Vitamin K (phytomenadione) Over-anticoagulation with 
warfarin 
2  
(1%;0.99) 
0 Prescribed for disease state, not 
warfarin-related 
T3 Flumazenil Over-sedation with 
benzodiazepines 
0 0  
T4 Droperidol, ondansetron, 
promethazine, hydroxyzine, 
prochlorperazine, 
metoclopramide, cyclizine, 
granisetron or domperidone 
Nausea/emesis related to 
drug use 
101  
(46%;0.54)
0 Prescribed for nausea following 
surgery or other reasons 
unrelated to drug therapy. 
T5 Naloxone Over-sedation with narcotic 0 0  
T6 Anti-diarrhoeals: loperamide, 
diphenoxylate, codeine or co-
phenotrope 
Adverse drug event 36  
(16%;0.84)
0 Prescribed for analgesia and 
other underlying disease states. 
T7 Calcium Resonium Hyperkalaemia related to 
renal impairment or drug 
1  
(0.5%;1.0 
1 
(100%) 
Error number 2 as in previous 
section 
T22 Unexpected medication stop 
 
Adverse drug event 2  
(1%;0.99) 
0 Two ADRs (not preventable) 
Patient notes data 
Code UK trigger Process identified Positive? 
(% of pts) 
Error? 
(% of +ve) 
 Notes 
T20 Over-sedation, lethargy, falls, 
hypotension 
Related to overuse of 
medication 
3 
(1%; 0.99) 
0 Hypotension unrelated to 
medication error 
T21 Rash Drug related/adverse drug 
event 
3 
(1%) 
0 Two were adverse drug 
reactions (not preventable) 
T23 Transfer to higher level of 
care, such as ITU or CCU 
Adverse event 2  
(1%; 0.99) 
0  
Biochemical / haematological / microbiological data 
Code UK trigger Process identified Positive? 
(% of pts) 
Error? 
(% of +ve) 
 Notes 
T8 APTT > 3 Over-anticoagulation with 
heparin 
2 
(1%; 0.99) 
0  
T9 INR >6 Over-anticoagulation with 
warfarin 
1 
(0.5%;1.0) 
1 
(100%) 
Error number 1 as in previous 
section 
T10 WBC < 3 x 109 /L  Neutropenia related to drug 
or disease 
1 
(0.5%;0.99
0  
T11 Serum glucose < 2.8 mmol/L Related to insulin use or 
oral antidiabetics 
0 0  
T12 Rising serum creatinine 
 
Renal insufficiency related 
to drug use 
4  
(2%; 0.98) 
0 Haemodialysis patient or  
underlying disease state 
T13 Clostridium difficile positive 
stool 
Exposure to antibiotics 1  
(0.5%;0.99
0 Cefuroxime stopped after 
positive result 
T14 Digoxin level >2mcg/L Toxic digoxin level 0 0  
T15 Lidocaine level > 5ng/ml Toxic lidocaine level 0 0  
T16 Gentamicin or tobramycin 
levels peak >10mg/L, trough 
>2mg/L.  
Toxic levels of antibiotics 0 0  
T17 Amikacin levels peak 
>30mg/L, trough >10mg/L 
Toxic levels of antibiotics 0 0  
T18 Vancomycin level >26mg/L Toxic levels of antibiotics 0 0  
T19 Theophylline level >20mg/L Toxic levels of drugs 0 0  
Table 39: Positive triggers and prescribing errors identified 
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of 168 individual positive triggers, of which 137 (82%) were the result of two triggers 
and did not lead to the identification of any prescribing errors.  These were T4 
(prescription for anti-emetics) and T6 (prescription for anti-diarrhoeals). 
 
6.5 Discussion 
 
This is the first comparison of these four methods of identifying prescribing errors in 
the same patient cohorts.  Our results are extraordinary in that they suggest that 
each method identifies different prescribing errors, with remarkably little overlap 
between them.  Previous studies of adverse events in general 50,51 and adverse drug 
events in particular 25 have also concluded that different methods identify different 
things. However, our results, which relate specifically to prescribing errors, show 
even less overlap between the different methods.   
 
Only 5-7% of prescribing errors were identified by both the ward pharmacist’s 
prospective review and the RRF.  More errors were identified using the RRF than by 
a pharmacist’s prospective review, but the pharmacist identified many errors that 
were not identified using the RRF. Our results indicate that the ward pharmacist 
identified a smaller percentage of all errors post-ServeRx; this suggests that some 
types of prescribing error may be more difficult for the ward pharmacist to identify 
with the electronic system.  This is important methodologically in that electronic 
prescribing may preferentially facilitate detection of prescribing errors by one 
research method but not others.  In this study, ServeRx significantly reduced errors 
when measured prospectively, but not when assessed from the patients’ notes.  
Perhaps not surprisingly, fewer errors were identified by the spontaneous reporting 
system and the trigger tool (each identifying less than 1% of all errors), but the trigger 
tool identified half of the errors that resulted in patient harm.   
 
These results lead to a re-reading of the existing literature, and have major 
implications for the interpretation of data previously presented using prospective data 
collection by the ward pharmacist 3,26,52.  Our results suggest that we may need to 
multiply the error rates found in those studies by a factor of two or three. 
 
When all errors identified by one or more methods are compared, the results suggest 
that ServeRx resulted in a significant decrease in the incidence of prescribing errors. 
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Why do different methods detect different errors? 
There are several overlapping issues, however they can be simplified into three 
issues: 
• Variability between pharmacists 
• Collecting data “on the job” or solely conducting research 
• The extent to which texts (drug chart and patients’ notes, computer records) 
represent reality 
 
Variability between pharmacists 
Different researchers and different pharmacists are likely to record different errors, 
because of differences in clinical knowledge, familiarity with the local prescribing 
paperwork and policies, and diligence in finding and documenting errors.  To try to 
minimise this we used one of the team (BDF), who is also lead clinical pharmacist for 
the trust, to “sweep” for missed errors.  Retrospective review has the same problems, 
particularly for a researcher external to the hospital, going back in time when policies 
and practice may have been different.  Completeness of data collection may be more 
of an issue in prospective studies.  We noted that for 16 of the pre-ServeRx errors 
identified using the RRF, and 11 of those post-ServeRx, there was evidence in the 
medical notes that the pharmacist had identified and rectified the error, but these 
errors were not reported as such by the pharmacist. There may be other errors that 
the pharmacist identified and rectified, but we did not discover in the patients’ 
medical notes.  This discrepancy clearly relates to deficiencies in completion of the 
data collection form rather than error identification. 
 
“On the job” versus dedicated research   
Our prospective study was conducted by the ward pharmacist as part of her job, 
however the retrospective review was done by a full time research pharmacist.  We 
estimate that the researcher spent about ten times longer than the ward pharmacist 
reviewing each patient.  They also have the advantage of seeing the whole clinical 
picture; the disadvantage of this is that it may lead to some hindsight bias.   Of the 
errors identified using the RRF but not the ward pharmacist, some were 
comparatively minor errors, such as not specifying the strength of co-codamol or the 
maximum doses for medication to be given when required.  A pharmacist on the 
wards is likely to amend these prescriptions without consulting the prescriber, and 
may not consider them to be errors worth recording.  Others were errors that the 
ward pharmacist may not have identified without reading the patient’s full clinical 
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background, something not routinely done as part of a ward pharmacy service. Such 
errors included drug history omissions, non-prescription of oxygen in patients for 
whom this was required, and prescribing too low a dose of prophylactic enoxaparin in 
patients with high-risk comorbidities.  Others were errors that occurred during 
weekends and may not have been identified by the pharmacist before another 
member of the team rectified them or the patient was discharged.  
 
Texts versus reality 
When the pharmacist is on the wards collecting data prospectively, they have access 
to more information than that present in the patients’ notes, and hence can detect 
different errors.  For example, the pharmacist identified some drug history omissions 
resulting from conversations with patients.  In others cases, the ward pharmacist was 
able to identify medication that was no longer required, such as prophylactic heparin 
in a patient who she could see was fully mobile.  These types of error are unlikely to 
be identified retrospectively. Finally, some of the pre-ServeRx errors related to 
unclear medication orders or incorrect doses that were subsequently rectified on the 
paper drug chart, meaning that no evidence of the error was available 
retrospectively. 
 
Advantages and disadvantages of the different methods 
Table 40 summarises the advantages and disadvantages of the four methods 
assessed.   
 
Asking the ward pharmacist to prospectively record the prescribing errors identified 
during routine prescription monitoring requires little additional resource, however 
identified only about 30% of all prescribing errors.  In contrast, retrospectively 
reviewing the medical notes using the RRF was the most productive, but also the 
most time-consuming method.  In practice, only 4 patients could be evaluated each 
day.  The RRF does have the advantage that it includes errors that appear to have 
resulted in patient harm, something required before economic evaluation can be 
achieved.   
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Method Advantages Disadvantages 
Ward pharmacist 
(prospective) 
Requires little additional 
resource 
Identifies only about 30% of all 
prescribing errors; unlikely to 
identify errors resulting in 
patient harm as errors rectified. 
Retrospective review 
form 
Identifies the largest 
proportion of errors (70-80% 
of all prescribing errors); 
identifies errors that result in 
patient harm 
Time-consuming (about 40 
minutes per patient admission, 
plus time taken to retrieve 
medical notes; about 4 patients 
could be reviewed each day)  
Retrospective use of 
trigger tool  
Relatively quick to apply tool, 
plus time taken to retrieve 
the medical notes. Identifies 
harmful errors (although not 
all). 
Provides information on a very 
small percentage (less than 
1%) of all prescribing errors.  
Spontaneous reporting Requires little additional 
resource; engages staff in 
the reporting of errors. 
Provides information on a very 
small percentage (less than 
1%) of all prescribing errors.  
Table 40: Advantages and disadvantages of each method for the detection of 
prescribing errors 
 
 
This study also reports the first application of a UK version of the US trigger tool.  
Application of the trigger tool following the RRF required only an average of 4 
minutes per patient; however, it would be expected that it would take considerably 
longer if this was done alone.  A target time of 20 minutes had previously been 
proposed in the US 24.  The trigger tool method identified two of the four errors that 
resulted in harm in our sample, but identified 84 false positive triggers for every real 
case of error.  However, most false positives resulted from two of the 23 items on the 
scale.  The remainder may be useful as prompts for ward pharmacists, and/or 
incorporated into electronic prescribing systems in the future as reasonably good 
predictive prompts for further investigation. There has been little work comparing the 
trigger tool with other methods.  Rozich et al 24 found that only 5 of 274 adverse drug 
events (ADEs) identified with the trigger tool were also identified by incident report 
and pharmacy intervention records; however they did not report the number of ADEs 
identified by these methods but not the trigger tool. We identified specificities for 
individual triggers ranging from 0.54 to 1.0; those previously reported in the US (in a 
larger sample) ranged from 0 to 0.77 24.   
 
Spontaneous reporting is probably the least time-consuming, but identifies a very 
small percentage of the total number of errors and cannot be recommended for 
evaluation of electronic prescribing. 
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Limitations 
A potential limitation is that the same researcher carried out the trigger tool analysis 
immediately after the retrospective review form on each patient. This meant that the 
researcher would have already had some familiarity with the patient’s medical 
records. As well as speeding the process, this could potentially have led to bias.  
 
Conclusion 
The incidence of prescribing errors is extremely dependent on the method of 
detection.  Only prospective monitoring and retrospective monitoring seem usable for 
research purposes, however each technique identifies broadly different errors.  The 
way an electronic prescribing system works may mean that it significantly reduces 
prescribing errors when measured by one method, but not by others. 
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7: A framework for evaluation of electronic prescribing 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
This Chapter discusses the approach to evaluation of electronic prescribing 
developed and used within this project.  
 
The first objective was to evaluate the evaluation framework.  The more specific 
objectives of this part of the study, as specified in our original protocol, were to 
provide: 
1. A descriptive account of practice within each system, including its 
implementation and changes in process and communications patterns 
2. Staff reactions to the new system, both during its introduction and once it has 
become established 
3. Staff views of the advantages and disadvantages associated with the new 
system 
4. Patients’ views of the new system. 
5. Assess the project in terms of sustainability in the hospital environment, 
changes it foreshadows and contribution to policy. 
 
Given the word limit for these reports, we have placed the qualitative evaluations 
of each system in Appendices A and B.  In this Chapter we assess the evaluation 
framework, summarise the findings of each system and draw out the combined 
insights from having assessed both systems. 
 
7.2 A Context of Evaluation of Electronic Prescribing 
 
Information systems programmes and initiatives in the NHS, from the local to the 
national, have become increasingly complex and technologically innovative as 
well as being increasingly expected to deliver substantial and transformatory  
outcomes 53,54. They come to directly and indirectly involve large numbers of 
people (stakeholders), to span institutions and professions, and may substantially 
reshape the processes of care giving.  In this way the adoption of such 
technological innovations in health care are closely intertwined with, or even 
indistinguishable from, organisational change – some of which is planned and 
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intended, but much of which may be unintended and emergent, and indeed may 
often not be immediately recognised 55. 
 
Our approach to the evaluation of EP at QHB and CHX has been motivated by 
such an understanding, and has led us to apply a broad approach in data 
gathering as a means to capture the overall reshaping of work processes that 
occurs as EP is introduced and used within secondary care settings and to 
provide an essential context for more focused evaluation measures. 
 
In any hospital, or even any ward within a hospital, the move to give up the 
established paper based methods for prescribing and administering drugs will 
inevitably be seen as a significant challenge that, at minimum, will draw concern 
(fears, hesitation) from managers, doctors, pharmacists and nurses, as well as 
patients. Each of these individuals and groups will approach the adoption of EP 
with some prior expectations, prejudices and probably many misgivings. But it is 
through these individuals’ developed attitudes and perspectives on technology, on 
the incidence and causes of error,  and on the need for change, that the EP 
system “in use”, the actual new ways of working or experiencing care will come to 
be established and sustained over time.  
 
Our evaluation studies in the two sites show in this way how, over time, people 
come to accommodate the new technical resources of EP within their working 
practices, and how the technical system itself and the care practices are shaped 
and changed. Thus one of the main results of the work reported here is to 
emphasise the significance of the local context and professional and patient 
attitudes to the way such systems are established and operate. To attempt to 
understand or assess EP without appreciating the significance of the challenges 
(and changes) its implementation implies is to risk missing the main point or failing 
to learn vital lessons.  
 
Evaluation is essential to address directly focused outcome measures established 
prior to implementation - to assess quality and efficiency of prescribing and 
administration of drugs, including the critical area of error as discussed in previous 
chapters. But the perspective on evaluation used in this study goes further and 
adopts a wider remit. We acknowledge a need for a diverse range of evaluation 
activities to capture the dynamic and multi-faceted processes of change that are 
initiated when EP is implemented and which can capture how new ways of 
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working are experienced by various stakeholders. We deliberately speak here of 
evaluation activities in the plural, because we see the scope of change implied by 
electronic prescribing as overflowing the capacity of any one privileged evaluation 
technique. 
 
As EP systems are brought into operation and used we should expect to see 
interesting consequences follow and should be able to capture them in evaluation.  
Some of these consequences will be planned for, expected,  or predicted (for 
example, fewer dosing errors, faster drug rounds, better checking by 
pharmacists), but some will not ( perhaps new demands for summary and audit 
data, loss of personal contact between HCPs, non-use of decision support). We 
may see changes in communication, regular tasks being performed in different 
ways, new medication regimes being established while established ones prove 
unable to be accommodated. Consequences may be seen for the hospital overall, 
or draw from broader organisational characteristics (relying on stable staffing  to 
retain and pass on knowledge, or seeing enthusiastic staff staying in post longer 
to work within the EP environment). Indeed, in the sites studied each of these 
findings is reported. 
 
Our experience also suggests that it is important to distinguish the aim and focus 
of evaluation, and to direct effort appropriately. We have seen the need for 
formative evaluations as part of an EP project, serving as an essential means of 
maintaining the impetus of the innovation – to provide input and direction in the 
specific context, to ensure that problems and bugs are identified, lessons are 
learned, successes are acknowledged, people feel involved and heard, and 
compromises and tactical changes essential to sustaining a system in use can be 
made.    
 
The broad multi-perspective approach to evaluation also has value in allowing a 
more comprehensive (or more importantly comprehensible and sharable) 
understanding of the overall achievement from EP; one that can usefully serve the 
wider community of policy makers, health care managers, researchers, 
practitioners and patients. As Southon et al 56 suggest, evaluation of ICT in health 
needs to be more organisation focused, and in particular to be undertaken in ways 
that allow it to substantially support existing organisational decision making 
processes. Thus EP systems also require summative evaluations – evaluations 
that serve to communicate what has been achieved, what the enduring outcomes 
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are, and in such a way as to facilitate the understanding of other decision makers 
and stakeholders in other places, and to help them make informed decisions 
relevant to their own context.   
 
7.3 Evaluation Perspective 
 
EP is one example of the contemporary trend to pursue reform in health care 
through the medium of information and communication technology (ICT). But as is 
widely acknowledged, such technical systems and innovations based around them 
are difficult to evaluate 57. Both formative and summative evaluation poses 
practical problems and raises questions of what should be evaluated, based on 
what data, the perspective from which technology, work processes and services 
delivered are to be assessed, appropriate means of collecting data, and the 
criteria of judgement to be used. As Symons 58 suggests, for any evaluative 
activity we need to carefully consider the context of evaluation itself (who is 
evaluating and why), the process (how) and the content (what)  
 
In the medical tradition the answers to such questions are usually found in 
randomised controlled trials (RCT), often proposed as the gold standard of 
evaluation. However, their applicability to evaluation of information and 
communications technology (ICT) based innovations is often questioned for 
theoretical and practical reasons 57,59,60,61,62,63,64,65. The RCT assumption that 
different factors or parameters (such as hardware performance, training, social 
arrangements and institutional history) can, through experimental design, be 
disentangled from the social processes and wider cause-effect relationships 
established around a system in use is often critiqued as limited or inappropriate for 
ICT based innovations 65.  
 
The wider information systems discipline is less influenced by the 
medical/scientific model. As organisational information systems have become 
more pervasive, ambitious, flexible, complex and interactive, evaluation emphasis 
in this field has, to a degree, shifted. It has moved away from simple cost and 
benefit approach, or narrow questions of “user satisfaction”, to new concerns with 
how, and to what extent, information systems innovations serve ambitions of 
organisational change, innovation in process and the development of strategic 
agendas. This in turn has lead to political, cultural and organisational aspects 
being seen as necessarily playing a major role in shaping evaluation activity 66. 
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Thus, issues of alignment with business goals and institutional interests, the 
support for knowledge work and knowledge workers, understanding of existing 
work practices in formal and informal senses and the ability to transform them, 
have all been given attention in the IS field 58,67 . Ethical questions, to what extent 
and in what way a new information system may effect peoples’ legitimate interests 
for example for professional discretion, privacy or information stewardship, also no 
longer appear to be irrelevant or simple to accommodate 68. 
 
In both the IS and medical informatics fields there is increasing agreement that 
evaluation should be seen less as a process of judgement, and more as an 
essential component of the learning/changing processes that are a fundamental 
part of the use of innovative technologies. Evaluation activity is a necessary 
attribute of these technologies, a means by which collective insights can be 
assembled and fed into current and future implementations, essential to “steering” 
the technology (creating it in use) and leading to increased organisational 
knowledge and capacity for change.  
 
Evaluation, in these terms, is not an activity undertaken outside of a new systems 
development activity, as a means of judgement, but is an essential part of it.  
Thus, increasingly formative evaluation is seen as more appropriate than a 
narrowly summative approach. This is particularly true, as Farbey et al.69  argue, in 
a changing or dynamic environment, where evaluation must allow for a proactive 
search for unexpected benefits (achieved or potential) as well as unexpected 
barriers. Such evaluation must be re-integrated into the change processes  and  
reflect the complexity and contextuality that drives the worked out “success” (or 
otherwise) of any innovative information system, revealing the complex processes 
that contribute to outcomes (to show why outcomes come about), and how  
relationships between system characteristics, individual and organisational 
characteristics operate (a process focus)  70,71,72 
 
Extending this point, we argue that evaluation of electronic prescribing systems 
should seek to capture the process of their enactment; that is the way this 
technology is understood and configured in use, and in-turn the way users and 
organisations are (re)constructed by their engagement with the technology.  What 
needs to be evaluated is not a moment in time or an isolated set of one 
dimensional outcomes (prescriptions written, drugs administered), but a dynamic 
and active socio-technical ensemble at work. 
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Such an evaluation should also reflect ethical perspectives, concerned not only 
with efficiency and effectiveness but also with broader implications of EP, looking 
towards changes to the way medicine and health care are conceptualised and 
practised, and are experienced by both health professionals and patients. Thus, 
for example, in the studies reported here, we have addressed patient attitudes and 
opinions at some length when assessing electronic prescribing. 
 
Accepting that evaluation activities for EP must include the evaluation of how they 
come to be embedded in their social, organisational and wider context necessarily 
implies different evaluation methods and perspectives, ones that can complement  
rigorous quantitative analysis of system functions and outcomes. We have used 
qualitative methods in the ethnographic tradition, including observation (on wards, 
in pharmacy and at managerial meetings) and various form of semi-structured 
interviews to gain an insight into how people experience and relate to EP in their 
daily tasks and routines, how they perceive it and assess it, and in this way to 
understand why certain outcomes happen – what Hirschheim and Smithson73 term 
an understandings zone of evaluation.  
 
Another method employed in the study at CXH was a group meeting (loosely 
termed as a focus meeting) attended by professionals from different groups 
(nurses, doctors, pharmacists and management). The meeting had a defined aim 
and agenda (evaluation of the system), and was facilitated by two researchers. 
Such a focus meeting allows evaluators to explore how different people interact, 
reacting to and influencing each others’ views, and how group agendas are built or 
expressed. Such an approach based on negotiation and consultations, has 
immediate formative potential if it re-enforces collective understanding and 
responsibility for a system as it becomes established. Such a collective evaluation 
process can also, usefully we would argue, help participants to question the 
validity of initial objectives and to reshape them based on shared experience74.  
 
Finally, these evaluation activities for EP must be reflexive. Any evaluation is 
ultimately a non-objective, political process that is established and resourced by 
particular interests. Evaluators, and those that use their outputs, should 
understand this and it should lead them to question their own and other 
participators interests, beliefs and assumptions, and consider how these might 
influence the choice of criteria and methods, the evaluation process and its 
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findings.  In this spirit the Requirements for Preparation of Final Reports for the 
Patient Safety Research Programme suggests that: 
 
Qualitative research should include the researcher’s perspective, areas of 
potential bias / influence, justification of data collection and analysis tools and 
choice of setting, participant information.  
 
This critical and reflexive stance is just as relevant for quantitative evaluations. 
 
 
7.4 SPO evaluation framework  
 
Taking the various points made above we now describe the framework we have 
applied in this study (Figure 19). 
 
. Systems  
functions 
Human 
Perspectives 
Organisational  
Context 
Structure 
 
Technical 
detail 
Work conditions and 
implied requirements 
Sustainability, 
opportunity costs, 
management needs’ 
skills requirements 
Process 
 
Information  
processing; 
correct and valid  
Human participation 
in tasks; social 
interaction 
Altered delivery and 
practice 
Outcome 
 
Relevant, applicable, 
reliable 
Quality of service, 
and outcomes 
Effect in the world  
Figure 19. The evaluation framework (Based on Cornford et al.21 ) 
 
A structure, process and outcome model was initially proposed by Donabedian75 
for evaluating quality of care from the perspective of different stakeholders, 
notably physicians and patients. Donabedian’s ideas were developed further by 
Cornford, Doukidis and Forster21 to produced a matrix of structure, process and 
outcome as one dimension and system functions, human perspectives and 
organisational context on the other.  
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This model addresses Donabedian’s three classic aspects from the perspective of 
the technology used, the people involved in the work process, and the institutional 
setting. The framework thus encompasses technical, individual, team and 
organisational perspectives and serves to address the long-term prospects of a 
system - its sustainability within a technical, social and organisational context - as 
well as changes to the means for the delivery of care and to established work 
practice.  Use of the framework has helped in this study to focus on organisational 
consequence of EP (“effect in the world”), and has led our evaluation activity 
beyond a few narrow or decontextualised measures.  
 
The advantage of this framework for studies of EP, we argue, is that it frames a 
broad set of evaluation activities and perspectives that combine social and 
technical perspectives and that encompasses qualitative and quantitative 
approaches. It must, however, be understood as just a framework within which 
specific data gathering approaches can be located, and we certainly do not claim 
that it alone offers the elusive integration of the technical and social, qualitative 
and quantitative elements. The framework can however, as shown here, guide 
evaluation activities and the choice of criteria, serving as a flexible template within 
which specific evaluation criteria and methods can be located, and related one to 
another in analysis. The framework is particularly relevant to the study of the key 
goal of reducing medication error through its compatibility with Reason’s model 
that sees errors as having roots in technical, individual, group and organisational 
failures, with the emphasis directed towards the latter end 76 . 
 
As a simple primary route through data the model allows consideration of how 
technical structures link to human work process and create organisational 
outcomes – a simple diagonal. Such a reading of  data might produce a clear 
understanding, but it is more likely that tracing such a simple chain of 
understanding will raise questions or pose contradictions (for example, how come 
“good” technology did not lead to “good” human process, or vice versa; how was a 
fragile and incomplete technology accommodated and made useful by human 
participants?). Resolving such a contradiction will then require a shift of attention 
to some other aspect of a system – perhaps in technical outcomes (for example, 
non-use of certain functionality), or be found in the prior attitudes of certain 
stakeholders. Considering the interaction (interrelations) between the conceptual 
cells achieves a deeper level of understanding (a hermeneutic reading of research 
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data) by moving from understanding parts to understanding wholes and back 
again.  
 
In the next section we apply the framework to the two hospitals. A summary of the 
findings is presented first (Tables 41 and 42).  
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 System Function Human perspectives Organisational context 
S
t
r
u
c
t
u
r
e
 
• ServeRx  is a stand alone technical system 
that includes support for electronic prescribing, 
scheduling, automated dispensing and 
electronic administration, as well as elements 
of stock control.  
• Includes computerised drug trolley and 
automated cabinets for storage. 
• Installed on one ward and with no substantial 
connection (other than basic data) to the 
Hospital’s other information systems.   
• Initial technical problems and the system 
needed tailoring to CXH/UK requirements.  
• Many problems rectified with subsequent 
versions but some hardware and software 
shortcomings remain.  
 
• Training provided to doctors, nurses and 
pharmacists but on-going support 
(including the physical presence of a 
trainer on the ward) was found to be 
necessary.  
• Doctors had little involvement in shaping of 
the system and some considered this as 
not appropriate.  
• Nurses hesitant about the system at the 
outset.  
• System driven forward by pharmacists, 
other professionals felt that it reflected 
most strongly pharmacists’ interests. 
• Pharmacists clearer at the outset what the 
system was for and what they wanted from 
it.  
• Patients unsure of what to expect, with a 
number of concerns about 
computerisation. 
• A pilot project, envisaged as an opportunity 
to learn from this system and inform future 
initiatives.   
• Initiated and managed by Pharmacy 
department  
• Enjoyed extra resources.  
• Substantial commitment from many staff 
members. 
 
P
r
o
c
e
s
s
 
• The system reached stability and became well 
integrated into work of the ward.  
• Once stable, the data processing functioned 
well.   
• Inbuilt structuring of core work processes of 
prescribing, dispensing and administration of 
drugs performed satisfactorily for most but not 
all drugs. 
 
• The system influences how, when and 
where prescribing is done and checked, 
shaping work processes of doctors, nurses 
and pharmacists.  
• Experience of using the system over time 
and over its many versions has meant that 
the attitudes towards it have evolved and 
shifted.   
• Nurses administering drugs bound by a 
sequence of procedures embedded in the 
system.  
• The way different professionals 
communicate with each other changed.  
 
• Experience emphasised the challenge that 
comes when the working practices of 
professional groups and interdisciplinary 
teams are reshaped by introducing a 
powerful and structuring technology.  
• Technology can be explicitly used to 
enforce a ‘good’ process, but some 
aspects of practice do not neatly fit, or are 
incompatible with, the system.  
• This is apparent on one ward, but across a 
hospital the effect could be magnified as 
different specialities are considered.  
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• A usable technology (hardware and software) 
that was over time shaped and integrated into 
ward practice.  
• Facilitates safe or safer prescribing and 
administration processes  
• Provides data which is of an appropriate 
quality and available for all participants in the 
care process.  
• Continuing mismatch between system 
characteristics and the use of certain drugs. 
 
• A system which pharmacists, and perhaps 
more reluctantly, nurses came to accept 
and many would miss.  
• Doctors’ opinions more varied; identified 
shortcomings but believed in benefits an 
ideal system might bring.  
• Restructuring effects on the way different 
professional groups work, varying 
opportunity to exercise a degree of 
autonomy.  
• Generally perceived as safer or at least 
potentially safer, reducing some errors but 
also acknowledged as introducing new 
risks.  
• Patients had less concerns about 
computerisation after the introduction of 
ServeRx than before it. 
 
• Plans for the system’s future are still being 
discussed, but in the immediate future 
ServeRx is not going to be transferred to 
another ward after the closure of Ward 8N.  
• The pilot has led to valuable lessons; 
benefits and drawbacks of EP; scope of 
impact; the processes involved in ‘hosting’ 
such a system; project management and 
implementation strategies.  
 
 
Table 41: Charing Cross Hospital: ServeRx system 
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 System Function Human perspectives Organisational context 
S
t
r
u
c
t
u
r
e
 
• EP implemented as a custom-built front end 
for Meditech pharmacy system.  
• Developed as part of a whole-hospital HIS, 
interfacing with other HIS modules. 
• Accessed via wireless laptops, static PCs 
and dumb terminals.  
• A number of technology problems including 
competition for laptops, short battery life and 
sometimes unreliable wireless connection,  
• DOS interface perceived as initially difficult to 
learn and requires complex combinations of 
keystrokes. However perceived as more 
stable and safer than Windows systems. 
 
• Formal on-going training program with 
dedicated system trainers supported by 
informal staff mentoring by more experienced 
colleagues.  
• Individual professional groups are willing to 
work through initial problems and adopt a new 
way of working that may not always provide 
their own group with obvious benefits. 
• View of computers as part of natural and 
desirable progress. 
• Hospital has had a long-term commitment to 
computerisation and an established, generally 
good, relationship with software supplier.  
• From its earliest involvement with HIS 
developed a strong focus on workable 
solutions for whole hospital. 
• A stable workforce helps embed new ways of 
working 
• Developed resources, skills and managerial 
competencies to maintain the technical 
components of the system.  
• A belief that they can get things right. 
 
P
r
o
c
e
s
s
 
• Few problems reported with data processing 
and reliability.  
• Facilitates rapid availability of test results, 
accurate medication history on transfer to 
another ward, and legible, timely discharge 
letters containing a complete list of current 
medication.  
• Enables co-ordination of work across the 
hospital to support the patient care process 
and allows different health professional 
groups to share data, communicate and justify 
decisions.  
• Technical capacity of the system is not seen 
as significant hindrance to clinical activities.  
 
• Legible, standardised, complete patient 
medication records which are always 
available make prescribing a more distributed 
activity with some decisions made remote 
from the patient.  
• Offers health care worker (in particular 
doctors and pharmacists) an opportunity to 
restructure their work and to choose to do 
things differently e.g.; multitasking for junior 
doctors on call, pharmacists new 
opportunities to change the way work is 
organised (but less pharmacy work done on 
the wards), availability of information may 
empower nurses to check and challenge 
doctors. 
• Both improves and diminishes inter-
professional communication; may reduce 
direct communication with patients.  
• Potential risk of “deskilling” prescribers 
balanced by opportunity to learn new drug 
information.  
 
• An organisational and professional alignment 
with technology and its suppliers supported by 
enthusiasts and champions. 
• EP (as a part of HIS) facilitates the 
establishment of a data driven practice that 
seeks to maximise the benefits of inter-
professional working.  
• EP facilitates enforcement of Trust 
prescribing policies. 
• Organisation policy and practices have tried 
to foster the preservation of relationships 
between professional groups.  
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t
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o
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• A stable, usable, continuously evolving 
system which supports the complex 
workflows surrounding medicines use 
• Most data collected is judged as of good 
quality (more complete, legible, accessible) 
and is sharable among multiple users.  
• Generally meets local user needs, though 
lack of data reporting facilities noted.  
 
• Doctors and nurses perceive as their 
system, not a system designed for and 
controlled by pharmacists  
• Perceived by staff and patients as more 
efficient and probably safer, with a better 
audit trail than paper.  
• Patients see EP as more secure and 
confidential, but recognise possibility of new 
types of “picking” error when prescribing.  
• Changes in working practice for all health 
professionals, helping them manage and 
use time more efficiently and effectively.  
• Practice of all health professionals more 
visible, highlights variation in practice, and 
makes mistakes more visible and 
accountable. 
• A sustainable EP system that operates as 
just one part of a hospital wide HIS.  
• A system that attracts staff and may 
contribute to low staff turnover.   
• Staff and patients perceive QHB as a 
modern, advanced organisation that 
embodies state of the art technology. 
• Often reflect on why, despite their sense of 
success, they have received relatively little 
attention by policy makers. 
 
Table 42: Queens Hospital: Meditech System 
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7.5 Applying the framework to Electronic Prescribing 
 
Each case study is presented in depth in the Appendices, here we give an 
overview in Tables 41 and 42 to briefly present the main findings of the studies 
reported within the adopted framework – for the full account of each study see 
Appendices A and B.  
 
In this Chapter we elaborate the framework further and apply it for a more 
detailed and integrated analysis of the two cases.  Drawing on Donabedian’s 
distinctions, the three aspects of structure, process and outcome are 
presented in turn, seen in each case from the perspective of the technical, the 
human and the organisation.  
 
Structure: The established characteristics of the situation under study. 
“The things we have”.  
Structure is sometimes referred to as “the causal past” 77, representing 
significant initial conditions that an innovation such as EP must relate to - 
current resources and actors and the characteristics of the work setting and 
hospital - and with which it must combine to become embedded.  
 
System Functions 
In the case of EP we consider the technical components used to implement 
EP, both as already established and as introduced as part of the 
implementation. Technical elements offer specific functionality, and may 
displace others, for example in both studies displacing the old style paper drug 
chart and in the case of CHX the old style drug trolley.  EP is thus an 
innovation in structure, the introduction of new technical resources.   
 
In both the sites studied, the technical components proved problematic. 
Computers crash and hang, batteries go dead, data transmission is not always 
reliable, data are not always preserved.  In both cases the technologies used 
started out as alien to the particular context with poor structural compatibility, 
for example because of their  origins in other health care systems (Israel and 
US) and the embedded assumptions that they carried. There was also in both 
cases some suggestion that there was simply not enough technical resource, 
for example a lack of computer workstations.  
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Technology is also a physical element and, for example, issues of ergonomic 
design were raised in the CHX case as nurses used automated cabinets and 
computerised trolleys. The different screen interface technologies used, 
Windows-like and mouse driven in the case of ServeRx and DOS based for 
Meditech, also proved significant in the minds of our respondents, with a 
general preference, or at least acceptance, that the Windows paradigm would 
prevail and serve better the needs of new users (drawing on their general IT 
skills) not withstanding the accumulated experience of old hands with the 
function keys.  
 
As a physical element of structure, the drug chart too, although being 
displaced by EP, was seen to play a quite important role. In purely technical 
terms, both systems attempted to provide some analogue for the drug chart, 
both on screen and as an articulation of ward based activity. But in both cases, 
particularly CHX where the system was directly related to previous and parallel 
practice in the hospital, what technology offered was not perceived as quite 
replacing what had been lost. Many people thus referred to the “overview”, the 
quick update, that a drug chart offers and felt a sense that care practices had 
been fragmented through the new technology. 
 
Human Perspectives 
Here we identify the various stakeholder groups who come to use or 
experience a new EP system, principally doctors, nurses, pharmacists and 
patients. Among the most significant elements of structure that they bring are 
their professional formation and training, their ethical tradition, as well as 
attitudes, desires and expectations in the face of change in general, and 
technology led change in particular.   
 
Our findings, in this respect, identified the training and support regimes 
established in both cases, as an essential structural element for successful 
implementation. Indeed, in the case of ServeRx, the quantity and duration of 
this support had to be expanded to maintain the system in operation. At QHB 
the confidence of users, and of new users in particular, was essentially linked 
to the good training facilities offered, and the high level of informal and ad-hoc 
support that people felt to be available. Indeed  in both cases it was found that 
training was really an “on-the job” activity that helped people to accumulate 
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their knowledge on a “need to know now” basis and relied on many informal 
supportive relationships across professional boundaries.  
 
Another aspect of structure that human actors provide is their commitment to 
EP as a means for professional and institutional development and part of a 
vision for their hospital or their professional specialism. Thus at CHX senior 
nurses identified EP as an essential element of a programme of modernisation 
and a useful challenge for their staff. Meanwhile other more junior nursing staff 
showed a more ambivalent attitude, and expressed concern that EP was to a 
degree coming between them and their patients – violating their professional 
tradition.   
 
Doctors too exhibited a range of prior attitudes and expectations in relation to 
EP. At QHB senior doctors were involved in the acquisition and build up of the 
use of the Meditech HIS from the start, and many (though not all) identified 
themselves as proponents of EP. As might be expected, in both sites junior 
doctors expected to bring their knowledge of IT in general to the EP system, 
and in general they found it easier therefore to learn the system, appreciate its 
benefits and foibles, and to keep a general faith in EP as an almost inevitable 
and desirable part of their future work practices. 
 
    The prior formation and training of pharmacists and the established pharmacy 
systems were seen to be strongly supportive of EP in both sites in that 
pharmacy culture is about order and sequence, exercising control, structured 
communication and working as part of a team. All this is broadly compatible 
with the inscribed systematisation that comes with EP technology.  Pharmacy 
work is also, at times, quite routine, and the potential to “automate away” such 
aspects was appreciated. Similarly pharmacists have perhaps the most 
concrete sense of error around drugs, and can make the most a direct link 
between EP and error reduction.  EP, potentially, might become a means to 
enhance or empower pharmacy interests, to embed them in a stronger way 
into practice though, as reported in the studies of both sites, achieving this is 
not so easy in operational terms (for example, problems in Decision Support 
Systems), nor is it necessarily wise in organisational terms if it results in EP 
being seen as a “pharmacy” system imposed on others (see section below).  
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Organisational context 
Here we consider the formal management structures through which EP is 
developed as well as the established culture and working style of the hospitals.  
 
In the cases studied here, in particular in the QHB case, we find that the 
establishment of  EP and its hospital wide implementation, draws strongly from 
the distinctive computer focused managerial strategy pursued over 10 or more 
years, itself linked to the relocation of the hospital to a new purpose built site. 
The organisation is the Meditech system and many people suggested that 
without it work would stop. EP was just a part of “the HIS” and was very much 
a taken for granted resource, an every-day matter. This had practical 
consequences for the research in that it was hard to keep any conversation 
focused on EP. Discussion swiftly slid away to some other part of the HIS. Put 
another way, this prior experience of technology had built a strong legitimacy 
for EP and smoothed the roll out into the various specialities across the 
hospital.   
 
In contrast, at CHX, the ServeRx system was a pilot, and the project was 
managed and sponsored by the Pharmacy department with degrees of support 
from other operational areas. As a large teaching hospital it is research led in 
many areas, and has considerable IT experience drawn over a number of 
years. One aspect of the hospital’s engagement with technology was its recent 
experience of a successful pioneering hospital wide PACS system that 
affected some people’s generally positive views of technical innovations and 
their potential to deliver tangible benefits.  The small scale of the pilot at CHX – 
one ward – also prompted some respondents, notably doctors, to reflect on EP 
in terms of “all or nothing”. If it was an institution wide initiative, and resourced 
at that scale, they saw more benefits, but in a pilot they saw more the 
disjunctions and extra work. 
 
Process:   The way things work and are worked out; how parts interact or 
operate to perform individual and collaborative tasks. “The things we 
do”. 
Process here is concerned with the activities that occur within the hospital 
setting as they relate to drugs and their management. This process is to some 
degree under the influence of human participants through their professional 
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training and experience, but is equally conditioned by the structural 
characteristics of the technology employed.  
 
Most significantly for these studies is our simple finding that process changes 
as a result of EP, being negotiated and worked out as a part of the extended 
implementation activity. Indeed, our findings suggest that the real significance 
of EP for each site was found not in the technical characteristics of the 
supplied technology, but in the activity of accommodating it and negotiating it 
into use.   
 
System Functions  
Our study here focused on the way that the technical components worked 
together as a system, how they manipulated and processed data, and how 
correct, valid and trustworthy they were in day to day use.  
 
From both studies we find that EP systems are not stable or given as 
operational technology, but demand constant attention to bring the technical 
process up to the desired level of performance and the full range of functions. 
Similarly they need attention to become acceptable within the social 
environment. For example, in the CHX case, throughout the period of use of 
Serve Rx there was constant attention to assessing and pursuing the required 
functionality such as discharge prescriptions, as well as to monitor the 
reliability and safety of the technical system.  
 
At QHB a similar route had been followed, though as a more substantial 
system with a longer history, some of the issues that CHX faced had been 
already resolved. Still, there was more similarity in their situation than might at 
first be expected. For example, both sites had problems with accessing and 
using summary, audit and overview data and it is surprising at first sight that 
neither system seemed to offer usable and flexible reporting systems to allow 
access to the data. Similarly, both sites continued to struggle with certain drugs 
and prescribing practices that did not quite ‘fit’ the inscribed logic of the 
software.   
 
Human perspectives 
Here the framework led to a focus on four main stakeholder groups: doctors, 
nurses, pharmacists and patients. Each group, taken alone presented their 
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own distinct account of what it means to work with and through the new 
system, which we briefly summarise here. More significantly perhaps is the 
ways in which EP changes the relations between the various stakeholders.  
 
In both the studies we have seen how EP influences how, when and where 
prescribing is done, how it is checked, and how drugs are administered. In this 
way we see EP as shaping new working practices for doctors, nurses and 
pharmacists as well as other health care professionals who interact with 
patients.   
 
For doctors, particularly junior doctors, the principal of EP was broadly 
welcomed even as some aspects of the systems in use were viewed as 
problematic, particularly so in CHX with its ‘project’ status and interface 
problems to other parts of the hospital. At QHB, in contrast, both junior and 
senior doctors reflected positively on the ability to work away from the ward or 
bed-end, and to access data and prescribe remotely. In this way EP, or more 
generally the QHB HIS, supported junior doctors in their dominant mode of 
working – always prioritising and shifting rapidly from one task to another.  
 
In a similar way pharmacists too had used the system to restructure their 
working practices, for example performing more reviews remotely at QHB, and 
in both cases using the EP system to help prioritise and schedule their work.  
 
For nurses EP is probably a more constraining development. For example, the 
CHX system imposed a distinct discipline on nurses as they loaded drug 
trolleys, administered drugs and completed a round. Nevertheless, they did 
over time come to find positive resources within the system upon which they 
could rely on in their work - and which helped to improve the systems image - 
for example, the lack of need to find keys and lock a trolley, or the swifter 
preparation for a drug round. 
 
Of course, shifts in time and place and the ability to reorganise work or rely on 
technical resources may have negative consequences. Both doctors and 
pharmacists at QHB recognised this, reflecting at times on how their 
relationships were perhaps weaker and how much of their interaction was 
mediated through the technology. Even nurses, who work for the most part 
within a ward, were aware of the technology’s potential to add distance to 
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work, reflecting on how computers could come between them and their 
patients if they looked at screens rather than faces. 
 
At both CHX and QHB the study asked patients for their attitudes to EP as key 
participants in the process. The findings reflect perhaps a more general sense 
in society that computers are on balance a good thing, and can offer many 
benefits in terms of efficient and reliable service delivery – a sort of “Tesco 
effect”. For some patients it represented an expression of the “modern” hi-tech 
care process that they desired. Still, they are not blind to the failings of 
computers and the potential fragility of a technical system when compared to 
the human. Nor were they wholly sanguine as to the nature of the new services 
they will be receiving, fearing that they may be less personal. 
 
Organisational Context  
Here we considered EP as an intervention or contribution to the overall 
organisation and to its operational development.  
 
The studies at both sites emphasise the challenge that any particular hospital 
must face when adopting EP and the long and extensive (almost unending) 
implementation that it requires. Getting from “here” – which for most hospitals 
will be an established, functioning, well understood and tolerably safe system 
based on paper and the accumulated years of experience of all the main 
actors (doctors, pharmacists, nurses, patients) - to “there” - a brave new world 
of electronic prescribing with effective decision support and ‘information at our 
fingertips’ must be understood as a significant process in itself.   
 
     In these terms EP is not an end state that is achieved after a discrete effort, 
but is more suitably understood as an enduring process of change and for 
which the organisation must be prepared and committed.   
 
Reflecting on the experience of both sites, very different in scale as they are, 
the overall impression is to reinforce the conventional wisdoms of IT projects; 
the need for high level commitment, shared ownership and active 
management, and for an overall incremental perspective that is resourced to 
support systems as they develop over extended periods.  
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Outcome: The consequences of an innovation, what endures, how care is 
experienced. “The things that happen”. 
Traditionally outcome is associated with measures of patient’s health status as 
a consequence of process, but here outcome is extended to include the 
enduring state of technology, of professional interests and for the health care 
organisation itself.  
 
System Functions 
     For the technical components outcome is expressed principally in their ability 
to continue to operate within the environment, to be considered to maintain 
their status as relevant, applicable and reliable participants in the health care 
setting – allowed to stay. This is of course not the usual use of the term 
“outcome” in health care, but in the case of EP, as with other new and 
challenging technologies, it is indeed a primary consideration.  
 
One way of expressing the relations between the human world and the 
technical has been in terms of the traditions of hospitality, the rules that govern 
the entertaining of guests and the conventions that retain some distance 
between the host and the visitor 78. There is then a subtle shift if or when a 
guest becomes a regular member of the family – when a technical visitor 
becomes “domesticated” and finds a taken for granted place within the 
household. 
 
In these terms the two technical systems studied here achieved rather different 
outcomes. In the case of CHX it was hosted for a while but never became 
taken for granted to the degree that it could not be dispensed with. 
Interestingly some similar metaphors were used by nurses when talking about 
the system and its alien status. As one said, “this is not our baby”.  In the case 
of QHB, in contrast, there is ample evidence that the EP, or more generally of 
the MediTech HIS has become domesticated and found a natural place in the 
hospital.   
 
Human perspectives  
Once again, we consider the four main stakeholder groups: doctors, nurses, 
pharmacists and patients. For each group we asked what their overall feelings 
were about their work with the new system, their sense of achievement or 
satisfaction in doing their job or receiving care. It is here that a more traditional 
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notion of “outcome” can be found – with outcome reported in terms of patient 
satisfaction, protocol adherence, and overall satisfaction with prescribing and 
administration. In these terms the two cases studied here offer some 
compatible findings, and some distinctive ones.  
 
These systems were generally perceived as usable and most professional 
groups expressed a general sense that they were safer or at least potentially 
safer, reducing some errors, catching others and refining aspects of process.  
When asked, and towards the end of the study, most people said that they 
would want the system to stay and would prefer to work with it – even initially 
sceptical nurses at CHX whose attitudes changed over time and as the difficult 
period of initial implementation passed.  From the perspectives of patients, 
interviewed at both sites, the general sense was that the computerised system 
they saw was desirable and should be more efficient and safer. They generally 
preferred it to other systems, and thus wished it to stay.  
 
In the case of CHX, as a pilot system operating on one ward and therefore 
inviting a critical more reflective response, the health care professionals, in 
particular doctors and pharmacists seemed to express their understanding of 
outcome through a multi-layered perspective. There was for them the “ideal” 
EP system which they understood in their own way and even enthused about, 
and then there was the actual ServeRx they used day-by-day. The tensions 
between these two EPs that are reflected in their comments provide a useful 
choice of perspective from which to assess outcome. Is it the day-to-day and 
messy incomplete and troublesome EP we consider, or is it the (possibly 
reinforced) vision that we should pay attention to?   
  
Organisational Context  
The organisational outcome reflects the institution wide response to the use of 
EP. 
 
The two sites studied are in this respect very different. QHB has 10 year’s 
experience with a comprehensive HIS, and for them EP was just one part of a 
broader commitment to a particular use of technology.  As such EP had indeed 
become just “one of the things we do”, having the status of an embedded 
characteristic of the hospital. Seen in the wider context though,as was 
appreciated by some staff, the future is not perhaps so clear. As NHS policy 
 118
develops and the National Programme moves towards EP the status of the 
existing systems in use at QHB may come into question. Nevertheless, from 
the hospital’s own perspective, their long experience of EP would seem to set 
clear standards against which any future strategy will be judged. In this way, 
one clear outcome for the hospital is their detailed level of understanding that 
probably exceeds almost any other similar UK site.   
 
At CHX, in contrast EP was operating as a pilot experiment on just one ward 
and its status within the organisation was as something new and different, 
reflecting a commitment to innovation. The system was publicised in these 
terms within hospital publications, and featured in a BBC programme. In this 
way and, despite the pilot ending as wards were reorganised, it did represent 
within the hospital a means for expressing its commitment to a proactive policy 
for medicines management. In outcome terms then, one of the significant 
aspects of the pilot was the opportunity it provided for learning about ward 
based systems in general and EP in particular, and bringing new knowledge 
and skills to the hospital. 
 
7.6 Lessons for EP policy and practice.  
 
We have presented a structured, theory driven evaluation of two novel 
electronic prescribing and drug administration systems that have been 
implemented in hospital settings. Both these systems can be seen as 
successful in that they were adopted and used over an extended period and 
the users of the systems are generally positive about them and they have been 
shown to reduce prescribing and drug administration errors.  Drawing on the 
findings and analysis reported above, and reflecting on the overall insights that 
have emerged from this aspect of the work, this section summarises the key 
lessons for EP policy and practice that emerge. 
 
Address EP as socio-technical innovation 
EP is a socio-technical innovation that is achieved over time and through 
engaging various different stakeholders in a collective effort to reform the ways 
in which drugs are used and to exploit the potential of technology in this. 
Reducing error is of course an essential part of the motivation for EP, but this 
motive should be balanced with other more general requirements for improved 
or reformed practices and to allow better use of resources. Adopting EP will 
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have many consequences for all manner of people and health care 
professionals and not all effort can be simply directed to, or assessed as a 
contribution to, isolated error producing practices.  
 
EP is not a technical solution there for the taking 
EP is not the substitution of one way of working by some fully formed and 
superior version, and it certainly does not arrive as a suite of software 
applications or databases that can immediately displace established ways of 
working. Rather, even as technology, we must expect it to be shaped and 
formed in the local context, adapted to meet particular needs and priorities. It is 
notable that most of the successful computerised prescribing systems in 
hospitals (renal unit at Brimingham, Brigham and Women in Boston) are 
systems developed in house, a situation in which the relationship between the 
technology and the users has the greatest potential for interaction. The 
experience at QHB and CHX is broadly compatible with this observation. 
 
Expect and respond to emergent change 
Our findings suggest that the change that is experienced through EP goes 
beyond the planned and is manifest in a number of shifts in the way work is 
organised, where it is performed and how it is prioritised – emergent changes. 
We have found in both sites studied that the use of EP will change the work 
process of individual health care professionals as well as the ways that they 
work together, changes that go beyond the particular functionality for individual 
tasks built into a system. It is fundamental to EP, as a tool that people 
appropriate in their own ways for use in their individual tasks, that the 
outcomes observed will be shaped along the way; for example, as pharmacists 
use computer screens to review prescribing data and to locate and prioritise 
particular prescribing events for scrutiny, or doctors prescribe from formularies 
and in standard ways. EP also allows subsequent related reforms of practice at 
the organisational level to be considered and pursued, for example how 
discharge prescriptions are prepared and dispensed, and these future 
possibilities should be recognised within EP projects.  
 
Support human interaction 
EP both connects and disconnects health care practitioners and patients within 
the care process. Shared prescribing data (at the individual patient level or in 
summary) can connect a pharmacist and a doctor and be supported by other 
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computerised media such as email. But if the technical mode degrades the 
interpersonal relations, for example keeping pharmacists in their office and off 
the ward, or on the ward but at the nurses station workstations, then some 
important element of the care process may be lost. Similar arguments can be 
made in respect of other relations between nurses, doctors and patients. Such 
effects must be anticipated and managed, with all stakeholders aware of the 
issues and contributing to their resolution and the trade offs required.  
 
Resource an extended implementation 
         This essentially local or situated construction of EP practices and procedures 
means that any technology which is successfully implemented and used in one 
setting might have different “impacts” or even be rejected in another. This is 
precisely because technology does not work in isolation but is intertwined with 
the social (for example, organisational and wider political context) and is 
appropriated in different ways, over different time scales and to different 
degrees by different people.  To succeed in this process, as we have seen in 
our studies, requires adequate resources being devoted to sustaining and 
adapting systems during an extended period of implementation and learning.  
 
Adopt a broad approach to evaluation 
One part of resourcing the extended implementation is to incorporate a range 
of formative evaluation activities to help maintain and refine the EP agenda. 
The use of our evaluation framework can help to ensure that such work is 
more complete and useful than isolated measures of selected outcomes. The 
evaluation framework can provide an opportunity to contextualise the findings 
from more quantitative studies, and help focus on stakeholder attitudes and 
behaviours and how they play a part in the ability of EP to become integrated 
into day-to-day activities.    
 
Work to develop better technical systems 
     Studies such as this should also provide vital information for the developers 
and suppliers of EP systems. It is notable that both the technical systems 
studied here originated outside the UK, and we have seen how such imported 
systems developed around other traditions of practice need extensive efforts to 
align them and their suppliers with the needs of UK hospitals. Some of the 
recurring issues that we have identified, such as basic understanding of UK 
practice, the need for flexible data reporting functionality or careful attention to 
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all the formal and informal roles of the drug chart, must be better addressed in 
research and evaluation studies, and the results communicated to the supplier 
sector.   
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8. Discussion 
 
The purpose of this research was to develop, and pilot, a range of methodologies 
relevant to the evaluation of electronic prescribing in hospitals.  Hence, we have 
structured the report around methodological issues, rather than presenting an 
evaluation of a system in the round.  In this Chapter we report the key findings of the 
previous chapters, and integrate them.  We briefly set these against the literature 
before going on to raise the resultant policy issues and research agenda. 
 
Our original aim was to show “the feasibility and practicability of the proposed 
framework of evaluation, and of methods used to conduct prospective and 
retrospective studies.”  We believe we have met this aim.  Our evaluation framework 
brings together qualitative and quantitative assessments of an EP system, and we 
have shown it is applicable at any stage of implementation, from a prospective study 
of a single ward pilot to a retrospective study of a well established, hospital wide 
system.  Another way of viewing this is that the framework allows assessment of 
outcomes, and sets them against a rich understanding of context.  As we described 
in Chapters 1 and 7, the outcome of an EP system depends heavily on the setting, 
the process of introduction and embedding in practice (one estimate from the USA is 
that success with CPOE is only 20-30% about the technology 79.  By describing this 
context it helps others understand the generalisability of the findings, and helps them 
plan for successful implementation. 
 
It is noticeable that most other evaluations of EP in hospitals, in the UK and USA, do 
not provide the necessary context, and just provide a limited number of quantitative 
findings.  “Lessons learned” about the best way to implement EP tend to be 
published much later.  Many of these articles do not  come from academic 
researchers, but from focus groups and committees formed from those who have had 
practical experience of implementation; they are not directly related to the 
quantitative evaluations. The advantage of a prospective evaluation of EP using our 
framework is that these lessons emerge early on, give a rounded view, and are 
directly linked to the quantitative findings.   
 
We have also provided a tool kit of definitions and methods which can be used for 
prospective and retrospective quantitative measurements of patient safety and harm.  
We have explained ways of defining and measuring both prescribing error and 
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medication administration error (Chapter 3).  For retrospective evaluations, we have 
defined the required dataset and had it converted into an Access database for direct 
entry in the field (Chapters 3 and 5).  We have also adapted the trigger tool method 
to reflect UK practices (Chapters 3 and 6).  One of the difficulties in drawing general 
conclusions from medication error studies is that the definitions and methods used 
can alter findings by one, two or three orders of magnitude.  In another report 80 we 
note that there is a need to standardise definitions and methods so that studies in 
several settings can be meaningfully compared.  
 
Methodology 
There were several surprising findings in our comparison of methodologies: 
• Prospective and retrospective methods of detecting prescribing errors usually 
detect different errors. 
• Electronic prescribing systems, in our study, mainly reduce the prescribing 
errors that pharmacists detect when visiting a ward.  When these errors are 
corrected, they usually leave no trace in the patients’ notes.  Hence EP 
systems, as they currently function, need to be evaluated prospectively rather 
than retrospectively.  The prospective evaluation of ServeRx showed a 
significant reduction of prescribing errors from 3.8% to 2.0% (Chapter 4).  
Retrospective evaluation (while not powered to detect a difference) showed 
the introduction of ServeRx reduced errors from 7.4% to 6.5%, and following 
the introduction of Meditech prescribing errors moved from 8.6% to 8.8% 
(Chapter 5). 
• Trigger tool detected two out of four cases of harm at Charing Cross Hospital; 
however, in studying 205 patients it was also triggered on 166 occasions in 
which it did not identify a prescribing error or harm.  However, two triggers 
caused most of the false positives (Chapter 6).  If they were removed the 
resulting triggers could at least be worked into a checklist for ward 
pharmacists, and there is the potential to have them interrogate an electronic 
patient record in the future. 
• Spontaneous reporting proved very insensitive to prescribing errors and is not 
recommended as a research tool. 
• There are still issues to be resolved to improve the inter-rater reliability in 
assessing prescribing errors, and assessing the extent of harm.  The inter-
rater reliability is recognised as a problem in the international literature; in 
practice it at least means the same person(s) would ideally be assessing 
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prescribing error in both strands of an intervention study.  The definition of 
harm depends to some extent on the purpose of the research.  For example, 
an economic evaluation may wish to know whether any extra resources were 
used (extra drugs? extended length of stay?) and whether the quality of life 
was reduced. 
• Contrary to the expectations of many, after the introduction of EP it was 
neither quicker to access patients’ notes for research purposes, nor were all 
patients’ notes available.  EP systems can not usually cope with all 
medicines, and hence paper based notes are also stored and need to be 
accessed, even with a comprehensive HIS system such as Meditech.  The 
long experience of the system at Queen’s Hospital also illustrated two other 
problems.  First, that software may no longer be able to access very old 
records (over 10 years old in this case), and second that electronic records 
are still not immediately available if there is more demand  on the server than 
it can cope with.  At each site, before or after EP implementation, it was still 
only possible to retrospectively evaluate about four patients a day (Chapter 
5). 
 
We also explored methodological issues by commissioning two expert essays, one 
on the economic evaluation of electronic prescribing (by Professor Buxton of the 
Health Economics Research Group, Brunel University) and the other on statistical 
issues in the evaluation of EP (by Dr Carpenter of the Medical Statistics Unit, London 
School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine).  These are presented in Appendices C 
and D, and the key points presented below.   
 
Economic Evaluation 
Professor Buxton notes that our studies provide some important indications of the 
possibilities and challenges for undertaking a formal economic evaluation of an 
electronic prescribing system.  As regards cost estimation, it emphasises the need to 
realistically estimate the initial costs which need to include not just the capital costs of 
the system and its installation, but also the costs of the time of key staff involved in 
the development of the system/implementation of the project.  Measurements 
undertaken in this study show that it is feasible to estimate the time implications for 
staff involved in tasks associated with prescribing/administration of medication, but 
this report emphasises that it may be more appropriate to establish the actual 
opportunity cost of marginal changes in staff time. 
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Much more difficult is the appropriate valuation of the errors avoided.  Two 
approaches have been identified, and both merit further exploration.  It needs to be 
established whether key stakeholders have a concept of an “intrinsic” value for error 
reduction, or whether a “consequential” valuation is more appropriate.  If the latter, 
then a substantial programme of work is needed to establish a robust method of 
valuation and provide mean estimates of the value of avoiding different types of error. 
 
We need robust estimates of the reduction in error rates for different types of errors, 
particularly for significant errors which, because of their relative rarity, are not well 
characterised in relatively small studies.  It needs to be explored whether it is 
possible to use aggregated experience or alternative data bases to establish robust 
and generalisable ratios of different types of error that occur in different settings. 
 
The problem of lack of generalisability of individual studies needs to be recognised. 
For the purposes of estimation of the cost-effectiveness of future implementations  a 
decision-analytic framework will need to be used that can incorporate parameter 
values from studies of particular past implementations such as this, as well as 
estimates of the value of avoiding different types of error.  For this to be achieved 
requires that all such studies collect a set of consistently-defined key parameters that 
can be used in modelling.   
 
Study design and analysis 
Dr Carpenter discusses study design and analysis.  Regarding study design, if 
possible randomisation should be used to ensure “cause” (electronic prescribing) can 
be definitively linked to any “effect” (hopefully reduced prescription error). In practice, 
we realise that for many smaller studies, randomisation may not be practical.  For 
such cases, informed by the ideal randomised study, Dr Carpenter highlights factors 
that should be taken account of in the design and describes methods for choosing an 
appropriate sample size; he has derived an appropriate formula and illustrates its 
implementation.  For example, a sample size of 107 patients in each group could 
show a reduction in prescribing error rate from 8% to 4% (alpha 5%, beta 10%). 
 
The analysis of data from such studies needs to take into account the hierarchical 
structure of the data, using multilevel modelling or generalised estimating equations. 
This is because patients have typically 10 prescriptions during their stay, yet the 
length of stay, severity of illness and hence number of prescriptions can vary widely. 
Failure to take into account this patient level information (for example, by analysing 
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the data using contingency tables) could be misleading, as the conclusions are 
vulnerable to bias from atypical patients. Evaluations of EP in the literature have not 
taken this into account and hence will provide p values that are smaller than they 
should be. 
 
Secondly, he discusses the relative merits of a logistic versus a Poisson model for 
data, preferring a logistic approach. Finally, he describes how “propensity score” 
methods can be used, in the absence of randomisation, to provide a check on the 
similarity between the control and intervention groups and can be used in the model 
for estimating the effect of intervention. 
 
ServeRx and error reduction 
ServeRx is not just an EP system, it also provides new technologies in the form of  a 
computer controlled store cupboard, an intelligent drug trolley with electronically 
controlled drawers for each patient, all linked to a bar coded patient identification 
system, required to release a specific patient’s drugs.  In addition to reducing 
prescribing errors from 3.8% to 2.0% ServeRx also reduced medication 
administration errors significantly, from 7.0% to 4.3% (excluding IV errors), while 
markedly increasing identity checking from 17% to 81%.  Other markers of “good 
process” were also measured, including the nurses observing more doses being 
taken and more doses being given nearer the target time.  These are significant 
changes; however, they were achieved at an increase in staff time.  The pharmacy 
department increased its service to the ward to keep belief in the new service, and it 
took doctors longer to prescribe and nurses longer to conduct medication related 
activities outside of drug rounds.   
 
In UK hospitals about half the MAEs are because drugs are not on the ward when 
required, something that can be ameliorated by extra resource, so the question of 
whether this reduction could have been produced by other means still arises. On the 
one hand, there was a feeling that now the system had bedded in, and with some 
relatively simple software changes, the extra resources required by ServeRx could 
have been reduced.  On the other hand, the ward (before the intervention) used the 
traditional drug trolley system.  It has been argued that a better system is a Patients’ 
Own Drugs (PODs) system; the Audit commission recommend this 11, although the 
evidence base that it is better is, in our view, weak.  However, the ward already used 
significant elements of the PODs approach, including pharmacists providing 
admission and discharge services, and using the patient’s own drugs (if available) in 
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the patient’s drawer of the drug trolley.  Hence, we would expect the reduction in 
MAE caused by ServeRx to be similar in a PODs ward. 
 
It is notable that bar coding, while markedly increasing identity checking, did not lead 
to 100% patient identification before administration.  This is partly because of the way 
in which “as required” drugs were administered (outside the normal drug round), 
partly in cases such as barrier nursed patients, in which the drug trolley would not be 
taken into the room, and the patient’s bar code would be stuck to the wall outside the 
room, and partly due to the adoption of “work rounds” whereby new bar codes were 
printed, scanned and then discarded if the bar-code on a patient’s wrist band did not 
scan easily.  
 
Limitations of EP systems 
EP and associated technology rarely seems to be able to cope with all aspects of 
hospital prescribing, and it is important that exceptions are sought and captured, as 
they may create new errors, or may not deal with difficult situations which are 
inherently more error prone:  for example, prescribing of high risk variable dose drugs 
such as warfarin or insulin, or certain IV drugs, or uses in specialist areas such as 
neonatal ICU or A&E.  Automated drug cupboards/trolleys may not be able to deal 
with bulky drugs, and bar coded identification systems will not be used to identify 
patients for all drug administrations.  People often have expectations that EP 
systems will work in all cases; their limitations in normal use need to be publicised 
more.  The evaluation framework needs to seek and capture these exceptions.  It 
would be expected that these exceptions will diminish if there is a good working 
relationship with the supplier.  
 
New causes of errors were introduced with ServeRx, such as picking the wrong drug 
from a list of products when prescribing.  For example, “Paracetamol Soluble 500mg” 
appeared alphabetically before “Paracetamol Tablets 500mg” on the screen.  There 
was an unintended increase in the prescribing of soluble paracetamol tablets until the 
product was renamed “Paracetamol Tablets (soluble) 500mg”, moving it below 
“Paracetamol Tablets” on the picking list; unintentional prescribing then stopped.  
This is a simple example of how people can adapt the system to reduce errors.  
While prescribing soluble paracetamol would just have produced inconvenience, 
there was a more serious problem caused by a similar issue of doctors picking the 
first product on a list rather than the right product.  In this case imipenum, a powerful 
antibiotic, appeared as “injection i.m.” (intramuscular) before “injection i.v.” 
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(intravenous).  IM and IV formulations are different and should not be confused.  
There were several cases in which doctors prescribed the IM formulation when 
meaning to prescribe IV. Luckily, the ward only used the drug intravenously, so 
nurses ignored the IM instruction.  However, in other settings and with other drugs it 
could be a dangerous error. 
 
When drugs or routes of administration can not easily be dealt with by an EP system 
a great deal of scrutiny needs to be applied to the exceptions.  The relationship 
between prescribing error and harm is not a simple proportion.  Some errors are 
much more likely to cause harm than others, and some of the drugs and routes of 
administration most likely to cause harm to others are those that some EP systems 
find difficult to handle, such as drugs that have their dose changed regularly 
(warfarin, insulin) or IV drugs.  We need to ensure that EP is not predominantly 
reducing the probability of events happening that are only weakly associated with 
harm. 
 
Harm from errors 
Our study has provided a basis from which the extent of harm produced by 
medication errors can be estimated.  We have provided the data set and definitions 
required, written an Access database for data entry in the field, and estimated the 
time taken and the extent of recovery of patients’ notes.  As the introduction of EP did 
not have any obvious effect in the cases of harm we can pool the data, and we find 8 
cases of harm from 356 patients – a 2.2% error rate.  The sample is not across all 
specialities, and is biased towards surgical patients at Charing Cross Hospital, 
however this gives the best estimate yet of harm from prescribing in hospitals, 
covering a teaching hospital and a general hospital.  Although Vincent et al 34 
reviewed 1000 patient admissions in the UK for medical error, they did not 
specifically search for prescribing errors, and did not review the drug chart.   
 
We took a fairly wide definition of harm, so, for example, a laboratory value (for 
example, serum potassium, INR, digoxin concentration) outside the recommended 
range as a result of therapy was considered harm, even if subsequently detected, 
corrected and there was no adverse consequence to the patient.  A more rigorous 
definition, which may be of interest for economic evaluation, may have reduced the 
cases of harm to 3 or 4 – around 1% of patients.  Taking our figures in the round, it 
could be said that for every 100 admissions, 1000 -1500 items will be prescribed, 
there will be 100 -150 prescribing errors and one patient will be harmed.  While 1% of 
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patients harmed is a small proportion, the sheer volume of patient admissions means 
there could be expected to be a large number of harmed patients across the country.  
As pointed out by Professor Buxton, there is a real need to estimate accurately the 
extent of harm which results from prescribing errors in hospital.  Our report for the 
NPSA on the Heinrich ratio 80, (which assumes a fixed relationship between non-
harm accidents, minor harm and major harm) has debunked its validity for medication 
errors.  We point out that there is an urgent need to explore the relationship between 
medication error and harm.  Both these reports point to the need for a large scale 
review of notes to establish the extent of medication error and harm in the UK. 
 
When to evaluate 
A significant factor in the evaluation of an EP system is when that evaluation occurs.  
We felt that when we studied ServeRx, around six months after introduction, it, and 
the humans working with it, had reached a reasonably stable level of activity. 
However, earlier assessment may have been a poor predictor of performance.  It 
takes time for an EP system and the people using it to find and reach what they 
perceive to be an acceptably safe and efficient way of working.  Early assessments 
of the Brigham and Women’s system found little improvement in their target 
variables, and that the system introduced a potentially fatal IV potassium chloride 
error; it took several years to remove the error and improve the target variables 8.  
More recently Shulman et al 41 also reported an initial increase in errors after the 
introduction of EP; errors eventually fell to below pre-implementation levels. 
 
There should be a need to regularly review the effectiveness of an EP system as it, 
or the human systems around it, or the technology it intersects with, continue to 
develop.  Even with a well established system such as the Meditech at QHB, the 
move in drug distribution/administration systems in the UK towards Patient’s Own 
Drugs systems means changes to the way the EP and pharmacy systems are used. 
Meditech will benefit from a re-evaluation when PODs has been implemented. 
 
We would also expect some of the measures of ServeRx to improve over time, such 
as the amount of nurses’ time on medication related activities, which would be 
expected to be reduced following a new software release.  Human systems could 
also be changed in the way they work with the EP.  Following the current evaluation, 
showing the errors the pharmacist misses, there could be a revision of the ward 
pharmacists’ ways of working with EP, which could in turn be expected to reduce 
prescribing errors, and would then need to be re-evaluated. 
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One advantage of the evaluation framework is that it gives sufficient understanding 
and context to not only describe and explain the effectiveness of the system, but also 
to predict ways in which it could be developed, could be improved, or is/could be 
used in such a way that it increases the risks to patients. 
 
Decision Support 
Decision support is not as simple as many think.  There are reviews that show it can 
(but does not necessarily) improve decision making and reduce length of stay 81,82 
However, many of these evaluations are of stand alone systems for a limited range of 
decisions, and often have been tested in the “lab” rather than in routine use in clinical 
practice. Our study of decision support (Appendix E) showed that QHB had a clear 
and overt policy on decision support – the prescriber remained responsible for the 
decision, and hence most of the decision support was ensuring that drugs were on 
the formulary, in doses and formulations that could be supplied.  At CXH there were 
similar restrictions, but prescribers and nurses made assumptions about decision 
support which were not true, such as that allergy checking and drug-drug interactions 
were in place.  However, the pharmacy had not activated these as they felt they were 
not sufficiently developed.  This mismatch of assumptions and reality could be 
dangerous and an overt policy of stating the extent of decision support must be part 
of the training.   
 
There are also some issues about what is usually considered as decision support in 
medicine. In reality, most “decision support” is decision constraint or decision 
removal, for example having chosen a drug, choice of dose is constrained, or choice 
of route may be removed.  This is sensible, and a reasonable way of reducing error, 
analogous to fly-by-wire technology in aircraft, or anti-lock brakes in cars – they 
ensure actions are not excessive, and give ordinary users the same performance as 
more advanced practitioners.  However, there are three issues that need to be 
addressed  
1. Does automatic removal of elements of decision making reduce the skills of 
practitioners, so they become more dangerous when not using a system with 
decision support?  When EP is ubiquitous this is not a problem, but over the 
next 10 years requires serious consideration by professions. 
2. Another view of decision support would be that it presents relevant 
information is such a way that better decisions can be made.  For example, 
the Meditech system includes biochemistry results.  Several cases of harm in 
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our study were a result of renally cleared drugs being given in normal doses 
to patients with reduced renal function.  Using decision support to inform the 
prescriber that a drug they are prescribing is renally cleared, and giving the 
creatinine clearance, and the formula for dose adjustment, would alert 
prescribers to a potential problem, and support them in their decision of which 
dose to give.  This sort of decision support could be developed in the 
Meditech system and would seem a development QHB may wish to consider. 
3. Finally, the focus of decision support at present seems to be the individual.  
However, in safe practices the role of the team and its various members is 
important – utilising their combined knowledge and perceptions makes for 
better and safer decisions, as shown with techniques such as crew resource 
management.  We also know that the role of the patient in decision making is 
extremely important, yet often not enacted in practice.  A decision support 
mechanism which supported these ways of practice may be a suitable 
development.  One theoretical approach which may support these ends is 
“distributed cognition” 83,84,85.  In our view this approach is worthy of 
exploration. 
There has been a literature on technology providing decision support in medicine for 
over 30 years, however it is significant that it is little used in practice.  There is a risk 
that over use of drug-drug interaction warnings, for example, lead to staff ignoring 
them.  Even at Brigham and Women’s Hospital drug-drug interaction warnings are 
only for those combinations that “you would virtually never prescribe together” (David 
Bates, personal communication).  Another issue is that, even in a well established 
area, such as drug-drug interaction checking in GP prescribing systems, there have 
been problems with the software handling the functions correctly 12.  Decision support 
is assumed by most people to be an important way of reducing errors; the gap 
between expectation and reality is important and potentially dangerous.  There is a 
need to alert practitioners to this, and seek new solutions.  One approach would be to 
identify the problems that are most likely to cause harm and focus on decision 
support in those areas.   
Qualitative findings 
The qualitative research describes the settings and shows the development of the 
relationship between the social and the technical.  Despite the EP systems, their 
settings and their stages of development being very different, there were common 
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lessons to be drawn about the implementation and effects of an EP system.  Chapter 
7 draws out the general lessons, and a more detailed description of each system is 
given in the Appendices A and B.  A novel aspect of our assessment of the systems 
has been asking the opinion of patients.  They generally liked the use of the systems, 
while being aware of the potential for new error that computers bring.    
 
The general lessons are that EP needs to be addressed as a socio-technical 
innovation.  It is not a technical solution “there for the taking”, which can just be 
“plugged in” to a ward or hospital; it needs to be shaped and formed locally.  A 
consequence of this is that there will be emergent, and potentially very important, 
changes in the way work is organised; these can to some extent be anticipated and a 
national debate will be beneficial in some cases.  An example is the way EP both 
connects and disconnects health care practitioners within the care process.  
Communication between professionals can be improved by access to a common and 
unique data set for each patient, however there is a significant risk that this may 
degrade interpersonal relations, for example keeping the pharmacist in their office, 
off the ward.  Instead of patients being seen, they may become objectified – existing 
as a list of drugs and measurements – this is counter to the way good care is 
conceptualised: recognising the patient as an autonomous individual.  However, 
being able to concentrate on a patient’s drugs in an office or at night in a residency 
may also improve the quality of “technical”, pharmacological care.  A balance needs 
to be struck between two.   
 
There are also lessons for implementation.  First, a good relationship with the 
supplier is important, and, as many suppliers are not from the UK, they need a 
thorough understanding of the UK system, and how we wish care to be enhanced.  
Second, the supplier and the hospital need to commit resources to a prolonged 
period of implementation, in which both sides are working to sort out and work 
through hardware and software problems, and develop new skills and working 
practices.  Constant support and on-the–job training are required.  Finally, the EP 
system needs to be evaluated, using the framework we describe; this can be applied 
with varying degrees of intensity.  Pre-implementation studies can be very useful.  
One valuable benefit of each EP system was to make errors more visible to 
professionals, however this led one consultant at CXH to think the system was 
dangerous.  He thought many more drug administrations were being missed and 
demanded that the system be withdrawn as it imperilled patient safety.  It was only 
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because we had pre-implementation data that we could show that there were indeed 
fewer (but more visible) omissions and the system was safer in this respect.   
 
Literature 
In any report of this nature it is usual to set the findings into the context of the 
literature on the area.  Any RCT of a new medicine would be integrated into such a 
knowledge base.  However, Information and Communication Technology (ICT) is 
fundamentally, ontologically, different to a medicine.  A molecule does not change, 
however ICT does change, and can be used in very different ways.  Hence, the 
benefits, and risks, of any system may not be transferable to different organisations 
or systems of work within them.    Here are some reasons why the literature is of 
limited benefit in this field: 
• A major source of repeated error in the USA is transcription of the prescription 
by an inadequately skilled person; once this error is made the drug is 
repeatedly given to the patient, and hence is more likely to cause harm.  EP, 
as usually implemented, markedly reduces these errors in the USA, and this 
is why EP is so successful in US trials.  In UK hospitals there is far less 
transcription, and it is done by doctors or pharmacists, so transcription errors 
are a small part of UK practice, and hence, other things being equal, one 
would expect EP to be less effective in the UK.   
• Virtually all studies are conducted in one hospital, and often on one ward, 
reducing the generalisability even more.   
• The commonest source of the studies comes from Brigham and Women’s 
Hospital in the USA, from a system they have developed to their own needs 
over more than a decade.  Even the best home developed UK system, from 
Birmingham, has been specifically developed for the needs of renal wards; its 
effects on other wards are unknown. 
• Literature from the USA is affected by their structure of health care.  For 
example, private hospitals target their marketing at doctors, as they bring in 
the patients, who bring the money.  Hence, they will not want to implement a 
system that deters community physicians.  As one hospital information officer 
lamented, she needed to bring in a system acceptable to 1,000 voluntary 
(community) doctors 79.  The successes and failures of US systems need to 
be interpreted against this sort of context. 
• The literature, particularly on practical issues of implementation and usage, 
goes far beyond the traditional academic literature.  It includes on-line 
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journals and magazines, reports of meetings and fora from a range of 
organisations and professional groups, and chat room entries and blogs from 
(often discontented) users. 
 
These problems of interpretation are partly due to the nature of ICT and partly due to 
EP being at a relatively early stage of development internationally.  However, it 
should be noted that the points we have made are not generally recognised and 
come from our past experience of ICT and US health care.  Had the past evaluations 
adopted the evaluation framework we have described, there would be far more 
context against which to understand them, and it would be easier to draw out the 
lessons, benefits and risks that would be more likely to transfer to EP in UK hospitals. 
 
As in the USA, the UK literature on electronic prescribing is very varied - from 
accounts of experiences in professional journals to more formal evaluations in 
academic journals. The accounts exhibit various degrees of partiality, often give little 
detail, may use unusual methods, and usually only asses one or two aspects of the 
performance of the system. Of the three hospitals which used EP from the 1990s 
onwards, Arrowe Park Hospital has published several accounts and evaluations, as 
has Queen’s Hospital. 
 
The eight most academic evaluations 40,41,42,86,87,88,89,90 are summarised in tabular form 
in Appendix K.  Of the studies which we can interpret in a similar way to our own 
(Table 43) we see some similarities: 
 
Study % prescribing 
errors pre- 
% prescribing  
errors post- 
% error reduction 
 
ServeRx 
Pharmakon 
QS 5.6 (ICU) 
 
 
           3.8 
           7.4 
           6.7 
 
          2.0 
          4.7 
          4.8 
 
          1.8% 
          2.7% 
          1.9% 
Table 43:  Prescibing error reduction following electronic prescribing in  
               UK studies 
 
One study 40 besides our own has measured medication administration error (MAE) 
reduction as a result of linking EP to an administration system. The studies show a 
similar reduction in errors. ServeRx reduced non-IV MAE by 2.7% (from 7.0% to 
4.3%). Fowlie et al 40 found a reduction of 3.6% (from 9% to 5.4%).  
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Overall, these findings are remarkably similar and may give some indication of the 
reduction in prescribing errors that EP can provide in the early stages of 
implementation. 
 
We finish by outlining what we see as the policy implications and research agenda 
that follow from our research. 
 
Policy Implications 
• All EP programmes should first be tested “in vitro” on a set of patient data 
which will explore an EP system’s competence in realistic prescribing 
situations.  This will improve quality assurance and add confidence to the 
“signing off” of the software before it is used on patients. 
• All new systems should be evaluated in several settings.  Our evaluation 
framework and methods are a good basis for others to use. 
• Professions need to engage early with some of the likely consequences of 
EP.  For example, how can patient contact be maintained?  How can 
pharmacy improve its error monitoring? 
• Long term relationships are required with suppliers. 
• Software must be able to be adapted locally. 
• Data needs to be structured so that it can easily be accessed and 
interrogated. 
• Decision support should be kept simple and overt from the start. 
• Before adopting EP, individual professionals need to have an understanding 
of the benefits to themselves, as well as patients as a whole and the NHS. 
 
Research Agenda 
• A patient database needs to be constructed to test EP systems “in vitro”. 
• We need to capture information from current EP experiments in the UK, 
including failed and withdrawn systems, to identify good and bad practice and 
system features. 
• Further work is needed on reliability of assessing errors and their 
consequences. 
• Future summative evaluations should recognise the hierarchical structure of 
data, should use logistic modelling and, given the difficulty of conducting 
randomised trials, propensity score methods should be used.  
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• The relationship between error and harm needs to be fully understood.  This 
is a substantial and important piece of work. 
• A large study of patients’ notes is required to establish the frequency of harm 
and to cost that harm.  From this the basics of an economic model for future 
interventions can be built. 
 
Conclusion 
Our aim was to pilot methodologies for the evaluation of EP.  We have provided a 
robust evaluation framework that can be used in any setting, and establishes the 
quantitative changes in the incidence of error as well as contextualising to give 
insight into generalisable lessons for the future.  We have also highlighted the issues 
to do with experimental design of future quantitative and health economic studies.   
 
Taking all our quantitative results into account, and recognising that the study was 
designed to pilot methods, we make the following tentative statement.  We think that 
in hospitals doctors make errors in 10-11% of the prescriptions that they write, and 
that the first implementation of an electronic prescribing system will reduce 
prescribing errors by 2-3%.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Word count: 43,590 
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Appendix A. Qualitative evaluation of ServeRx 
 
A.1 Introduction 
 
This Chapter describes the qualitative evaluation of the ServeRx system. Together 
with Appendix B it supports and elaborates on findings discussed in Chapter 7.  The 
findings are analysed and reported using Cornford’s et al. framework.21  
 
The ServeRx electronic prescribing system, as briefly introduced in Chapter 2, was 
installed on a 28-bed general surgery ward at the Charing Cross Hospital (CHX) in 
2003 and includes electronic prescribing, scheduling, automated dispensing and 
electronic administration, as well as elements of stock control. The technical system 
(the hardware and software) comes from a small and specialised supplier (ServeRx: 
MDG Medical, Israel) (Figure 20). It is one of just three trial implementations in the 
world. The system is a “closed loop” system, joining electronic prescribing with a 
forced choice of the correct product in dispensing and bar-coded identity checking of 
the patient at the time of administration. A principal aim is to reduce prescribing and 
administration errors, but this needs to be understood within a broader desire to 
improve (or not degrade) the overall level of patient care, and to free resources for 
other productive care activities.  
 
 
 
Reducing Human Error and Ensuring Patient Safety 
The ServeRx® System from MDG Medical is an efficient, affordable and cost-
effective medication management and control system for acute-care hospitals and 
long-term-care settings. ServeRx® is a secure closed-loop computerized system that 
reduces medication errors and seamlessly manages patient care from prescription 
through dispensing, administering and reporting.  
(http://www.mdgmedical.com/ServerRx.html) 
Figure 20: The ServeRx system (supplier’s description) 
  
The project to pilot the ServeRx system was initiated in January 2003 following initial 
contacts between the Hospital and the technology vendors. It took six months to 
complete preliminary work, including preparing an operational outline, refitting a 
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treatment room on the ward to hold the equipment, installing the equipment, and 
system testing. The system went live on the ward in June 2003 following brief training 
undertaken using hardware and software different to that actually implemented.   
 
The system was quickly integrated into the ward’s working practices, though not 
without many issues emerging through the early period. It has operated in a live 
mode for just over two years at the time of writing, having taken about nine months 
from initial live running to a situation in which a stable system was in everyday use on 
the ward and covering basic functionality (Figure 21).  
 
2002  
 December  CHX Contract with MDG for 6-9 month beta 
test on surgical ward 
2003  
 May Original proposed implementation date; 
Electronic discharge prescriptions and usable 
remote terminal in pharmacy promised for 
September 
 June Limited system goes live on 8 North 
 August Software stability problems (8N and in Israel) 
 August/Sept Software patches to fix bugs; system become 
more stable while MDG reworking code  
 November Date of release of stable software given as 15 
January; no date given for discharge and 
pharmacy terminal  (version1.13) 
2004  
 January Release of 1.13 proposed by MDG for May 
2004 
 February Intermediate version of software installed  
 June  Release 1.13 implemented 
Figure 21: Implementation timetable, ServeRx 
 
A.2 Methods 
 
As a complement to the before and after design used at CXH and described in 
Chapter 4, this element of the research was based on an ethnographic approach and 
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included interviews with relevant stakeholders including nursing staff, consultants, 
junior doctors, pharmacists and pharmacy management, as well as periods of 
observation on the ward and at project steering group meetings. A focus group 
session was also held, nine months after the system went live (April 2004), at which 
doctors, nurses, pharmacists and hospital managers discussed their experiences and 
attitudes to the system.  (See Annex Ai for an agenda for the focus group session.) 
 
Formal interviews, undertaken between March 2003 and February 2005, were taped 
and transcribed and the focus group was supported by a dedicated note taker. (See 
Annex Aii  for an interview guide.)  If tape-recording was not feasible, or interviews 
were very brief, written notes were made. Information was captured by two 
experienced researchers (TC, EK), who compared findings and produced a rich 
account which acted as the source for the main section of this Chapter. A separate 
methodology and researcher team undertook the patient related research reported in 
Section A.4  
 
This element of the research was motivated by a desire to understand how such an 
innovative set of technical components (computers, bar codes, mobile devices, smart 
cupboards) came to be established within the working practices of health care 
professionals as they prescribe and administer drugs and how their attitudes to the 
system developed throughout the period of planning, implementation and use.  
 
A.3 Evaluation Results 
 
In this section we report the findings from the interviews and observation using the 
structure of the Cornford et al. framework. The analysis is presented first for the 
system function, then the human perspectives and finally from the organisational 
view. In each section the analysis is reported first in terms of structure, then process 
and finally outcomes, though we acknowledge that these sub-headings are at times 
hard to strictly adhere to. 
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A.3.1 System functions 
 
Structure 
At CXH the ServeRx electronic prescribing and administrations system with 
automated dispensing is installed on only one ward. It has no substantial connection 
(other than basic patient data from patient administration system) to the Hospital’s 
other information systems (for example, PACS). 
 
After an initial period of instability and slow running, and with the release of patches 
and new versions of the software, the technical system became generally stable from 
about September 2003 (three months after implementation). The principal elements 
of the technical system implemented are described in Figure 22. 
 
 
Central ward based server computer holding patient and pharmacy databases 
and supporting data backup procedures. 
Automated cabinets to hold ward stock and individual non stock drugs  in 
computer controlled drawers. 
Central console for drug selection and trolley loading, used by nurses and 
pharmacists via a touch screen interface. 
Workstation at nurses’ station, available for all tasks including prescribing and 
review, using a conventional keyboard and mouse. 
3 * portable and dockable pentablets (Pentabs), available for prescribing with 
stylus input. 
2* computerised and dockable drug trolleys, each with touch screen and bar 
code readers. 
1 * bar code printer to produce wrist straps for all patients on the ward 
Figure 22: Principal elements of technology within the system 
 
The technical elements all started life with some operational problems: The Pentabs 
had limited battery life, and some data loss problems were observed on docking. At 
one point they were taken out of use, later they were replaced with a new version. 
Their screens too were small and not as bright as desired making it hard for two or 
more people to review data simultaneously. In practice, much prescribing was 
undertaken using the two fixed workstation computers where the windows interface 
was generally found to be easy to use and provoked little comment.   
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The server computer was often slow and would hang - a problem associated in part 
with its data backup routines. Other problems noted were the small size of the trolley 
drawers and the lack of suitable handles, and initially trolleys broke down. The 
automated drug cabinet too, while functioning well, raised design issues associated 
with the ergonomics of its use, particularly when it was being restocked. Finally, in 
the initial periods, the sheer quantity of demand on the system for all types of 
functionality meant that there were often queues for access – particularly to the 
workstations. 
 
A number of desired system functions were not available at the start of the period of 
use, for example the ability to generate and despatch discharge prescriptions, though 
this was added during the project. Equally almost all aspects of decision support 
including allergy alerts were not implemented, not being judged to be of appropriate 
robustness for operational use (see Appendix E). 
 
Although doctors and pharmacists who were only occasionally working on the ward 
found the system difficult to use, overall those using the system frequently found the 
interface intuitive.  
 
“Initially I thought it was quite confusing but that was because I wasn’t using it all the 
time.  […]  Since I have been doing the ward, I think it is quite good”. [Ward 
Pharmacist] 
 
Process 
Since the system has reached some form of stability (about three months after 
implementation) it has become almost totally integrated into work of the ward. Once 
stable, the data processing functioned well.  The inbuilt structuring of the core work 
processes of prescribing, selection and administration of drugs performed 
satisfactorily for most drugs, but some aspects of this work were found to be 
incompatible with the system (for example, prescribing of warfarin and intravenous 
fluids), and not all drugs could be safely prescribed through the system because their 
protocols do not fit easily into the structures embedded in the software – regular dose 
at set times - and these remained on the system only as a prompt to consult a 
subsidiary paper chart.  Some related problems arose in respect of antibiotics in that 
the system set duration to the hospital norm (five days), and this could lead to their 
being omitted thereafter if the prescription was not renewed.  
 152 
 
Prescribing takes place at the bedside, with doctors in theory using portable and 
dockable pen tablets that are not wireless enabled, and which update the central 
ward database only when docked. These Pentabs provide doctors with a structured 
prescribing form and access to patient medication history, with pull down menus for 
selecting drugs, selecting doses (including defaults), and timing and some relevant 
alerts, for example for allergies. However, as noted above, these devices were often 
not used, with doctors often reverting to the fixed workstations.  
 
Following prescribing by Pentab or at a workstation the prescription data is uploaded 
to a database held on a ward based server computer. The prescribing data can then 
be systematically reviewed, checked or changed by pharmacists, and they can do 
this from any terminal on the system with certain access to the prescribing data. 
During the study period review was principally undertaken on the ward but also, in 
the later stages, included one terminal located off the ward and in the central hospital 
pharmacy. Where once almost all pharmacist intervention was located on the ward, 
based around the paper drug chart (if and when available), there was now the 
potential for review remotely. 
 
Dispensing and administration of drugs is achieved by the use of two computerised 
drug trolleys for ward drug rounds, rounds being undertaken in parallel for each side 
of the ward. Rounds start with loading the trolley, which is done while it is docked to 
the main console (touch sensitive screen) and automated cabinet. An individual 
patient’s drugs are loaded into an individual drawer of this trolley at the start of a drug 
round. The scheduling software allows the patient to be identified and their relevant 
drugs are indicated based on the recorded prescriptions. Item-by-item drugs are 
drawn from the automated cabinet that holds the majority of the ward stock. The 
system is designed such that only one drawer on the trolley (the individual patient 
drawer), and one drawer of the automated cabinet can be open at any one time. 
Preparation for a drug round is then a more structured activity for a nurse, and one in 
which the individual patients are considered one by one, and their medicines are 
systematically collected together.  
 
During the ward drug round administration to the patient is initiated by reading a 
patient’s bar-coded wrist strap. Reading this bar code triggers the opening of the 
appropriate drawer of the trolley for this patient and thus allowing access to the 
appropriate drugs. The possibility of giving drugs to the wrong person should thereby 
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be greatly reduced. Administration is then recorded on the trolley’s computer screen 
(again a touch screen), which updates the main record when it is re-docked with the 
main system.  Undertaking a drug round is equally a more structured activity, with a 
specific activity of identification and a more comprehensive scheme for recording 
administration.  
 
This description of the process embedded in the technical apparatus is of course 
summarised and at each step of the process there are alternative routes (for 
example, bar codes may be on room doors or furniture, as in side room isolation 
nursing  when trolleys are not brought into the room). In some case the system has 
to be circumvented, as when too many drugs are needed and they cannot fit in the 
patient drawer.  
 
Outcome 
“It was a living hell for 6 weeks. Not just because of the change process but because 
of unstable technology. We were completely unprepared for the degree of change 
although we tried to prepare…… It is a complete change of practice”. [Senior Nurse 
in focus meeting] 
 
The most significant outcome for the technical system is that, after a period of 
intense frustration and technical failures, it was made to work and has been able to 
remain in continuous use for over two years. In part this is attributable to the 
maintenance of working relationships between the hospital and the supplier, with 
errors, bugs and conflicting issues of practice worked out and to a degree resolved 
through time. But even after two years of use, some issues of appropriate 
functionality within the technical system remain to be resolved, for example, how the 
prescription of oxygen should be handled within the system.   
 
As shown in Chapter 4, ServeRx has significantly reduced prescribing and drug 
administration errors, but has increased the time taken for these activities. These 
outcomes can partly be understood as an outcome of the functionality inscribed in 
the technical system. However, as addressed below, they also need to be seen as a 
consequence of how people came to use it.  
 
In summary, the following outcomes of the technical system were identified by 
interviewees: 
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• A usable technology (hardware and software) that was over time shaped and 
integrated into ward practice. 
• The maintenance of prescribing and administration data to an appropriate 
quality and available for all participants in the care process. 
• Continuing mismatch between system characteristics and the use of certain 
drugs. 
 
A.3.2 Human Perspectives 
 
“It was surprising … we thought we had thought about everyone else who needed to 
be trained … but we forgot about many people who had been involved in drug 
prescribing practices for years… e.g. dieticians, they weren’t trained, we didn’t think 
about it. There are more people involved in drug management than we expected”. 
[Senior Nurse] 
 
“A single biggest change we had in this ward in 30 years” [Consultant in focus 
meeting] 
 
ServeRx was implemented on a single surgical ward and operated as a system for 
only a specific part of the care activity with no integration with other information 
systems. Nevertheless, many human participants were drawn into the system and 
used it. At the core these include doctors, nurses and pharmacists, though almost 
anybody who came onto the ward to contribute to care was a potential participant (for 
example, dieticians, physiotherapists etc.).  The following section presents the views 
of the three main stakeholder groups, nurses, doctors and pharmacists. The views of 
patients are reported separately in section A.4 
 
 
 
Structure 
Initiation and training 
As an experimental project that was piloting a range of new technologies and new 
ways of working the system was supported by a dedicated trainer who provided 
formal and informal support and spent much time on the ward and supporting the 
various users. This support has proved vital to the nurses’ satisfaction with the 
system, and the period in which the trainer was continuously present on the ward had 
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to be extended. In the initial stage the pre-implementation training undertaken shortly 
before the launch used a system that was not identical to that implemented. In effect, 
training for the main user groups was undertaken in the initial period of use, during 
which a brief parallel running approach was used.  Thereafter training was offered to 
people as required, though for doctors in particular the training was not generally well 
received and some avoided it or undertook it with little commitment - they expected to 
learn on the job, expected to apply their general IT knowledge,  and to develop their 
use in interaction with colleagues.  
 
“I haven’t had a formal training but I picked it up, it is fairly user friendly. And nurses 
help you a lot… you can ask them questions”. [HO in focus meeting] 
 
“But you learn on the job, it takes time to learn. This is not the system you can learn 
from manuals”. [Pharmacist] 
 
“A lot of doctors didn’t come to training. Even if they did, they didn’t pay much 
attention”. [Sister] 
 
Doctors 
This system seems at first sight to have had fairly minimal structural impact on 
doctors. As one would expect, it was the more junior doctors who had most direct 
contact with the system, and for them it was just one among a number of immediate 
concerns that they faced as they worked through rotations and moved from post to 
post. What the system demanded from them, in terms of computer skills or new work 
practices, was seen as generally within their competence, if at times rather irksome. 
As one of the trainers reflected, junior doctors prioritise all the time and this project 
was not a top priority for them.  
 
“There should have been more involvement from clinicians”. [Consultant in focus 
meeting] 
 
Some doctors reflected on the structure of the system in terms of its lack of a 
reflection of their interests. Put another way, they looked for a greater involvement in 
the design of such systems, and felt that their participation in both design and 
implementation planning was the only way to achieve really useful, appropriate and 
usable systems.  Whether this is true or not (and whether it is achievable), such 
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comments do reflect a general sense that in the case of ServeRx the level of 
involvement of doctors was not really appropriate to the task being undertaken.   
 
Nurses 
Nurses had to use ServeRx as the only way to administer drugs and as such the 
structural aspects of the system impinged on their work extensively. Nurses were 
hesitant about the system at the outset, and often feared letting go of familiar 
structures within their work environment such as the bed-end drug chart and the old 
style drug trolley.  They also expressed a lack of knowledge about computers (some 
had not used a mouse before) and some fear and resistance to computers becoming 
a more substantial part of their job. 
 
“I avoided it [ServeRx] because I’m here for the patients. My job is looking after 
patients”. [Staff Nurse] 
 
“Without previous knowledge of computers it was difficult”. [Staff Nurse] 
 
“Computers do not feature much in nurses training”. [Junior Nurse] 
 
Pharmacists 
This system was to a large degree driven forward by pharmacists, the project being 
led by the Chief Pharmacist, and this emphasis was reflected in comments by both 
doctors and nurses who saw the whole system as reflecting most strongly 
pharmacy’s interests. Unsurprisingly then, pharmacists when interviewed had the 
clearest understanding as to what the system was for (reduce errors, save time, 
improve service), how it operated, and the perceived additional benefits for 
pharmacists (more time for patient contact, taking drug histories, discharge 
counselling etc.).  
 
Pharmacists interviewed in the early stages of the study and before the system was 
in live use could immediately appreciate the potential for more comprehensive 
review, of more legible entry and more coherent detail drawn from pull down menus 
and better adherence to the hospital formulary. The more enthusiastic persons 
interviewed at the start of the research came up in the end with a sustained and 
positive account of expectations for the system:  
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“It will enable us to capture our practice, e.g. asking ‘tell me all the changes done in 
the last 48 hours’ this will be a huge benefit. It will make audit possible, e.g. listing all 
the patients on drug X.” [Pharmacist] 
 
Asking if the system would serve the interests of Pharmacists elicited a number of 
feelings. The wish for an ideal ServeRx could be quickly conjured up, principally in 
terms of freeing time and “eliminating routine things”.  What would be done with this 
time? Three ideas emerged 1. spend more time with patients, 2. liaison with GPs and 
“the community”, and 3. thinking about the processes and “keeping up-to-date with 
the latest developments”.   
 
This last point was elaborated by a pharmacist remarking that junior staff have little 
discretionary time and little opportunity to think about their work. Our interviews also 
indicated that for most pharmacists “working with patients” was the goal, for example 
in taking drug histories (doctors are not good at this they suggested), and advising 
patients about their drugs. They then linked this back to an ideal ServeRx by asking 
how the new system would support such goals.  
 
Process 
Doctors 
Junior doctors, who do the majority of prescribing, use pentablets to prescribe at a 
bed site or workstations on the ward. As one doctor noted the workstation now 
provides a focal point where different professionals gather, and doctors can ask 
pharmacists questions. However, others pointed out that with a drug chart it was 
easier to get a quick overview of drugs and, whenever necessary, discuss it with a 
consultant.  
 
Doctors generally understood that a system such as ServeRx has the potential to 
change processes within the care setting and could make a significant contribution to 
improved medical practice and in principal to the elimination of a significant general 
class of error. They however maintained a strong distinction between this system 
with, as they saw it, some significant failings and problems, and an ideal system. For 
example, doctors often expressed the opinion that such a system would be more 
appropriate and desirable if it was implemented across the hospital, which would 
result in fewer problems of transition of their working practices between the study 
ward and the rest of the hospital.   
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“Either everywhere or nowhere”  [HO in focus meeting) 
 
“But .. if everyone in the country was using it this would presumably solve most of the 
hurdles”. [Consultant, focus meeting] 
 
“It shouldn’t have been introduced in a surgical ward. Would have been better in a 
quieter ward with less prescriptions”. [Consultant, focus meeting] 
 
Junior doctors noted often the extra work they thought it created, for example 
transcribing drug charts of patients coming on to the ward (a task shared with 
pharmacists), having to deal with some drugs outside the computerised system (and 
thus as they indicated “having to do two rounds”), the need for training as they 
rotated, and the queuing for access to terminals.  
 
However, over time there were some more positive comments made and, for 
example, a comparison drawn with the Hospital’s PACS system, which was seen as 
a success for technology.  
 
“It is very positive, it has eliminated paperwork. This can be compared with PACS. 
PACS is very successful, it is a model for such projects…. This system will spread. If, 
like PACS can be accessed from any computer” [Spr] 
 
However, others indicated that EP is rather more complicated to implement than 
PACS, emphasising the way in which EP systems shift the complex relationships 
between different health care professionals and articulate the work process: 
 
“PACS is not a system that is of the same immediacy than the drug management 
system like ServeRx. Can’t compare it. This is a fundamental process, many people 
are involved in it not like in PACS when it is 1:1” [Consultant] 
 
Nurses 
The way the nurses prepare for drug rounds and administer drugs has changed 
significantly. In the task of loading the drug trolley, the nurse is bound into one 
sequence of events which may seem to fragment the work – a per patient, by drug 
process of loading the trolley drawers, and one which splits off some aspects of the 
work, such as preparation of IV fluids, or may leave some untidy aspects to be dealt 
with, foe example referral to paper charts, or uncertainty as to whether oxygen 
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should or should not be prescribed through the system. Undertaking a drug round is 
equally a more structured activity, with specific attention to identification and a more 
comprehensive scheme for recording administration. The system demands 
passwords and pin numbers along the way to establish a definitive record of who has 
done what and when. Prescribing or administration not undertaken as part of regular 
drug rounds, for example when a nurse gives a “stat”, occasional or elective dose, 
requires another work flow to log and administer, and this involves walking to and fro 
from the computer twice to obtain the drug and then to record administration. 
 
Thus, perhaps not surprisingly, and as noted above, nurses were hesitant about the 
system at the outset often reflecting on their perceived role as a nurse. 
 
“I spent less time on a drug round but it doesn’t help me to do a better job as a nurse. 
Before nurses could pick up a chart and at a glance see what is there, what happens. 
In 20 seconds you could see what they’ve got there (on what drugs a patient is)”. 
[Staff Nurse] 
 
“I’m here for the patients. My job is looking after patients.” [Staff Nurse] 
 
The nurses’ perception was in general that there might be less medication errors 
being made or at least there should be less errors in the future if or when the system 
became more established. Their notion of error was generally related to others 
activities, principally doctors. 
 
“Doctors make less errors.” [Nurse] 
 
“Biggest problem is mis-prescribing of drugs because doctors might have clicked on 
a wrong drug (from drop-down menu). Before, when they had to write down the drug, 
there was less scope for error, they might have prescribed wrong dosage but at least 
drug was right”. [Nurse] 
 
However, nurses too could reflect upon their own practice and see some potential for 
error reduction in the system. 
 
“Coming from different wards using traditional trolley, and trying to find different drugs 
in the trolley and maybe finding a drug isn’t there – something that wouldn’t happen 
with ServeRx – in that respect I find it very beneficial”. [Nurse] 
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“When I had to do a night shift it definitely helped, it was quicker, and as you are so 
tired there is less chance of errors”. [Staff Nurse] 
 
“The system hasn’t reduced medication incidents but in the future it should (now 
there are hiccups). Still the system highlights that drugs were not given, gives 
reminders of drugs to be given outside normal drug rounds”. [Nurse] 
 
More senior nurses, and those who had had more information during the build up to 
the implementation by participating on the project team, were generally more 
positive. They saw the future in this system, with a better more careful and error free 
regime of care with time saved becoming available for more creative nursing activity. 
They anticipated and kept faith with these promised benefits, even at the times when 
the system was at its most problematic, as one quote given above says, “The system 
hasn’t reduced medication incidents but in the future it should…” 
 
Through the interviews we can see that nurses attitudes towards the system shifted 
over time, from “non-involvement” at first (except for senior nurses), to some interest 
(on seeing ServeRx room and equipment being established), to feeling somewhat 
uncertain and lacking confidence (after receiving the first part of training), 
apprehension and disgruntlement (during the turbulent first weeks or rather months) 
to guarded acceptance of the system or at least acknowledgement that “the system 
is better now than it was before”.  
 
All nurses considered the implementation process and the time the system took to 
stabilise as very stressful. Indeed, some nurses saw their attitude as a part of the 
problem, for example referring to “my technophobia”. Getting through the difficult 
period, and learning to work with the new system evoked a sense of satisfaction in 
some nurses. Indeed one of the senior nurses commented on the system as being a 
way to engage more junior staff and to give them a challenge that would spur them 
on to develop new professional competencies. 
 
“They will survive it… this project helped to build resilience”. [Sister]. 
 
“We have a personal sense of satisfaction now as we are up and running. It is getting 
there, becoming part of routine”. [Nurse] 
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Still, for some nurses the overall feeling from the experience was of being made to do 
something that they would not have chosen to do, and which they still, to a degree 
resented as an imposition. 
 
“It wasn’t our baby so we don’t feel a sense of achievement. We have done well but 
we know it wasn’t ours. Not that I would have wanted this to be our baby, even if I 
could have made it my baby.” [Nurse] 
 
Pharmacists  
Pharmacists can to some extent choose how and where they do their work. While 
previously they visited each patient and checked their drug chart if available, now 
they can check through the computer and assess each patient’s chart for changes, 
then visit patients whose drug records indicated a pharmacy related problem. 
However, they can (and the ward pharmacists does) continue to see all or most of 
the patients on daily basis. 
 
Pharmacists attitudes and responses, as they developed over time, are significant in 
understanding not just what they understood the system to be intended for, but also 
how the system became a reality for them as it started operations and was 
embedded into their working practices. Thus pharmacists who used the system 
generally reported positive responses: 
 
“I think overall I would say I would rather it was here and I wouldn’t want to go 
backwards and take it out”. [Ward Pharmacist] 
 
“I didn’t actually know what to expect so I guess that’s probably a good thing. I mean 
I thought it would be high tech and very nice to look at but I didn’t know what the 
absolute plus points would be from it. [….] Well I like it because everything is on one 
screen, it’s all there. You don’t need to go around looking for the different bits and 
pieces and if you want it you have the sort of power, as it were, to change something 
and its all easily readable, you know there are no qualms about mistakes being 
made”. [On call Pharmacist who has used the system as cover] 
 
“It is easier to spot problems. Also, it seems that everyone is thinking a bit more 
about drugs, there is a greater ‘visibility’ of prescribing and that’s good”. [Trainer and 
Support Pharmacist] 
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The question of working with patients and maintaining patient contact was, as 
indicated above, a central concern of pharmacists and some comments indicated 
some questioning of the extent to which this system was serving that goal. 
 
“On this ward you are very computer focused. All the prescriptions are done at the 
computer. Before drug charts were by patients’ beds and that’s when you used to talk 
to patients, see them in their whole environment”. [On call pharmacist who has used 
the system as cover in focus meeting] 
 
The disappearance of drug charts was a common theme commented on by 
pharmacists as well as doctors and nurses.  They all emphasised the quick access to 
a general overview that the chart provided, usefully placed at the end of the bed, 
even if in the same sentence they would acknowledged the frustration of physically 
locating charts and the problems of incomplete, incoherent and illegible entries. 
 
Outcomes 
One of the outcomes of the project are the peoples’ attitudes towards ServeRx and 
computerisation in general. The pharmacists interviewed generally shared a positive 
opinion about ServeRx and most of them did not oppose computerisation. Junior 
doctors’ opinions about the system varied widely, ranging from very enthusiastic 
(“very good”, “quicker”) to rather negative. However, the majority of those we had 
spoken to considered the “ideal” computerised system as generally worth pursuing. 
Senior doctors tended to be more sceptical about this particular system and the 
computerisation process in general, although again they did not necessary dismiss 
an idea of EP system that is all pervasive and shared between wards and different 
hospitals. After the initial turbulent implementation effort most nurses have come to 
accept the system, with some becoming reliant on it, as the above quotations 
suggest: 
 
“I have come round to it in more ways that I though I would but still I’m not 100% 
convinced….I am a pretty hard person to satisfy.” [Staff Nurse] 
 
“I like the system. I am now worried about going to the old system, I prefer this to 
paper drug charts” [Sister in focus meeting]. 
 
The majority of interviewees felt that the system was safer due to: 
• Legible and complete prescriptions; 
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• Easier and more timely access to prescribing data; 
• Access to patients’ history; 
• Automated dispensing of drugs; 
• Checking patients identity (by scanning bar codes on patients’ wrists) 
• Greater visibility of prescribing and ability to audit. 
 
However, the system introduced new risks. The problem most commonly noted was 
a picking-up error, where doctors would choose a wrong drug from a list. Many also 
worried about computer failure and its implications for practice (how to proceed 
without records) and potential risks of administering wrong drugs or not administering 
on time. As one of the doctors noted, ServeRx has resulted in house officers having 
the main responsibility for updating the system and has reduced the involvement of 
others in the process of prescribing. 
 
Many of the participants mentioned that they missed the drug chart.  Its use in 
practice goes beyond its “official” purpose - it is used as a quick method of assessing 
the clinical state of a patient while standing at the bedside, particularly by nurses 
coming on shift or pharmacists visiting the ward. Senior doctors also missed the 
ability to use a drug chart as a communication “device” between themselves and 
junior doctors or visiting consultants. 
 
“Now I am thinking about what I can and cannot do with a drug chart. […] I 
appreciate paper drug chart more”. [Junior doctor] 
 
It seems that one of the outcome of the way the system was used was “shifting of 
time” when activities are done; for example, when prescribing takes place and when 
it is checked. Perceptions about implications for time taken to do different activities 
varied amongst professionals. Junior doctors, although acknowledging that they did 
not need to look for a physical record or re-write paper records, generally felt that the 
ServeRx system has introduced extra activities (for example, the need to transcribe 
records for patients moving between wards) or made some of the activities more 
cumbersome (for example, prescribing on the computer and viewing records). 
Nevertheless, as stated before, most of their problems tended to stem from particular 
limitations of the system and its confinement to one ward. All nurses pointed out that 
some activities took longer and some shorter when using the new system. However, 
their perceptions of time taken for different activities differed. For pharmacists the 
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introduction of ServeRx resulted in new activities, for example providing support for 
nurses and doctors on Ward 8N (for example, answering their queries about the 
system, helping out with some system-related problems) and transcribing of 
prescriptions. However, it has also made the process of reviewing prescriptions 
easier. 
 
The system has imposed changes in practice on all those who work with it; most 
were seen as beneficial and appropriate.  Nevertheless, the system is seen as more 
structuring and at times constraining for those who work with it.  To varying degrees 
the system sometimes poses irksome duties and enforces a unique sequence of 
activity. This is particularly visible in the way the nurses prepare for and conduct drug 
rounds, considering each patient one by one. Pharmacists’ work process has 
changed as well. Because they can check each patient’s chart at a terminal in 
pharmacy, eventually this might result in some pharmacists choosing to spend less 
time on wards or seeing patients for whose charts they have identified a problem. 
Such a development might not be welcomed, as explained to us: 
 
“The system with its protocols and alerts is not enough. Doctors can ask pharmacists 
different things” [Junior Doctor] 
 
However, we have noticed that this is not necessarily the case. The ward pharmacist 
for Ward 8N continues to visit the ward regularly and speak to doctors on the ward, 
as well as see most of the patients on daily basis. Furthermore, by virtue of the 
project itself, we observed more interaction between participants on the ward, 
particularly around prescribing. For all of the period of implementation the ward had a 
constant presence of a trained pharmacist to work with other staff as they became 
familiar with the system and as they encountered problems.  Pharmacists and their 
work gained visibility. Moreover, in the face of the new system certain solidarity 
emerged, with nurses and doctors helping each other, showing a shared sense of 
being in the front line.  
 
A 3.3 Organisational Context 
 
Structure 
Implicit in the qualitative evaluation of ServeRx is a question: “If it is demonstrated 
that ICT used in this way does reduce errors, then how might we build upon this 
experience to inform any wider scale deployment of the system?”  Through the 
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expressed opinions of the participants, and discussion with pharmacy managers, we 
present here some of the relevant issues that emerge. 
 
It is significant that this was a pilot project. It was undertaken with a general 
understanding that what was being attempted was new, innovative and potentially 
worthwhile but was still an experiment or pilot. It was also understood as being 
demanding of extra resources and effort, including in technical and organisational 
design, dedicated space, and individual commitment. The system was supported by 
the constant availability of support staff to answer questions, collect problems and 
issues for resolution, provide training and reassure users. This “project status” 
allowed some lee-way, and it was generally understood as an opportunity to shape 
this system and potential future systems.  Even so, it was a considerable shock to 
some staff that a system such as this did not arrive “fully functioning”.  
 
If the system were to be more widely implemented, to further wards or across the 
hospital, this special status would not remain. For managers contemplating any wider 
deployment the consequence of uncertainly or lack of trust in the technical 
components and the active support for them is important.   
 
Process 
Experience on this ward has emphasised the inevitable challenge that comes when 
the working practices of professional groups and interdisciplinary teams are 
interfered with, as they inevitably are, by introducing a powerful and structuring 
technology.  
 
The structuring itself poses a dilemma. On the one hand in addressing the aim of 
reducing errors in prescribing and administration the technology is explicitly used to 
constrain and enforce a “good” process. But, as the process is developed and 
codified it reveals aspects of practice that do not neatly fit, or which are mutually 
incompatible. This is apparent on one ward, but across the hospital the effect would 
be magnified as different specialities are considered. For example,  a paediatric ward 
or care of the elderly. Equally, computerised prescribing and administration is not the 
only potential strategic initiative in this area;  for example, in this hospital PODS  has 
also been under trial on other wards, but the question remains as to the compatibility 
of the system as worked out with PODS. 
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Outcome 
At the time when we begun to write this report the study period had come to its end 
and the future of the system, both on this ward and in some potential larger roll out, 
was under active discussion. Initially, it was decided that the system would stay on 
Ward 8N but would not in its present form be rolled out to other wards. It was 
considered that  “the system in its current configuration was neither robust enough or 
flexible to contemplate extending to other wards”. More recently, due to the re-
organisation of the hospital, which will result in Ward 8N being closed, a discussion 
centred around feasibility and desirability of transferring ServeRx to another ward. As 
the supplier was not able to commit to a date when new version of the system would 
be ready and more generally has shown diminishing interest in the UK’s market, the 
final decision was not to transfer the system at present. However, discussions 
continue whether ServeRx might be used on a Day and Stay Unit.  
 
Despite this outcome, the pilot has led to valuable lessons regarding benefits and 
drawbacks of EP, the processes that are involved in “hosting” such as system, as 
well as project management and implementation strategies. It has also led to the staff 
involved with ServeRx acquiring new skills. 
 
A.4 Patients Views       
 
“They say: “Here comes Tesco again”. They are intrigued, want to see it, especially 
the younger patients are interested in it. Patients don’t voice negative comments”. 
[Nurse] 
 
A 4.2 Methods 
 
Patients on the study ward were interviewed to obtain their views on possible 
advantages and disadvantages of the ServeRx system.  A structured interview 
schedule was used (see Annex Aiii). This consisted of a small number of questions 
with 5-point Likert scales to measure satisfaction and agreement, and a series of 
open-ended questions to explore patients’ views in a qualitative manner. The 
interviews included the same topics pre- and post-ServeRx, but the questions were 
reworded as appropriate for use before and after its implementation. Specific 
questions were included relating to the use of when required (PRN) medication; this 
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was because of concerns that PRN medication might be less accessible to patients 
during post-ServeRx drug rounds.  
 
All patient interviews were conducted by a research pharmacist.  A convenient 
sample of patients was obtained by asking nursing staff to nominate patients who 
they considered to be well enough to be interviewed.  All interviews were carried out 
in a relaxed manner, and any questions that appeared difficult for the patient to 
answer were omitted so as not to put undue pressure on the patient.  Patients’ 
responses were recorded by hand in as much detail as possible. Pre-ServeRx 
interviews were conducted at convenient times during April and early May 2003; post 
ServeRx interviews were carried out on various dates between 25 February and 6 
December 2004.  
 
Responses obtained on the Likert scales were summarised using the median and 
range.  The qualitative data were analysed by identifying and comparing general 
themes.  
 
A 4.2 Results 
 
The patients interviewed 
Eight patients were interviewed pre-ServeRx, and twelve post ServeRx. The patients 
were broadly similar in terms of demographic details (Table 44), with the exception 
that only one female patient was interviewed pre-ServeRx and five post-ServeRx.  
Patients were similar in terms of age distribution and length of stay at the time of 
interview. All except one patient (interviewed pre-ServeRx) had been in hospital 
before.  
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 Pre ServeRx Post ServeRx 
Length of time 
in hospital 
Number of patients (%) Number of patients (%) 
0-4 days 1 (12.5%) 2 (17%) 
5-9 days 2 (25%) 4 (33%) 
10-14 days 4 (50%) 4 (33%) 
15-19 days 0 0 
>20 days 1 (12.5%) 2 (17%) 
Total 8 12 
Age band of 
patients 
interviewed 
Number of patients (%) Number of patients (%) 
21-25 years 0 0 
26-30 years 1 (12.5%) 0 
31-40 years 1 (12.5%)  2 (17%) 
41-50 years 1 (12.5%)  2 (17%) 
51-60 years 0 1 (8%) 
61-70 years 1 (12.5%)  4 (33%) 
>70 years 4 (50%) 3 (25%) 
Total 8 12 
Gender of 
patients 
Number of patients Number of patients 
Female 1 (12.5%) 7 (58%) 
Male 7 (87.5%) 5 (42%) 
Total 8 12 
   
Whether first time 
in hospital? 
Yes, 1 (12.5%) 
No, 7 (87.5%) 
Yes, 0 
No, 12 (100%) 
 
Table 44: Demographic details of the patients interviewed 
 
Patient satisfaction 
Before the introduction of ServeRx, the median level of patient satisfaction with the 
paper-based system was 4 (range 3 - 5, where 5 was the most highly satisfied).  The 
median level of enthusiasm regarding the proposed Serve-Rx system coming to the 
ward was 3 (range 2 - 5).  
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After the introduction of ServeRx, patients’ median level of satisfaction (median 4.5; 
range 3 – 5) was very similar to that pre-ServeRx.  The median level of enthusiasm 
for a return to the paper system (median 3; range 1 – 5) was also very similar to the 
previous level of enthusiasm for ServeRx.   
 
With respect to the administration of PRN medication, six of the eight pre-ServeRx 
patients interviewed (75%) were aware of the PRN system and 75% all reported that 
they had requested PRN medication during their stay.  Post-ServeRx, 11 of the 12 
patients (92%) were aware of the PRN system and 10 (83%) had requested a PRN 
drug.   Pre-ServeRx, the median level of satisfaction with the PRN system was 5 
(range 4-5); post-ServeRx it was 4.5 (range 2-5). 
 
 
Pre-ServeRx qualitative results 
In response to an initial open question about their general impression of the current 
paper-based system, patients' comments were mostly positive and upbeat.  
 
“Very good. Nurses are very hard working. They rely on reading the prescription 
chart and then going to the cabinet (which is double the work)”.  
 
“Current system is very intensive. It takes up a great deal of nurses' time. Particularly 
in view of the fact that NHS contracts bank nurses; all the time bank nurses must 
spend on administering medicines. Nurses do long days and therefore definitely 
room for errors to creep in” 
 
Several patients referred to the paper-based system being labour-intensive. Two less 
positive comments were made. These were a perceived concern that there was no 
check of whether prescribed medication was still required, and a concern that 10pm 
medication was sometimes given at 10:30pm, which was perceived to be too late.  
 
When informed that "a computerised system of prescription and medication 
administration” was going to be installed on the ward, patients gave a wide variety of 
responses. Some were very enthusiastic, saying that it “sounds brilliant”, for 
example, but without giving more details as to why. Others were very sceptical. Two 
patients mentioned “Big Brother”, but this phrase was used in relation to a fear of 
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computers failing, rather than in relation to being watched from afar. One patient 
referred to other computer systems that had received bad publicity, another was 
concerned that staff would blame the computer for any errors that occurred, and 
another that there would be a loss of “the personal touch”.    
 
In terms of the practicalities of how the system would operate, some patients 
described spreadsheets, bar codes, scanning, and inputting data, suggesting a good 
understanding of what the system would be like.  Others talked of cylinders, a system 
resembling an automatic cat-feeder, and a robot moving around the ward. One 
patient thought of the system as a replacement for the pharmacist's ward visit.  Some 
raised very relevant concerns, such as whether a computerised system would be 
able to handle intravenous drugs, and how unwanted doses would be managed, and 
system crashes, reflecting problems that did arise when the system was put into 
place.  Most patients referred to “time-saving” at some point during their interview, 
clearly assuming that the aim of introducing the new system was to save time and 
increase efficiency.  Three also referred to error reduction.   
 
“Computers will decrease mistakes and bring benefit. Can’t see a cost saving 
though” 
 
“Save nursing time. Save money for NHS in the long term. Very happy to see 
progress in the right direction.” 
 
When patients were asked what they thought the effect of the computer system 
would be on the administration of PRN medication, one patient expressed the view 
that it might help the nurse to find the appropriate medication quicker. Another hoped 
that the computer would not hinder the process “since it can’t hear a patient 
screaming for painkillers”.  
 
Post-ServeRx qualitative results 
When asked for their general impression of the current system post-ServeRx, 
patients’ comments were again very positive in general ranging from “excellent”, 
“good” to “generally OK”.  
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“Good idea. Only one nurse needs to go round doing the drugs. Safer. Only goes to 
the person with the wristband. Wristbands are clear - survived a shower. Scans 
easier”.  
 
However, there were some exceptions. One patient said: “Computers aren't always 
right”. He was concerned that nursing staff did not know what medication they were 
giving, possibly referring to the fact that tablets are not identifiable individually once 
they are dispensed and placed in the drug trolley.  Another noted that nursing staff 
sometimes scanned a barcode from a strip of barcodes, rather than the one on the 
patient’s wrist.  One commented that doses were sometimes given late, and another 
referred to a problem whereby they had been waiting for a drug to be supplied for five 
days.  During the course of the interviews, several patients referred to language 
and/or cultural issues, suggesting that the computer system may have advantages 
for staff for whom English is not their first language. 
 
When post-ServeRx patients were asked what they perceived the paper-based 
system of medication administration to have been like, their responses suggested 
that they had a good understanding of how the system actually worked in practice.  
This is probably because all had been admitted to hospital previously.  The majority 
of patients had some safety concerns with the paper-based system.  These included 
its perceived time-consuming nature, illegible doctors’ handwriting, losing “bits of 
paper”, communication, and drug trolleys left unattended.  Some simply expressed 
the opinion that the computer system was safer.  
 
When asked about any advantages that they could think of with the paper-based 
system the majority of patients interviewed with ServeRx in place could not think of 
any or only mentioned its disadvantages.  
 
“The computer is a better way of doing it. Paper could get lost” 
 
“Not in terms of speed because you have to go through files searching for doctors 
instructions. With a computer you simply press a button and it's there on screen - you 
get a printout saying what's given. Modern technology is better if all the info is there”. 
 
Some thought that there were advantages with a paper-based system but couldn’t 
specifically name any. One patient thought that the paper system retained flexibility. 
Other pointed out: 
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“The human is always the best. The system looks pretty good, but I didn’t like it when 
my bar code wasn't read. It has been read, but not all the time. It [paper system] 
stood the test of time. Whether the paper system is better depends on the rules for 
both systems and whether those who use it abide by them”. 
 
When asked about the perceived impact of the new system on administration of PRN 
medication, three patients thought the system was beneficial, five considered it to be 
detrimental and four were unsure or thought it made no difference. The three positive 
comments related to speed, and nurses no longer having to look for written 
medication records. Two of the negative comments concerned the perceived extra 
time needed if nursing staff had to check the drugs prescribed on the computer; the 
other comments were more general concerns about computer systems. 
 
“With the paper system the doctor can write it up there and then. Where do they go 
with this current system? Computers can go wrong, e.g. when I came in for an OP 
visit I was told to come straight in as an inpatient. They were looking for a bed. I 
needed to phone my relative and the computer came up wrong. I don't believe in 
computers”. 
 
“Hopefully [the new system] makes nurses lives easier. To scan your bar code or 
look up on the system when you had your last dose. Not having to look for written 
records”. 
 
“They take longer now because they have to check on the computer first. If the 
computer is going slow it takes them longer to check what each patient can and 
cannot have” 
 
A 4.3 Conclusions  
 
Our interviews suggest that patients have a range of views on the computerisation of 
medication prescribing and administration.  There was little difference in median 
satisfaction scores before and after computerisation, although our sample size was 
very small. It was interesting that the median score for enthusiasm for the “other” 
system was at least one point less than the median score for satisfaction with the 
‘current’ system during both study periods.  
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Prior to computerisation, patients were very unsure of what to expect, with a number 
of concerns about computerisation. Much of this was based on what seemed to be 
an inherent mistrust of computer systems. Following the implementation of the new 
system, patients voiced these concerns less often and instead commented on 
perceived disadvantages of the previous system.   
 
It was of interest that patients assumed that the main reason for computerisation was 
to save time, when this has not proved to be the case in practice.  Interestingly, two 
also felt that the computerised system would be beneficial for staff for whom English 
was not their first language.  Patients varied in terms of which system they perceived 
to be safer.  
 
Our findings suggest that patients may be slightly less satisfied with the system for 
requesting PRN medication with the computerised system, but a larger study would 
be required to substantiate this.  
 
Finally, our results raise some useful points about patients’ perceptions of what is 
important, such as 10pm doses being given at 10:30pm. This would be considered to 
be accepted practice amongst hospital staff, and therefore highlights a mismatch 
between patients’ and staff expectations.  Patients were also aware of some 
important safety issues such as scanning barcodes from a list rather than the one on 
the patient’s wristband.  
 
A 5 Summary of evaluation: key findings 
 
A  5.1 System Functions 
 
Structure:  
 
• ServeRx includes electronic prescribing, scheduling, automated dispensing 
and electronic administration, as well as elements of stock control.  
 
• Installed on only one ward and has no substantial connection (other than 
basic data) to the hospital’s other information systems.   
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• Initial technical problems and the system needed tailoring to CXH 
requirements.  
 
• Many problems have been rectified with subsequent versions but some 
hardware and software shortcomings  remain.  
 
Process: 
 
• The system reached some form of stability and is almost totally integrated into 
the work of the ward.  
 
• Once stable, the data processing functioned well.   
 
• The inbuilt structuring of the core work processes of prescribing, selection 
and administration of drugs performed satisfactorily for most, but not all, 
drugs. 
 
Outcome:  
 
• A usable technology (hardware and software) that was over time shaped and 
integrated into ward practice.  
 
• Facilitates prescribing and administration processes and provides data which 
are of an appropriate quality and available for all participants in the care 
process.  
 
• Continuing mismatch between system characteristics and the use of certain 
drugs. 
 
A 5.2 Human perspectives 
 
Structure:   
 
• Training provided to doctors, nurses and pharmacists but on-going support 
(including the physical presence of a trainer on the ward) was found to be 
necessary.  
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• Doctors had little involvement in shaping of the system and some considered 
that this was not appropriate.  
 
• Nurses hesitant about the system at the outset.  
 
• System driven forward by pharmacists, other professionals felt that it reflected 
most strongly pharmacists’ interests. Certainly, pharmacists were clearer at 
the outset what the system was for and what they wanted from it.  
 
• Patients unsure of what to expect, with a number of concerns about 
computerisation. 
 
Process:  
 
• The system influences how, when and where prescribing is done and 
checked, shaping work processes of doctors, nurses and pharmacists.  
 
• Nurses administering drugs are bound by a sequence of procedures 
embedded in the system.  
 
• The way different professionals communicate with each other changes.  
 
• Experience of using the system over time and over its many versions has 
meant that the attitudes towards it have evolved and shifted.   
 
Outcome:  
 
• A system which pharmacists, and perhaps more reluctantly, nurses have 
come to accept and many would miss.  
 
• Doctors’ opinions were more varied, but generally they felt the system had 
many shortcomings but they still believed in benefits an ideal system might 
bring.  
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• The system had restructuring effects on the way different professional groups 
work, although some could exercise a degree of autonomy.  
 
• The system was generally perceived as safer or at least potentially safer, 
reducing some errors but also acknowledged as introducing new risks.  
 
• Patients’ views varied but they had less concerns about computerisation after 
the introduction of ServeRx than before it. 
 
A  5.3 Organisational Context 
 
Structure:  
 
• A pilot project, envisaged as an opportunity to learn from this system and 
potential future initiatives.  It enjoyed extra resources in terms of money and 
time and required substantial commitment from many staff members. 
 
Process:   
 
• Experience on the ward emphasised the challenge that comes when the 
working practices of professional groups and interdisciplinary teams are 
interfered with by introducing a powerful and structuring technology.  
 
• Technology is explicitly used to enforce a “good” process, but some aspects 
of practice do not neatly fit, or are incompatible with the system. This is 
apparent on one ward, but across a hospital the effect would be magnified as 
different specialities are considered.  
 
Outcome:  
 
• Plans for the system are still being discussed, but in the immediate future 
ServeRx is not going to be transferred to another ward, after the closure of 
Ward 8N. The pilot has led to valuable lessons regarding benefits and 
drawbacks of EP, the processes that are involved in “hosting” such a system, 
as well as project management and implementation strategies. 
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Annex A i: Agenda for focus meeting 30 June 2004 
 
Tony Cornford (t.cornford@lse.ac.uk) and Ela Klecun (e.klecun@lse.ac.uk) 
Department of Information Systems, London School of Economics 
 
In the first part of this meeting we would like to discuss ServeRx’s performance and 
how it might be judged. Then we want to discuss the process of implementation of 
the system and how change has been experienced and handled. Finally, we would 
like to ask what can be learned from the project. Our aim is to pose these questions 
and to identify and explore areas of agreement and debate. 
 
Part 1. Is ServeRx successful?  
How would you define success, i.e. what criteria should we use to measure this 
(content) and how can we assess them (process)?  
 
Has the system had an effect on the incidence of medication errors? 
 
Has ServeRx had substantial effects on working practices and professional roles? 
 
Can you identify changes in the relationships between different professional 
groups/patients, at the ward level and against the hospital wide context? 
 
Has the system influenced practices, expectations or attitudes elsewhere in the 
Hospital and Trust, e.g. in other wards, specialisms? 
 
Would you like the system to stay on Ward 8N, be discontinued, or perhaps extended 
to the whole hospital? 
 
Part 2. The Change Process 
Has ServeRx been experienced as a substantial change process? If so, change in 
what areas and experienced in what ways? 
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Considering the full duration of the ServeRx project, how would you describe the 
changes in attitudes and responses to the system over time.  
 
What aspects of the project have been most influential in shaping these attitudes? 
 
Part 3. Lessons Learned – beyond ServeRx 
Considering the issues discussed so far, what can be learned about: 
 
-The process of medicines management, i.e. manual and computerised and across 
the clinical settings. Have we learned anything about the way medicines are 
prescribed, dispensed, administered and managed, and the way different professions 
work together? 
 
-The potential of computerised drug management systems, e.g. should they include 
additional functionalities, support other aspects of medical practice, be more 
integrated with other hospital information systems or should such moves be 
abandoned? 
 
-Appropriate implementation processes for innovative information systems within a 
clinical setting; how can the implementation of such systems be best approached, 
what could have been done differently? 
 
How might this knowledge be put to use in future projects?  
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Annex Aii: Questions: aide memoire 
 
This is just a sample of questions asked. Questioned varied depending on the person 
being interviewed and the time of the interview (e.g. before, during and after the 
implementation of ServeRx)) 
 
(Check current job title and where they work) 
¾ How long have you been working at QHB? 
(interviewer to clarify this in terms of  timeline of the HIS project) 
 
 
How often do you use the system? For what tasks?  
 
What was it like, learning to use the system? Did you have any problems when you 
first started?  How were these resolved?   
Is the system easy to use? 
 
Have you ever experienced the system crashing/going down when you’ve been using 
it or needed to access it?  (Lead on to ask about other critical events, risky situations 
– do they remember any specific events, what have they learnt from incidents like 
that?) 
 
Has the system met your expectations? 
What do you see as the main potential benefits from having the system? 
What would you miss most about the system if it went? 
 
What would you like to change about the system? (prompts: reporting facility, 
allergies pop-ups, insulin etc) 
In your opinion, does the use of the system result in reduction of medication errors? 
What is the biggest problem? 
 
 
Is the system successful? How would you define its success, i.e. what criteria would 
you use to measure it (content) and how would you assess it (process)? How would 
other groups define its success? 
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Prompt for : 
a) measures of success,  
b) work practices supported, enabled or removed, 
c) other people (groups) who will define this 
 
What do you do if there is something you think could be improved? Are there 
procedures in place to deal with system improvement?  E.g. User groups?  (probe: 
how easy is it to get things changed- feeling of involvement in the system 
development over the years) 
 
As a pharmacist how do you see the system influencing 
• Your role in provision of healthcare 
• Your working practices on a day to day basis 
• Your working style as part of a team or as a professional 
 
Has your behaviour/practice been changed by the system?  If so, in what way? 
 
¾ do you think the system makes you think more or less about what you do 
compared to the paper-based system? (prompts: are things sometimes too 
easy?  Or does it encourage people to think, to “ engage the brain”? 
 
¾ Have you ever felt constrained in what you want to do by the system?  
(explore dosing flexibility; timing of doses etc) 
 
¾ Has the system ever pushed you do make a certain decision? (prompt: ever 
had to do something that was against your professional judgement?) 
 
¾ Has the system affected the amount of time you spend with patients? (if no 
experience of other system, ask if system helps or hinders time for direct 
patient contact) 
 
¾ Has the system affected the amount of time you spend with other health care 
professionals? (prompts: better or worse relationships compared to using a 
paper-based system. If no knowledge of other system, ask if system helps or 
hinders time for direct patient contact) 
 
¾ Who is more in control – you or the computer? 
 
¾ Does the system make you feel safer? 
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How are your professional interests as a pharmacist represented in the system? (I.e. 
does this system mainly support pharmacists in their work, or perhaps nurses or 
doctors?). What group may benefit most from the system and why? 
 
What are the attitudes of clinical staff (doctors, nurses) towards ServeRX?  
Have the attitudes changed over time? In what way? 
Are nurses and doctors confident in using the system? Do they find it easy to use? 
Do they find it useful? 
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Annex Aiii: The ServeRx Patients Opinion Survey 
 
We are seeking the views of patients on 8 North regarding the new 
computerised prescription and medication administration system.  We would 
like to know about your current experiences of receiving medication on this 
ward. 
I would be very grateful if you could spare 15 or so minutes of your time while I 
go through and ask you a series of questions.  Please feel free to give your 
honest opinion, as your answers will be treated in a confidential manner.  You 
do not have to give an answer to each question. 
Q. 1 Speaking from your experience on the ward, what is your general impression of 
the system for prescribing and administering medicines? 
________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________ . 1 
 
Q. 2 As you may know, nurses on this ward currently give routine medication to each 
patient as follows: four times a day they wheel the ‘drug trolley’ to your bedside, read 
your bar-code and then select your medication from the drawer of the ‘drug trolley’ 
before handing them over to you.  This is what we call the ‘drug round’. 
A. If you were asked to indicate your satisfaction with this system (as described 
above), how would you rate it on the following scale? 
Very satisfied  Indifferent   Very unsatisfied 
 ⏐__________⏐__________⏐__________⏐__________⏐ . 2 
 ☺  .  / 
 
B. Do you have any other comments to make about this, perhaps give a reason for 
the above rating? 
________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________ 
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________________________________________________ . 3 
Q. 3 When required, nurses can also administer medication outside of the scheduled 
‘drug round’ (i.e. if a patient has been prescribed a pain killer, this can be given out 
when the patient is in pain instead of waiting for the ‘drug round’). 
 
A. Were you aware of this system? 
 Yes  . 4 
 No  . 5 
 Don’t know  . 6 
B. Have you been prescribed any ‘when required’ medication? 
 Yes  . 7 
 No  . 8 
 Don’t know  . 9 
C. If yes, have you actually asked for a medication outside of the ‘drug round’ (i.e. 
when you have required it)? 
 Yes  . 10 
 No  . 11 
 Don’t know  . 12 
D. How would you rate your satisfaction with this system of giving medication ‘when 
required’, on the following scale? 
Very satisfied  Indifferent   Very unsatisfied 
 ⏐__________⏐__________⏐__________⏐__________⏐ . 13 
 ☺  .  / 
 
E. Do you have any other comments to make about this, perhaps give a reason for 
the above rating? 
________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________ . 14 
[F. PRN status (i.e. researcher to list PRN drugs, if any):  
________________________________________________ 
 184 
________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________] . 15 
Q. 4 Previously, there was a paper-based system of prescription and medication 
administration on this ward.   
A. Do you have any experience of this paper-based system (as a patient or 
otherwise)? 
 Yes  . 16 
 No  . 17 
 Don’t know  . 18 
________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________ . 19 
 
B. What images come to mind when you hear this? 
________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________ . 20 
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C. How do you think such a system worked? 
________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________ . 21 
Q. 5 The system worked as follows.  Details of all medication were written on a paper 
drug chart.  The ward had a conventional drug trolley, which contained all the 
medication in alphabetical order.  There was no one compartment designated to you 
and the wristband you are currently wearing was not bar-coded and would not be 
read. 
When the nurse reached your bedside, she/he would read the drug chart and select 
your medication from the drug trolley. 
A. What do you think of such a system? 
________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________ . 22 
B. Do you have any reservations about that system? 
________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________ . 23 
C. Do you think that such a system would have had any advantages over the current 
computerised system? 
________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________ . 24 
Q. 6 The nurses were still able to give ‘when required’ medication outside of the 
scheduled ‘drug round’. 
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What affect, if any, do you think the computerised system has had on the way nurses 
administer ‘when required’ medication? 
________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________ . 25 
Q. 7 If you were to rate how you feel about the prospect of such a paper-based 
system returning to this ward, how would you do so on the following scale? 
Very happy  Indifferent   Very unhappy 
 ⏐__________⏐__________⏐__________⏐__________⏐ . 26 
 ☺  .  / 
Do you have any other comments to make about the proposal to return the paper-
based system, perhaps give a reason for above rating? 
________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________ . 27 
Q. 8 Do you have any other comments to make about what has been discussed 
today? 
________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________ . 28 
I am now going to ask you some standard questions: 
Q. 9 Is this your first time as an inpatient in a hospital? 
 Yes  . 29 
 No  . 30 
 Don’t know  . 31 
Q. 10 How long have you been in hospital this time? 
________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________ . 32 
Q. 11 [Interviewer to indicate age:] 
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 21-25  . 33 
 26-30  . 34 
 31-40  . 35 
 41-50  . 36 
 51-60  . 37 
 61-70  . 38 
 >70  . 39 
Q. 12 [Interviewer to indicate gender:] 
 Female  . 40 
 Male  . 41 
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Appendix B. Qualitative evaluation of electronic prescribing with  
the Meditech system at Queen’s hospital Burton on Trent 
 
B 1 Introduction 
 
This Chapter describes the qualitative evaluation of the Meditech system. It is 
structured round Cornford’s framework (Chapter 7).  It illustrates how the framework 
can be applied to a well established system, and provides valuable lessons.  Given the 
novelty of our involvement of patients, we report and reflect on this information at 
length.  Finally, we reflect on the methodology.   
 
Queen’s hospital Burton upon Trent (QHB) is a 460-bed district general hospital 
providing acute care plus a range of community-based and outreach services to around 
200,000 people living in Burton-on-Trent and surrounding areas.  
 
The vast majority of wards and departments at QHB operate on a “paperless” basis via 
the Meditech Hospital Information System (called “the HIS” by staff), which can be 
accessed from anywhere in the hospital. Paper medical notes are still maintained but 
most prescribing, recording and communication throughout the hospital is now 
electronic.   ITU and HDU, theatres, the private patients ward, outpatients and part of 
A&E are the only departments not to use electronic prescribing (EP). 
 
Geographically, QHB is located on two adjacent sites, separated by a public road. 
Acute in-patient services, A&E, pathology laboratory, pharmacy, therapies, and 
majority of outpatient clinics are housed in the modern two-storey block on the main 
site. All wards have access to a vacuum tube system for the delivery of urgent small 
items which can be transported safely by this method. These include inpatient and “to 
take home” medicines.  
 
Three care of the elderly wards, plus a “half-way-house” ward are on the Outwoods 
site, which is a short up-hill walk from the main hospital entrance.  The Outwoods site 
also houses dietetic services, the diabetes centre, plus training and education facilities 
for nurses, doctors and other staff.  These wards use a traditional portering service for 
delivery. 
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The origins of the Meditech HIS project, of which EP is now an established part, 
coincided with a time of great change for hospital services at Burton.  
 
The hospital now occupies a 26-hectare site roughly two miles west of its former site in  
Burton town centre. Development of the present site started in 1973 with the 
construction of the Outwoods wards which provide intermediate care facilities. Until 
1993, acute services remained at the old Burton General Hospital and pharmacy 
services operated on two sites.  By September 1993, all wards had moved up to QHB, 
the old hospital closed and pharmacy services were consolidated in one enlarged 
department at Queen’s Hospital.  
 
In the late 1980s, initial discussion on upgrading the existing patient administration 
system stimulated research into better technology options and resulted in the selection 
of the Meditech from the USA. To fund it, the hospital borrowed £2m from the health 
authority and pledged medical equipment money for two years.  At that time, the 
pharmacy was looking to upgrade its own Cortex computer system and wanted access 
to patient data, with the possibility of electronic prescribing in mind.  
 
Phased introduction of individual modules in the Meditech HIS package began in 1991.  
By December 1993 the master patient index had been set up and tests could be 
ordered and results reported electronically. Several other modules, including Patient 
Care Inquiry (PCI) which collects all the reports, letters and notes for a patient, 
followed.  
 
Electronic prescribing was the last facility to be introduced.  The original Meditech 
Order Entry module was not suitable for an NHS hospital because it required 
pharmacists to enter in patient orders, as they do in the USA. In the words of one 
pharmacist who saw that early system : “Apparently, the doctors just write on a slip of 
paper and then the pharmacist enters it in and makes sense of it.  So we said we just 
haven’t got the time and why duplicate work?”  
 
Instead, an EP front end was developed, in which medication orders were entered 
directly into the pharmacy module. Staff involved at that time recalled Meditech 
“bending over backwards”  to develop a product suitable for the NHS marketplace. One 
nurse said: “They [Meditech]  work in Canada and USA and other countries but they 
didn’t really understand how the NHS works.  So they had to work closely with us at 
that point to understand the fundamentals” 
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The first trial of EP was carried out on one medical ward in April 1994. This followed 
the Arrowe Park model of prescribing using static PC terminals and paper printouts for 
medicine administration recording. The pilot was terminated after 2 weeks because of 
concerns that, in the words of one project team member, that “what was at the end of 
the bed was not the same as the computer” 
 
Full implementation had to wait until suitable and affordable mobile technology became 
available. In November 1994 QHB became a demonstration site for the NHS EPR 
(Electronic Patient Record) project and gained the funding needed to purchase  20 
Toshiba laptops and associated wireless technology.  In December 1996: EP 
(Meditech version 4.4) was successfully piloted on 3 Outwoods site care of the elderly 
(COE) wards 91,92  with subsequent roll-out across the hospital site as shown in Figure 
23 below.  The Queen’s  project team have presented and reported their work on EP 
93,94 and an independent evaluation of EPR was carried out in 1997 95 
 
Figure 23: EP roll out at Queen’s Hospital 
April 1994: First trial on medical ward using  Arrowe Parke method (static terminals for prescribing 
and paper printouts for medication administration) 
Dec 1996: Mobile technology pilot on Outwoods COE wards Meditech version 4.4 
March 1997: Wards 5 and 6 (acute COE) plus A&E emergency admissions unit 
June 1997: Ward 11 (ophthalmology)  
Nov 1997: Wards 19 and 20 (orthopaedics)   
June 1999:  Wards 6 and 8 (acute medicine). Meditech version 4.6 : Separate screens for medicine 
prescribing and administration   
July 1999: Elective surgery ward 11 (gynae) and ward 14 (ENT) 
Nov 1999: Wards 3 and 4 (acute surgical wards and theatre recovery areas) 
Order sets being developed: to simplify complex prescribing (eg for ENT) 
March 2000: Wards 15 and 16 and delivery suite (maternity) 
May 2001:  Meditech version 4.8 . Facility for inserting take home (TTO) drugs automatically into 
discharge letters for GPs 
April 2002: ward 1 and 2 (paediatrics) and neonatal unit 
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B 2 Methods  
 
The study at Queen’s Hospital Burton (QHB) was the retrospective arm of the project to 
pilot the prospective and retrospective evaluations of electronic prescribing (EP) in 
hospitals. The evaluation framework is Cornford’s (Chapter 7).  The principal research 
objective was to determine if it is feasible to quantify the effect of EP on medication 
errors using retrospective review of patient notes. The purpose of the qualitative work 
(primarily interviews with key stakeholder groups plus some observation) was to put the 
quantitative findings in context. Stakeholder groups were defined as those who took 
part in the decision making process regarding the system; those who use the system or 
its outputs; and those who are in some way affected by it. The intention was to 
interview a broad range of clinical and non-clinical staff at senior, middle and low 
grades, plus a small number of  inpatients. 
 
Approach and data sources 
Informed consent was obtained from all participants before interviews commenced. 
The vast majority of interviews were tape recorded, with the subject’s consent. If tape-
recording was not feasible (for example, because of the setting), written notes were 
made. All interviews were fully transcribed  and written notes typed up.  
 
Initial scoping visits Jan-June 2004 
Initial contact with Queen’s Hospital Burton (QHB)  was made through the Head of 
Pharmacy Services, who was designated the primary contact point for access to the 
site and for the local provision of information about the study to potential participants. 
 
The initial scoping visit took place in January 2004. The research team met QHB staff 
who had been involved in the hospital computer system from the start (the “core 
team”), observed a medicine round on a surgical ward, and carried out a preliminary 
interview with a junior doctor.  
 
Further in-depth scoping interviews with three core team members (two pharmacists; 
one nurse) and two users of EP (one senior and one junior clinician) were done in June 
2004. These interviews explored understanding of, and participation in, the system; 
assessment of key benefits and problems; and how the system influenced professional 
working practices.  They also clarified the research team’s own understanding of the 
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system. Questions were tailored to the respondent’s professional group and to their 
role in system establishment.   
 
Two researchers (IS and SC) independently read and re-read the interview transcripts 
and notes, then met to discuss and agree emerging themes. (see Annex Bi for detail).  
These initial data were used to develop a topic guide for subsequent interviews (see 
Annex Bii). 
 
Staff interviews and observations  November 2004 –March 2005 
The majority of follow-up interviews with staff were done at QHB over a three-day 
period in November 2004.   The interview guide used is shown in Annex Bii  
 
Pharmacy staff and the majority of senior clinicians were identified and approached by 
the key contact; other clinical and ward staff were mainly recruited by senior 
pharmacists responsible for the relevant wards. A small number of interviewees were 
identified by the research team during interviews and department visits.  Researchers 
visited QHB again in early 2005, after an announcement had been put out on the HIS 
asking staff with issues or comments about the EP to contact the research team.  No 
further interviewees were identified in this way. 
 
All staff interview data (see Table 45) has been included in the analysis. Initial charting 
was done using the framework developed from the scoping interviews 96. Three 
researchers (TC, EK and IS) independently read and re-read the interview transcripts 
and notes, then met to discuss and agree emerging themes. The Cornford framework 
was then applied systematically to the data by EK and TC, and reviewed by IS.  
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 Senior Mid Junior Total 
Pharmacy  2 5 1 8 
Clinical 3 1 4 8 
Nursing 2 3 1 6 
Other    4 
     
Observations     
Drug administration  2    
Pharmacy (clinical check) 1    
Pharmacy (dispensing) 1    
Prescribing 1    
Prescribing training 1    
 
 
Table 45: Staff interviews and observations (all data) 
 
B 3 Evaluation Results 
 
In this section we report the findings from our staff interviews using the structure of the 
Cornford framework 21  The analysis is presented first for the system function, then the 
human perspectives and finally from the organisational view. In each section the 
analysis is reported first in terms of structure, then process and finally outcomes, 
though we acknowledge that these sub-headings are at times hard to strictly adhere to.  
 
B 3.1 System Functions 
 
Structure 
At QHB electronic prescribing (EP) is an integral part of the hospital-wide information 
system (HIS), as described above. It is present as one of the HIS modules, but it 
seamlessly interfaces with other modules. From the perspective of users “the system” 
they use for prescribing activity includes multiple parts of the Meditech suite including 
prescribing, patient index, nursing notes, tests etc.  
 
EP was the last clinical ordering module to be implemented in the hospital. As 
described  earlier, the EP module was written specially for QHB.  Small  modifications   
have been done continuously (either by the internal staff, or when necessary by 
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Meditech); major system upgrades happen approximately every two years. A new, 
Windows-based upgrade is expected soon. 
 
The technical elements of the system include a mixture of dumb terminals, PCs and 
laptops. The laptop computers used for prescribing and administration on wards are 
capable of accessing the hospital-wide wireless LAN. Each EP ward has two laptops 
and three static computer workstations. It has been suggested that some departments 
(for example, therapies) do not have enough PCs, and there can be competition 
between nursing and medical staff for laptops at ward medicine round times. However, 
this is not perceived as an important problem, and generally the hospital seems to have 
extensive and adequate access points. More commonly, lack of laptops and their short 
battery life is mentioned as a problem - while one laptop is charging, there is only one 
available to doctors, nurses, pharmacists and others on a ward. 
 
The hospital wide system uses a DOS interface which is perceived as initially difficult to 
learn. Our findings suggest that most people get used to this quite quickly, indeed 
many grew up with the system, only know this interface, and fear a move to the new 
windows/mouse interfaces. Even some young doctors who have grown up with 
Windows systems seem to like the interface. They consider the system safer - it very 
seldom crashes - and one suggested that the structured key stroke driven interface 
imposes a sequence of steps which have to be followed. Some people also reported it 
as easier not to have to use a mouse in certain conditions (i.e. where there is no space 
for a mouse, for example on a laptop attached to a drug trolley) For those familiar with 
the system  it is quick to execute commands and to move between screens. Others, 
however, are eagerly waiting for a Windows interface, because the current interface 
seems to them very old and outdated, (“rubbish”’ as described by one of the 
interviewees), reporting that it is difficult to remember how to access certain functions 
(complex combinations of key strokes), and the interface (key placing and 
combinations) are different on different machines. 
 
The impression conveyed through the interviews is that the HIS is a very stable 
system, seen as much more reliable than the usual Windows-based applications. For 
example, we were told that it only crashes about once a year, although, as one would 
expect, more problems tend to arise after a major upgrade. However, interviewees 
indicated that the wireless connections were not always reliable, and terminals 
sometimes break down halfway through prescribing (freeze). Generally, people 
interviewed were satisfied with the system’s structure, and although they  would have 
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liked to see some improvements,  the technical capacity of the system was not seen as 
significantly hindering their activities.  
 
Process 
Few problems were reported with data processing and data reliability. Authorised users 
can access relevant modules and read and update information that is shared between 
different professionals. Pharmacists and doctors regularly access patients’ history, 
nurses’ notes and tests results etc, and indeed expect such functionality to be available 
to them as they perform their duties.  Pharmacists, doctors and nurses all spoke of the 
system in this way:  
 
“You have got a lot more information at your fingertips” [Pharmacist],  
 
“We can all see the patient as a whole”  [Nurse] 
 
“Look that’s my hospital!,” [a Consultant, pointing at the computer screen] 
 
Prescribers access EP screen to prescribe medications (regular medicines, “stat” and 
single doses). They can also mark medications for discharge, which are later 
dispensed by the pharmacy. During drug rounds nurses go around patients’ beds with 
a conventional drug trolley equipped with a laptop, through which they can access the 
drug administration screen. Pharmacists can access the system and review patient 
medication orders from anywhere in the hospital, although they tend to check them in 
the pharmacy.  
 
In addition to the functional elements described above, the system also serves to 
provide a structure that allows the coordination (articulation) of work within the hospital, 
and to a large degree, around the patient, supporting the patient care process: 
 
• It allows for different professionals to access each others data and to 
communicate, for example to justify their decisions; pharmacists can make a 
note as to why and in what way they have changed a prescription, nurses can 
state why they have not administered a drug. 
• Test results are available faster, and can reach all authorised persons. Data are 
in this way more available for use than in a paper-based system. (However, the 
system does not easily support the provision of group summary data  to clinical 
users within a speciality.) 
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• Accurate medication history can be provided on transfer to another ward. 
• GP receive legible discharge letters with lists of patients medications 
automatically inserted. (These letters are send by post not emailed. A brief trial 
of electronic discharge was established but did not survive.) 
 
Back up procedures are in place. In case of a system crash or to cover planned 
downtime periods all records can be printed out from a dedicated  PC which stores 
back up information. These records can then be used, for example, by nurses to 
administer drugs.  Printing these “downtime sheets” takes at least 30 minutes and is 
done in order of ward number.  This can occasionally cause problems for the off-site 
wards, who always come last. All new  medication orders and administrations made 
during downtime, must be entered back into the system when the system is live again. 
Pharmacy can print labels for outpatients on a different system. 
 
This back up system is most appropriate for short term breakdowns. New procedures 
for “worst case scenarios” are currently being developed so the hospital can cope with 
a crash lasting up to seven days. 
 
“We always said, up to 2000 or 2001, that if it went down for more than 24 hours that 
would be the end of the story, we’d just shut it down and go back to paper but … we 
can’t do that now.  It is too entrenched in the whole setup.  We have to look at seven 
day downtime – accommodate up to seven days – which I think is the absolute worst 
scenario you could think of.” [Pharmacist ] 
 
Outcome 
The HIS technical system (including EP) is a product of a decade’s on-going effort by 
QHB and Meditech staff and the system continuously evolves; there are minor, 
continuous changes, and every two years – bigger changes/upgrades.  Many are 
reported as the results of incidents; if there is an error, for example, it is then  
investigated and a procedure/system function might be changed. 
 
One primary outcome we therefore should note is the establishment of a working 
relationship between the hospital and the supplier, based on longstanding and 
generally positive regular contact. As a result, and through years of working on analysis 
of emerging requirements and their prioritisation, negotiating of interests, and on-going 
development, as well as careful implementation plans, the system in the large as well 
as in the specific case of electronic prescribing, has been maintained in use on the 
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majority of wards and across many departments of the hospital. Overall, the technical 
system is judged by its users to be reliable, to perform well, and to substantially meet 
the hospital needs. 
 
B 3.2 Human Perspectives 
 
As a hospital- wide system, and with the fluid boundary between the overall system 
and the specific element of electronic prescribing, there are inevitably many human 
stakeholders drawn in to the system, including nurses, pharmacy staff, doctors (from 
house officers to consultants), other health care  professionals, hospital IT staff, 
management, and of course patients. The following sections presents views of the 
representatives of the three main stakeholder groups (pharmacists, doctors and 
nurses), as well as some comments from other health care professionals including 
dieticians and speech therapist. The views of patients are reported separately. 
  
Structure 
Training  
An important element of this system’s ability to operate is the induction of new staff and 
the confidence staff in general have in their ability to learn to work with the system, 
seek information, report problems and receive peer support. The quality of training is 
thus one significant factor influencing attitudes to the system. 
 
At QHB an on-going  training programme for doctors and nurses is provided by 
dedicated nurse trainers. An initial formal training lasts for about 2.5 hours, but much 
training happens “on the job” and it is common that new staff are “shadowed” by  more 
experienced ones. Because of low staff turnover there is usually someone experienced 
to assist new employees.  Some new junior doctors may have seen the EP system as 
medical students, or during a previous house job at QHB.   
 
Generally, the people we interviewed were very satisfied with the training and support 
received, with both the formal and informal aspects  “on the job”. Nevertheless, we 
were told that the system is enormous and it is difficult to know all its parts. Even 
members of the core implementation team were still learning 
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Doctors  
Some senior doctors have played a major role in the whole process of acquiring and 
developing the HIS and were a significant element of the organisational driving force.  
They had been at QHB for a number of years and their attitudes to IT systems in 
general, and EP in particular, have been formed and modified over a long period.  
 
Members of the core team reported a range of opinions at the time of the HIS 
introduction, from worry and apprehension to enthusiasm in being involved in 
something new and adventurous. More recently, the main areas of resistance have 
been in anaesthesia, intensive care, and the neonatal unit, where some doctors felt the 
system was not flexible enough to meet their specialist dosing requirements. 
 
“ From the neonatal point of view we has issues as well as critical care whether it was 
safe practice to actually implement that because of very tiny doses and making that 
sort of work.  But we actually worked through that didn’t we and we implemented 
that..”.  [Nurse] 
 
“It is the emergency drugs basically they were worried about because they are 
nanogram and microgram and somebody has to calculate and check it before we give”. 
[Doctor] 
 
“It was the format as well wasn‘t it, the way the screen was formatted.  We felt it should 
be clearly specific to either critical care areas or neonatal with it being such tiny doses”. 
[Nurse] 
 
Except for the comments above,it seems from interviews that those who are frustrated 
with EP tend to be frustrated with the hardware (e.g. limitations of laptops), rather than 
the software itself. It seems too that it is the junior staff who more clearly see EP ( 
rather than other HIS functions) as a benefit, despite the initial effort to learn it and their 
short term appointments (see Figure 24). Younger doctors are more likely to see the 
computers as a future, as a part of a natural progress. As one young house officer said:  
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“The way forward is definitely computers. Change what you can but it’s quite difficult 
not to use computers” 
 
 
 
Figure 24: Some positive opinions expressed by doctors 
 
Nurses 
Like doctors, nurses use the HIS extensively in their work, and EP is just one aspect. 
Nurses’ attitudes, as reported to us, have changed over time – from mixed feelings, 
anti-new system, apprehension and fear, to acceptance and a generally “taken for 
granted” feeling.  
 
The sequence in which the modules were introduced may be significant here, and this 
was deliberate. The Admissions module was done first but then soon after Order Entry 
and Results Reporting were implemented, so that staff  could see real benefits in terms 
of not having to chase up test results. It appears that senior nursing staff quickly saw 
the advantages. However, the nursing module (introduced in 1992/3) was a problem, 
because nurses had to input their notes (including  physiological measurements such 
as blood pressure, fluid balance etc) on to the system but they felt they got little out of 
it. One system trainer, herself a nurse,  told us: 
 
“On the whole the nurses are very positive towards the system, they are vigilant as well 
if they think something is not quite working right, they are good at reporting it, more so 
“It takes four weeks to get used to the system and once you’ve got the system working, you 
cannot imagine how you ran 45 patients with drug charts all over the hospital. Because…jobs 
which will perhaps take you two hours in a… hospital with paper charts, you can do all that in 
half an hour easily….I think it’s fantastic, electronic prescribing.  It is like using a GP system.  
All your drugs are on there, a lot of them have got your doses, so you don’t get spelling 
mistakes.  What you prescribe is what you get given and there is none of this confusion.” 
[Junior doctor] 
 
“They [computers] are everywhere in the hospital! Everywhere. Every single place in the 
hospital. I won’t do it without. No computer, I won’t do a clinic. Because all the letters are 
there, the last letters, the new letters, the results, the trends, other peoples letters, they’re all 
organised. My notes come that thick, I can’t go through that in a clinic.” [Senior Doctor) 
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towards the help desk…..[ ]They [nurses] were probably more sceptical over electronic 
prescribing than anything because they are safety conscious and it has got to be safe”.  
 
 
Pharmacists 
Any EP system would be expected to have significant consequences for the structure 
of pharmacy work, offering opportunities to change the way it is organised. One good 
example illustrated here is the way that, contrary to the usual arrangements in UK 
hospitals, pharmacists at QHB are attached to consultants not wards (except for care 
of the elderly where one person does those three wards, for geographical reasons). It 
may also be significant that, at QHB, pharmacists do not tend to rotate but retain their 
specialism.  A number of pharmacists at QHB have been there for many years and 
have seen the system from its inception to the present state.  
 
In general, the pharmacists had a positive attitude towards HIS and EP, and none 
wanted the system to be taken away. As one said: “I just think this is so much better 
than the paper system” . 
 
The impression given in interviews was that the structure of the system fitted well with 
the way pharmacists work; methodically and carefully and in collaboration with other 
health care professionals.  Although the system might be seen as extending control 
over the way they work, it also offers them opportunities for more control over their 
workloads ( the flow of information and the times they do their work), allowing 
prioritisation and flexibility. 
 
 
Process 
Doctors 
As is usual in hospitals, most prescribing is done by junior doctors, usually house 
oficers (HOs), and the vast majority of prescribing in QHB is done electronically (sliding 
scale insulin and neonatal gentamicin being two exceptions). For doctors this is the 
most immediate process change brought by EP.  Prescribing is also a more distributed 
activity, with many reporting making prescribing decisions remote from the patient, for 
example at a screen in the doctors’ mess. 
 
Senior doctors choose to use (or not) HIS in different ways and to different extents. 
Some have embraced the system enthusiastically and considerably altered the way 
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they work (what, how and where). For example, one senior doctor reported regularly 
accessing patients’ notes and ordering tests remotely, often from home.  
 
Junior doctors reported that, by accessing computer records, they can more easily deal 
with out of hours calls, sometimes avoiding going to the ward. Because of this some 
things, for example about a patient’s condition, might be missed. This risk had existed 
before EP with telephoned orders but in that situation there was an additional risk of 
confusing exactly what had been said. It could be argued that because doctors have 
access to computer records they are less likely to go to see the patient in such a 
situation. However, as one junior doctor suggested: “I think the people who would have 
got out of bed then, still get out of bed now.”  
 
One doctor also noted that  an on-call doctor looking after a very ill patient could deal 
with other problems via a computer and continue looking after the vulnerable patient 
instead of having to go to another ward. This  was more effective use of time and might 
lead to better patient care.  However,  she also thought  the EP system had changed 
aspects of the way she worked : 
 
“Sometimes you have to remember, as well, to tell your patients if you are starting on a 
new medicine. If you are going down to the end of somebody’s bed and scribbling on 
their chart it does kind of jog your memory….But [with EP] you can say ‘I have seen 
this patient’ when what you have actually done is prescribe”. 
 
As a result of changing practices (facilitated by the system) many doctors noted that 
they have less personal contact with pharmacists. Some did not even know who is the 
pharmacist working with them.  
 
“I hardly ever see a pharmacist now.  Just get random bleeps”. [Junior Doctor]  
 
Opinions differed regarding the potential effects the use of the system might have on 
doctors’ prescribing practices. In the words of another junior doctor: “It just makes you 
think a little bit more. Because it saves time, it saves errors elsewhere”. 
 
Another junior doctor did acknowledged that there was a potential risk of relying too 
much on the computer: 
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“Maybe the consultants are worried we’ve lost our thought process, we don’t think any 
more. We don’t realise we’ve accidentally added a zero, or just copied what the patient 
had written down, which was wrong.[…] Computers are there to help us but we still 
need to use our brains. As long as we check up on each other … “ 
 
But contrary to a prediction that doctors might lose prescribing skills by using EP, one 
SHO noted that she learns things about drugs while using HISS. She told us: 
 
“I do find it interesting. I have sort of learned things occasionally- oh, I didn’t know that 
drug did that to that one” 
 
Nurses 
The introduction of EP  meant a major  change of  medicine administration practice for 
nurses.  The primary benefits cited for EP were that medication orders were legible, 
standardised  and complete, and  that a patient’s medication record was always 
available. Nurses felt the system was safer but not necessarily faster than with paper 
charts. There were benefits in terms of time which had previously been spent on 
checking and ordering drugs for inpatients, and on visits to the pharmacy to chase up 
discharge medication (TTOs).The EP system automatically flagged up prescribed items 
which were not carried as check the progress ward stock, so nurses no longer had to 
do “out of stock” lists. TTOs were printed out automatically in the dispensary, and 
nurses could check on the system to confirm when they had been dispensed.  
 
At times nurses might need to discuss drugs with patients so they learn how to take 
them. This was easier with a paper record. One nurse caring for elderly patients 
explained: 
 
“Before, you would sit with your patient and have their medication printout sheet with 
you . Obviously you would have your own printout sheet with you, but the list you would 
work down together….You would be more like the patient sitting in the bed and you 
right by them. [Now] I am having to turn and look down at my screen”  
 
 
Another nurse, prompted by the interviewer on whether using computers meant that 
nurses were getting further away from the patients, said: 
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“Well, it isn’t the way it should be, but I can’t see an alternative….It is so American now, 
with people suing for everything and you have to cover yourself….You have got to be 
accurate, you have got to cover yourself if it ever came to court.” 
 
While some nurses cite improved communication between professionals because 
everyone has access to the system, one nurse pondered: “I think sometimes we do 
communicate too much with the computer but I suppose at least it is useful that we can 
always look back and see what professionals said about a particular case…”  
 
It was suggested that it might be easier for junior nurses to call doctors to check 
something, knowing they do not have to come all the way to the ward. This can also 
mean that certain orders are done faster. When the need arises, nurses can also 
search the system to check how drugs should be administered and thus might be more 
likely to challenge doctors. They also appreciated the facility to write notes on the 
system as to why drugs were not given. 
 
However, like doctors, some nurses noted that the computer system is less flexible 
than the paper system. For example, notes regarding administering a drug in the future 
cannot be made on the computer record. 
 
Pharmacists 
As noted earlier, the system allows pharmacists to a degree to choose how they go 
about their daily tasks. They can either use EP on the ward or somewhere else (for 
example, at their desk in pharmacy). The system allows them to refine their process, 
for example when reviewing to focus directly on new items, and items marked as 
needing monitoring. These items are checked daily, while other orders might be looked 
at once or twice a week (for example, to check that an antibiotic course doesn’t go on 
for too long). While doing such clinical checks pharmacists can check varied 
information within HIS. For instance, pharmacists reported often reading nursing notes, 
for example to see why a patient has been admitted, and  also accessing relevant test 
results.  
 
Checking can be done any time, even when doctors are doing rounds, as computer 
records can be accessed by many, with no need to have a set time or set amount of 
time, so pharmacists are no longer tied to the ward timetable.  
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Some reported a preference to do their work in the pharmacy which gave them the 
opportunity to do clinical checks in a relatively quiet environment. One pharmacist 
chooses to print out a “to do” list in pharmacy and then does clinical checks on the 
ward when doctors are doing ward rounds. Others reported not going during rounds.  
 
Easy access to information may mean that pharmacists are more likely to be more 
thorough in checking different results and more pro-active in finding problems.  One 
described it thus: 
 
“… because we are linked in with biochemistry with the pathology reports, with the X-
ray reports, we have got access within pharmacy to just about everything now.  So we 
can actually do our monitoring of things like the electrolytes, checking on the bacterial 
growth that they have got the right antibiotic.  We can do it here and be far more 
efficient and again far more pro-active whereas if you are having to go up to a ward, 
rifle through the notes … it does not get done as much, the result may have been 
telephoned through but you are not aware of it.”    
 
However, they were more likely to do this from desks in the pharmacy, and less likely 
to have direct contact with patients and other health care professionals on the wards. 
 
“I think the thing that hit me most was the fact that we had been used to going around 
the wards and often the cards were by patient and suddenly that contact had gone so 
we were here sitting at our desks in pharmacy and unless there was a definite reason 
for us to go and see the patient then we didn’t see them” 
 
As one pharmacist admitted: “So you possibly lose some of the contact that you will 
have had – not with the patient – but more with the professional staff.  Whereas you 
may have been going and having a word with the doctor and you would be doing it on a 
face to face basis so you could build up a relationship, that is I think harder to do 
because everything is done with the computer and then it is perhaps done with a 
telephone call and they do not know who they are talking to. […] We see them [nurses] 
less.  I would hope that when we do contact them that we are being more pro-active 
and more positive, so perhaps what we say is more relevant.” 
 
Some argued that the system allows pharmacists to focus on cases which need 
investigating. The contra argument is that patients should be seen as patients, not as a 
set of notes, and talking to patients and seeing them in the flesh is important.  One 
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pharmacist described being told by a patient, who had been in hospital several weeks, 
about a medication which had been missed off on admission. 
 
However, as one pharmacist pointed out, rather then just asking patients general 
questions, pharmacists can now go to wards prepared, after checking different results, 
and then ask patients specific, targeted questions. Furthermore, some argued that 
even when pharmacists used to go to the wards all the time the quality of care wasn’t 
necessary better – did they really talk to patients or just look at the drug chart at the 
end of the bed? 
 
In terms of quality of working life there was a difference of opinions. Some pharmacists 
enjoyed working at the pharmacy, having an opportunity to do clinical checks in a quiet 
environment without many disruptions. Others would have preferred to be on wards 
more.  
 
For  pharmacy work itself the system does seem to facilitate significant efficiency gains. 
It speeds the supply side and order turnaround time (i.e. from prescribing to dispensing 
of a prescribed item) is reported as much faster than in other hospitals. The system 
also allows the supply and clinical sides of pharmacy work to be separated and done 
by different professionals.  
 
The system also facilitates an enforcement of the hospital formulary, described by one 
senior pharmacist as: “wonderful with the EP, because there is a flag on it saying it is 
prescribed, yes or no, and if you put no then it doesn’t come up and they can’t 
prescribe it.  ”  
 
 
Other health care professionals 
EP had a significant impact on the practice of dieticians at QHB. One told us that, at 
her previous hospital,  nutritional supplements had to be ordered by doctors because 
only they were allowed to write prescriptions. At QHB dieticians did their own 
prescribing using the EP system. The benefits (better access to patient information; 
better organisation of time; more visible errors) and drawbacks (lack of flexibility in 
administration times; system crashes) were similar to those cited by other professional 
groups.   
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Interviews with other health care professionals revealed little direct involvement in the 
EP aspects of the system, but  emphasised that easy access to information seems to 
encourage inter-professional communication. A speech therapist described how, before 
the HIS,  no-one outside her profession saw her notes: now “ if a nurse or a 
physiotherapist wants to look what I’ve done then they can actually access my notes 
directly through the system.”   
 
 
Outcome 
The majority of people interviewed were satisfied with EP and more generally HIS and 
did not want to go back to a paper-based system. However, one doctor we interviewed 
was not sure if she wanted the system to be abandoned but did express a preference 
for it not to have been implemented in the first place. However, because it has been 
consistently the Trust policy to have EP, such problems have been worked through and 
generally EP is in use, even if, as reported to us, they still have  “niggling problems”. 
 
Most doctors, nurses and pharmacists interviewed considered the system as safer 
because all information is available at hand and certain procedures are made easier. 
Because of the easy access to test results and nurses’ notes, as well as prescribing 
data, doctors and other health care professionals are more likely to check such items.  
 
Specific issues of safety mentioned in interview by doctors as outcomes included: 
 
• More attention to drug-drug interactions in prescribing and dosing options.  
• Prescribing warfarin: ability to check INR (international normalised ratio – 
measures clotting time of blood).  
• Legibility and completeness of data.  
 
“I think if you trained well and if you know your drugs well, this system supports you 
rather than makes you more dangerous” [ junior doctor].  
 
Nurses too perceive the system as safer. “Yes it is a safer system and it makes us feel 
better.” [senior nurse]. 
 
A related issue to safety is visibility of data and the audit trail produced:  
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“That’s another big bonus of the system as it stands is that you have, if a drug has 
been given you can see that it has been given and if it’s not been given, you can see 
why it’s not been given.  And it is verifiable and you can tell who did the ward round 
giving drugs out”[senior doctor]   
 
Pharmacists were aware of different errors that might result from (others) using EP. For 
example, they mentioned doctors making picking errors (picking a wrong drug or even 
a wrong patient from a list), risks of making errors when patients are transferred from 
wards not using EP, and risks resulting from systems crashes. They also acknowledge 
that the way their practices have changed might lead to some risks. For example, some 
prescriptions are only reviewed once (usually only new items are checked unless some 
items are marked for continuous monitoring). So, if something was missed it may not 
be picked up till much later (for example, during discharge).  
 
However, pharmacists interviewed generally perceive the system as safer, citing the 
usual aspects, including legible and complete prescriptions, greater accessibility of 
records and access to test results, as well as such features as automatic production of 
labels. 
 
The general hypothesis is that a safer system in specific areas should lead to a better 
care overall. However, as our discussion above suggests, EP  facilitates some more 
qualitative changes in the way care is performed and in the nature of relationship 
between different professionals, changes which might have significant implications for 
patients safety and quality of healthcare.  
 
A significant outcome for both doctors and nurses is the different ways that the 
computerised records afford for visualising information. Some suggested that, 
compared to a paper-based chart, the system does not provide an equivalent overview 
of drugs. A small minority of doctors interviewed do not like EP because of this; one 
said he would like to “dynamite” this particular module. This seems to be a particularly 
acute problem in neonatal, as one paediatrician described: 
  
 “When it’s on computer you have to just go into it and people may sometime just 
continue the medication even when it should have been discontinued or something and 
you can’t really see what the child is on.  So some people just didn’t like it.”  
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To the degree that the system makes  practice more visible, this should result in 
increased safety. It also leads to a better awareness of variations in practice. For 
example, timings of administered drugs is now recorded. This was reported to have 
made nurses realise how often drugs are not given at times when they supposed to 
have been given (for example, because a drug round takes a long time), and also how 
practice differs in each area (for example, what is acceptable practice  - such as 
waking patients to give them drugs early in the morning or not). 
 
Because of the potential for audit, mistakes are more visible and more accountable. As 
one of nurses said: “you are aware that it is your number in there.” But this also means 
that potentially mistakes may be rectified quicker and that people can learn from them.  
 
“ A lot of the time these things would have happened on paper anyway – you just 
wouldn’t have been aware of them. […] So I can’t say that the system causes errors.  
There is [no] perception out there that it does cause errors.  I think most people 
appreciate that this system shows up the errors but doesn’t actually cause them” [core 
team member] 
 
We cannot say whether the system actually saves time for nurses or doctors and this 
was not directly the focus of this research.  Junior doctors interviewed certainly felt it 
saved time on routine tasks such as ordering tests and rewriting drug charts (described 
as “mind-numbing” and “secretarial”),  and both doctors and pharmacists said it cut 
non-productive travel time to and from wards. The nurses interviewed felt more 
ambivalent about it. According to some, drug rounds take less time, while others 
believe the opposite, because instead of looking at paper records nurses have to take 
a laptop to the patient.  Time-saving examples they raised  included: not having to 
query doctors about illegible or incomplete prescriptions;  TTOs done much faster; no 
need to manually do out of stock drug lists.  
 
From a dispensary service viewpoint (and also for pathology services), the more 
efficient use of time just produced more work to do. One senior pharmacist told us: 
 
“I think the workload has gone up a lot. We have managed to absorb it whereas 
perhaps we wouldn’t have done if we hadn’t got the system….We are lucky in a way 
that we don’t have a lot of vacancies which you do in the big city hospitals. At the 
moment we haven’t got a vacancy…but it [staffing level] hasn’t increased over the last 
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two years so there is actually more pressure really….You don’t actually get any reward 
for being efficient sometimes, do you?” 
 
Finally, we must acknowledge that you cannot improve everything with a computer 
system, there are other bottlenecks and constraints. Thus a nurse on COE reflected: 
 
 “Social services is a big problem with the elderly and there is always a lot of delay on 
it.  So it has not really improved it on the computer, because social services are so 
delayed as it is.  They are improving.”  
 
 
 
B 3.3 Organisational context 
 
Structure 
A number of the essential organisational elements have been introduced already in this 
Chapter. These include the long term commitment of the hospital to computerisation 
including by many of its medical leadership, the stable labour force within the hospital, 
the commitment to training and the established relationships with the software supplier.  
 
It is significant that the HIS is well embedded in the hospital and expresses, and is 
expressed through, the general working culture. In this sense the HIS has become an 
accepted and almost taken for granted resource, developed, used, maintained and 
upgraded over the years and in use almost uniformly across the hospital. The required 
resources, skills and managerial competences are in place and seem to be working 
well to maintain the technical components and their integration within the working 
practices across the Hospital. 
 
Through our interviews we have seen expressed a general agreement that computers 
are “the way of the future” and an acceptance based on experience of the “unstoppable 
progress” towards computerisation of hospitals. In this way, at QHB, EP has long been 
seen as natural and inevitable. Because of the largely successful implementation of 
different HIS modules, there is an atmosphere of quiet belief that they can get things 
right (have proved it), even if there is a greater distrust of national initiatives. It is 
significant that this is different to the prevailing NHS-wide image of IT as expressed in 
failures.   
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Process 
The section on Human Perspectives has outlined many areas in which the HIS has 
altered delivery and practice of health care within the Hospital. EP at QHB has to be 
understood as  a part of a hospital-wide commitment to computerised systems and 
many of the benefits of EP come from its connectivity to HIS, allowing access to 
different data, for example patients’ records, test results, etc. More generally, as a part 
of HIS, and therefore as a part of a wider hospital commitment, EP is not generally 
understood as a “pharmacy” project imposed on others. This aspect may be quite 
significant when comparing the experience at QHB with other systems in use in other 
hospitals – in particular the CHX ServeRx system described in this report. Our general 
sense from the two studies is that it becomes quickly important that doctors and nurses 
perceive EP as their system, rather than a system designed for and controlled by 
pharmacists.  As suggested by one of the interviewees at QHB, doctors are the only 
group who has real power to refuse to use the system, but the support of nurses is 
pretty vital too.  
 
The distinctive character of EP at QHB  is manifested in many ways, but taken all 
together these can be described in terms of three key features – presented here in 
essentially positive terms. 
 
Establishment of a data driven practice that assumes availability (and quality) of data 
and seeks to maximise the benefits that can be derived from the facilitation of a fluid 
interaction between health care professionals. Building on this, as we were told by one 
senior doctor, the system will become “protocol heavy” as a way to help doctors to 
keep up-to-date and as a primary means to achieving better quality of care for the 
patient. 
 
A process orientation that lifts the individual health care worker (in particular doctor and 
pharmacist) out of specific times and places and offers them (at best) an opportunity to 
restructure their work and refocus their professional commitments. However, that such 
a system allows this does not mean that it will happen. Our research has shown that 
different professionals have chosen to do things differently –  been allowed to choose – 
and in this trust policy, management practices and a positive organisational culture 
have been vital in ensuring that, for the most part, relationships between different 
professionals have been preserved. 
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An organisational and professional alignment with technology and its suppliers, taken 
forward by responsible actors, enthusiasts and champions, and that balances 
resources committed to perceived benefits achieved, and future benefits to be strived 
for. The organisation has, from its earliest involvement with this technology, had a 
strong focus on workable (indeed working) solutions 
 
“… it is only enthusiasts that take things forward in the hospital…” [Senior Doctor] 
 
“We never buy anything in Burton that we haven’t seen in use.” [Senior Doctor] 
 
Outcome 
“I think they [patients] think we are very advanced because we are using computers.” 
[Nurse] 
 
As has been mentioned a number of times,  staff turnover at QHB is lower than in 
many hospitals. In part this is a feature of their location, but there seems to be some 
evidence that the HIS helps QHB to attract and keep doctors, pharmacists and nurses.  
House Officers reported that they are often are keen to stay after their initial period, in 
part because of the computerised environment in which they work. (There were of 
course other factors mentioned: nice, calm environment; less “macho” culture, mature 
and very helpful nursing staff.) 
 
It is then perhaps surprising that one outcome that has been often mentioned is that, 
despite the undoubted achievements of QHB in making EP and an integrated HIS work 
within the NHS structures, that they have received relatively little attention through a 
period in which computerisation of the NHS has been a major political policy. For now 
the system is going to stay, is sustainable, though the wider national programme 
(NPfiT/ Connecting for Health) is acknowledged as presenting some question marks for 
the future. 
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B 4 Patients’ Views 
 
B 4.1 Methods 
The semi-structured interview (see Annexe Biii) was adapted from one already been 
used with inpatients at Charing Cross Hospital, the prospective arm of our study. 
Piloting took place on one acute medical ward in February 2005.  Data collection began 
the following day, and was completed on a subsequent two-day site visit in March 
2005. 
 
To provide some consistency with the quantitative study, patients were recruited from 
general surgical (including orthopaedic), general medical, and acute care of the elderly 
wards. Recruiting patients or relatives from paediatric and off-site COE wards was not 
attempted. 
 
Sampling was purposive, based on use of “as required”  (PRN) medication and 
admission history. On each ward, the aim was to recruit at least one first admission,  at 
least one previous admission to QHB, and at least one previous admission to another 
hospital.  
 
A paper listing of eligible patients was generated for each ward by a senior pharmacist 
and then checked with the ward sister before patients were approached. Patients 
expressing an interest had the study explained to them, and were given a leaflet.  
Verbal consent was obtained and documented by the interviewer for all respondents. 
Where feasible, written consent was also obtained.  
 
Interviews were done on the ward, 
and took around 15-20 minutes. 
Written records were anonymised 
before analysis. Interviews were not 
taped, but the patient’s comments 
were noted verbatim as far as 
possible. Text “in italics” indicates 
the respondents own words 
(For further comments on the 
methodology see Annex Bv.) 
                                                              Table 46: Patient demographics 
 General surgery 
Acute 
medicine 
Gender   
Female 4 3 
Male 8 4 
   
Age (years)   
26-30 1 0 
31-40 2 1 
41-50 2 0 
51-60 2 1 
61-70 1 1 
>70 4 4 
   
Hospital admission history   
First ever admission 1 1 
Previous at QHB 5 2 
Previous at QHB and elsewhere 6 4 
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B 4.2 Results 
 
The patients and their medicines 
 
Twelve male and seven female patients aged from mid-20s to over 80 were 
interviewed on acute medical and surgical wards at QHB (see Table 46).  Just over half 
(10) were over 60 years old. Seven had been in hospital for less than a week; the 
remainder from two to eight weeks. Only two patients were first-ever hospital 
admissions. The majority had been in QHB as inpatients before; 10 of them had also 
had previous admissions to other hospitals. 
 
A listing of the current medication orders for each patient was produced by Pharmacy 
department staff immediately before the interview. One patient had been recently 
admitted and his records were not available.   
 
All but two patients had current medication orders on a PRN basis. The drugs involved 
were for pain (9), sickness (9), constipation (2), night sedation (2) and bronchodilators 
(1). All patients also had at least one regular medication order (range 2-10 drugs). 
 
In general, the patients were vague about their current medication, recognising 
painkillers and antibiotics but underestimating the total number of drugs they were on.  
Changes made to regimens on admission ( “threw them all away and start again- I 
don’t know what’s happened”.) and products from different manufacturers were 
mentioned as sources of confusion by older patients. 
 
Only five said they had discussed their medicines with a health care professional since 
admission. One said “ Not anything specific, but it’s always good to question things. 
You shouldn’t be passive”  
 
Of those that had not, only two said they definitely had things they would like to ask 
about their medicines. As one patient put it: “Why am I taking them? What’s it doing for 
me?”   But the majority had no specific questions, saying they had got used to the way 
things were in hospital. One patient was surprised at the idea: “They say they’ve got 
the knowledge. You’re going in to be made better. Why would I challenge my 
consultant who clearly knows best?” 
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Patient view of the hospital medicines system 
We asked patients for  their general impression of the system for prescribing and 
administering medicines on the ward, and how satisfied they were with it. 
We also asked specific questions about missed or refused doses, access to  medicines 
outside normal drug round times, and discharge medication. 
 
General satisfaction 
Patients considered “the system” as the ward environment, with all its equipment and 
staff. “Just pleasant polite staff. Brilliant technology, the future. Beats a load of 
paperwork, notes getting lost.” 
 
The computer on the drug trolley was only a small part of this system and not 
particularly important. 
 
“When you are really ill you don’t give much thought to the drugs trolley. …They check 
your number to make sure. I’ve never known any different. It seems to work” 
 
The majority rated themselves as very satisfied with the system which they saw as 
modern and efficient. Cited benefits related to time-saving for nurses, legibility, rapid 
access to notes and other information,  and  a visible checking process which one 
patient said made him “feel safe”. Another patient explained: 
 
“I can see them doing it. It’s one of the most efficient ways they can work, and less 
complicated. If you start making things complicated it’s bound to confuse. That’s how 
mix-ups and mistakes happen” 
 
Another thought EP was: 
 
“Probably a lot safer than writing it down. No human brain is infallible, you could forget. 
It's on the system so you know. Time due-you need to know you haven't given it too 
soon or too late.” 
 
However, one patient felt unable to give a satisfaction rating because  it was humans 
who put the information into the system, and they could make mistakes. If a member of 
staff was called away in the middle of a round they could get “side-tracked and forget 
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what they were doing”. It was also possible to make mistakes if the screen was not 
user-friendly, or if the sun was glaring on the screen.  
 
Two patients said they were not satisfied with the system. Both related to delays in 
prescribing and administration of medicines. One patient who had been prescribed a 
midday dose of an IV antibiotic said she was still waiting for this at 2pm. She felt that 
wards varied; the one she was on was “too laid back”. 
 
Questions and concerns  
We asked patients if they had any questions they would like to ask the hospital about 
the computer system. Only one specifically said yes (about test results) However, a 
range of concerns were mentioned in responses to other questions. 
 
Several related to the accuracy and completeness of clinical information obtained on 
admission. One patient who had been admitted to QHB before wondered why she had 
been asked again about drug allergies. “I think it’s very good but does it hold all your 
medical records? I was admitted 3 years ago- that information should be there already” 
 
Others wondered why their medicines had been changed. One patient said that he was 
not receiving all his medicines in hospital. At home he had eye-drops, but had not 
brought them in with him. 
 
Two patients mentioned  the system going down. One was also a member of staff, and 
described it as a “nightmare”. The second was concerned about what happened if  the 
computer was not working. 
 
 
Better than paper? 
We asked patients how satisfied they would be if the hospital switched back to using 
paper drug charts.  Eight said they would not be happy about this, eight were neutral 
and three gave no rating.  Although many of the patients had had a previous admission 
at a time when paper drug charts would have been used,  only two had specific 
recollections. Their views therefore have to be interpreted with caution as  they may 
have been influenced by the way the interviewer described how a paper chart system 
worked. 
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In general, patients felt safer with EP (“Humans make mistakes”) and that things were 
“easier”.  They felt that less paperwork meant more time for nursing and that EP 
enabled accurate transfer of information between nursing shifts.  One patient explained 
why s/he would be “a bit worried” if the hospital changed back to paper charts : 
 
“There’s more backup [with computer]. Paper leaves a lot more room for things to go 
wrong. Staff are so overworked they don’t need the extra hassle, especially if they are 
really tired. There are so many things that could go wrong. I wouldn't feel so confident” 
 
Confidentiality and security of personal information was an important issue for some 
interviewees. A paper chart was “open to tamper with. It’s not personal”. With EP, “no-
one else can get at it”. However, it would be quicker for doctors to see all the patient’s 
medicines with a paper chart at the end of the bed.  
 
One patient compared the two systems: 
“With paper, someone you wouldn't want to see your information could see it at the end 
of the bed. With computer, it’s different. Someone you want to see your information 
may have difficulty accessing the computer for some reason” 
 
Patients saw nurses entering PIN numbers, and liked the fact that “Joe Public” could 
not view or change their personal details One patient felt strongly that access to the 
system had to be strictly controlled, and that ensuring staff competency was an on-
going process because “familiarity breeds contempt” .  
 
Losing the “personal touch” or the “ human element”  was mentioned repeatedly by one 
patient who was dissatisfied with the medicines system at QHB.  She felt the doctor 
looked at the computer and not at her, and that they did not actually ask patients 
directly. 
 
Saying no to medicines 
Most patients appeared compliant and unquestioning, taking whatever they were given 
“I say no to medicines full stop. [But] you are in hospital to get better. You must take 
the drugs”.  While they retained some autonomy over analgesia (“Painkillers, you can 
please yourself when you have them), most rejected the idea that they might refuse a 
dose of another type of medicine if they felt it was not helping them. “You cant just say 
when you want it. I take what the doctor tells you to take”  
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The majority (12) were not aware that nurses could record on the EP system the 
reason why a dose was not given. Most thought this was a good idea because people 
who didn’t take their medicines were “not helping themselves”. The EP record 
Indicated that there was “a problem”, and helped transfer that information when nurses 
changed shift. (“There’s no error, if someone forgets to tell, it’s on computer)  
 
As required (PRN) medicines 
All but two patients said they were aware that they could ask for medicines outside the 
normal drug round times. One of those patients had not been prescribed any prn 
medicines; the response in the second case was unclear.  
 
Seventeen patients had been prescribed at least one prn medicine. However five of 
them were unaware of this. Two had been prescribed as required anti-emetics but no 
doses had been given; the remaining three patients had a variety of prns, including 
analgesics, laxatives and bronchodilators.  
 
For the majority of patients, as required medicines meant painkillers (although 
bronchodilators and laxatives were also mentioned) and the system for getting them 
when they needed them worked pretty well. Nurses asked patients during normal round 
times; outside these patients press a call button or asked a nurse. The post-op 
analgesia and anti-emetic order sets allowed the nurse flexibility in choice of painkiller, 
but no patient mentioned being given a choice.  Some types of prn medicine (inhaler, 
skin creams) were left with the patient.  
 
As with the Serve-Rx system at CXH, nurses did not have to bring the drug trolley to 
the patient bedside. “If you say you want something you get it. You just shout to them. 
They don’t bring the computer –just bring two tablets”  
 
Patients were aware that checks were made on the frequency of prn dosing. One 
described asking a nurse: “ if I get a twinge I’ll ask “am I due”? “ Another said: “the 
computer checks to make sure you are in timescale” 
 
However, if prn medicines which the patient normally took at home had been missed   
on admission, the outcome could be less satisfactory: 
 
One elderly patient who had suffered from migraines since a child  developed 
symptoms when in hospital. She said she had tried to explain to two doctors the drug 
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she usually took at home, “… but they didn't understand and didn't prescribe it”.   
Instead she was first given tramodol, despite saying that she usually took something 
else.   
 
Her migraine had continued to worsen and she had started to vomit. Later she received 
co-codamol ; there was a delay in getting this prescribed, and it had not been as 
effective as her usual treatment. She told the interviewer she had experienced “a day 
and a half of pain which could have been relieved much earlier” 
 
Getting medicines to take home 
We asked patients who had been in hospital before what they remembered about 
getting medicines when they left hospital.   
 
Eight people said they had been prescribed medicines to take out (TTOs), and gave 
positive accounts of the time the dispensing process took. One patient described 
waiting “about 3 hours”, but most waits were shorter than this, and several described 
their TTOs being “ready on the ward” when they wanted to leave.  
 
Another compared the supply process with and without EP: 
 
“It was very quick and correct. The previous hospital was terrible. I waited half a day” 
 
General views on computers/IT 
The interviewees expressed a very positive view of computers, seeing them as “the 
future” and “a good thing”.  
 
“Computers are more efficient, better on confidentiality. Paper is not lying around for 
people to see. Access is more secure. Computers make things better for the future” 
 
There was a sense that having computers in hospital was the inevitable next step 
because “everybody uses them now”.  They were fast, efficient, prevented duplication 
of effort in communication and saved getting “bogged down with paperwork”.  Patients 
noticed them on the front desk of the hospital, in outpatients, in A&E as well as on the 
ward desk and the drug trolley. One patient said computers generated a background 
noise which told him  that they were “always here”. Another thought there was one 
under his bed.  
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In a minority, there was also an awareness that computers were not foolproof, and that 
backup systems were needed in case they went wrong. The system could not be 
considered in isolation from the users: “Computers have got to be good. But nurses are 
key-the people who use them” .  
 
B 4.3 Conclusions 
 
These data provide a complementary perspective on issues raised in staff interviews, 
particularly with regard to accessing and sharing information, professional  
accountability, and personal communication. As with staff, “the system” for medicines 
was seen as more than EP itself. In general, patients perceived EP as safer and more 
efficient than paper charts. They also saw it as more secure and confidential. 
 
 
 
B 5 Summary of evaluation: key findings 
 
B 5.1 System Functions 
 
Structure:  
 
• EP implemented as a custom-built front end for Meditech pharmacy system.  
 
• Developed as part of a whole-hospital HIS, interfacing with other HIS modules. 
  
• Accessed via wireless laptops, static PCs and dumb terminals.  
 
• A number of technology problems including competition for laptops, short 
battery life and sometimes unreliable wireless connection, but technical 
capacity of the system is not seen as significant hindrance to clinical activities.  
 
• DOS interface perceived as initially difficult to learn and requires complex 
combinations of keystrokes. However, this system is perceived as more stable 
and safer than Windows systems. 
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Process:  
 
• Few problems reported with data processing and reliability.  
 
• System enables co-ordination of work within the hospital to support the patient 
care process and allows different health professional groups to share data, 
communicate and justify decisions.  
 
• Facilitates rapid availability of test results,  accurate medication history on 
transfer to another ward, and legible, timely discharge letters containing a 
complete list of current medication.  
 
Outcome:  
 
• A stable, usable, continuously evolving system which supports the complex 
workflows surrounding medicines use 
 
• Generally meets local user needs, though lack of reporting facility noted.  
 
• Most data collected is judged as of good quality (more complete, legible, 
accessible) and is sharable among multiple users. 
 
 
B 5.2 Human perspectives 
 
Structure:   
 
• Formal on-going training programme with dedicated system trainers supported 
by informal staff mentoring by more experienced colleagues.  
 
• Individual professional groups are willing to work through initial problems and 
adopt a new way of working that may not always provide their own group with 
obvious benefits. 
 
• View of computers as part of natural progress.  
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Process:  
 
• Legible, standardised, complete patient medication records which are always 
available have made prescribing a more distributed activity with some decisions 
made remote from the patient.  
 
• Effective multitasking when on call is easier.  
 
• Fits well with the way that pharmacists work, and offers new opportunities to 
change the way that work is organised. 
 
• EP both improves and diminishes inter-professional communication and may 
reduce direct communication with patients.  
 
• Potential risk of “deskilling” prescribers is balanced by opportunity to learn new 
drug information.  
 
• Availability of information may empower nurses to check and challenge doctors. 
EP facilitates enforcement of Trust prescribing policies.  
 
Outcome:  
 
• Perceived by staff and patients as more efficient and probably safer, with a 
better audit trail than with paper records.  
 
• Patients perceived EP records as more secure and confidential. However, the 
system is also perceived as introducing new types of “picking” error when 
prescribing.  
 
• Changes in working practice for all health professionals, helping them manage 
and use time more efficiently and effectively.  
 
• Significant change to the working practices of pharmacists, with less pharmacy 
work done on the wards but also more freedom for individuals to define their 
own way of working.  
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• Practice of all health professionals more visible, highlights variation in practice, 
and makes mistakes more visible and accountable. 
 
B 5.3 Organisational context 
 
Structure:  
 
• Hospital has a long-term commitment to computerisation and an established, 
generally good, relationship with software supplier.  
 
• From its earliest involvement with HIS, the hospital developed a strong focus on 
workable solutions that do indeed work. 
 
• A stable workforce and the required resources, skills and managerial 
competencies to maintain the technical components of the system.  
 
• A belief that they can “get things right”. 
 
Process:   
 
• Doctors and nurses perceive EP as “their” system, not as a system designed for 
and controlled by pharmacists.  
 
• EP (as a part of HIS) has facilitated an establishment of a data driven practice 
that seeks to maximise the benefits of inter-professional  working.  
 
• Offers health care worker (in particular doctors and pharmacists) an opportunity 
to restructure their work and to choose to do things differently.  
 
• Organisation policy and practices have helped to foster the preservation of 
relationships between different professional groups.  
 
• An organisational and professional alignment with technology and its suppliers, 
taken forward by responsible actors, enthusiasts and champions, balances 
resources committed to perceived benefits achieved, and future benefits to be 
striven for.  
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Outcome:  
 
• A sustainable EP system that operates as just one part of a HIS.  
 
• A system that attracts staff and may contribute to low staff turnover.   
 
• Staff and patients perceive QHB as a modern, advanced organisation that 
embodies state of the art technology 
 
• Staff often reflect on why, despite their success, they have received relatively 
little attention by policy makers. 
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Annex Bi  Analysis of initial scoping interviews 
 
Themes from initial interviews could broadly be classified under two main headings. 
 
1) Getting there (surviving implementation) Staff on the core team had all been at QHB 
for over 15 years and been intimately involved with the development of the Hospital 
Information System (HIS) from its first beginnings in the early 1990s.  For them, 
“getting there” encompassed both their experiences of implementing and adapting the 
software, and how the system had changed the way they worked.  The users had been 
at QHB for less time ( 1-5 years ) and had experienced at most only one  upgrade (v4.8 
in 2002) For them, “getting there” was described in terms of the initial training they got, 
and having support while they gained confidence.  
 
All spoke of learning to trust the system (it did not increase errors; it made mistakes 
more visible). One core team member mentioned that the audit trail had not initially 
been popular with users “because it records who does what”. They also gave examples 
of things they would like to change (mainly around decision support and reporting 
facilities), but the mechanisms for registering suggestions and getting then actioned 
were unclear. 
 
2) Promise vs reality All three prescribers had had some experience of traditional (ie 
paper-based) medicine systems and made positive comparisons on the availability, 
clarity and completeness of medication records, and on warfarin prescribing. These 
initial interviews made it clear that EP could not be considered in isolation; it was an 
integral part of the wider HIS system.  For users not involved in its development, it was 
impossible to speak of EP without talking about test ordering and reporting, and 
reviewing clinic letters and nursing care notes.  
 
Other, slightly more negative, issues to do with lack of flexibility in prescribing of 
specific drugs (insulin, IV fluids)  and the scheduling of doses, were also raised.   
 
All interviewees described a significant time saving with the system. However, they 
were ambivalent on the impact on face-to-face contact with other health professionals 
or patients  
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Annex Bii  Staff Interview guide for Queen’s Hospital Burton 
 
(Check current job title and where they work) 
 
¾ How long have you been working at QHB? 
(interviewer to clarify this in terms of  timeline of the HIS project) 
 
¾ What was it like, learning to use the system? Did you have any problems when 
you first started?  How were these resolved?   
 
¾ Have you ever experienced the system crashing/going down when you’ve been 
using it or needed to access it?  (Lead on to ask about other critical events, 
risky situations – do they remember any specific events, what have they learnt 
from incidents like that?)  
 
¾ What would you miss most about the system if it went? 
 
¾ What would you like to change about the system? (prompts: reporting facility, 
allergies pop-ups, insulin etc) 
 
¾ What do you do if there’s something you think could be improved? Are there 
procedures in place to deal with system improvement?  E.g. User groups?  
(probe: how easy is it to get things changed- feeling of involvement in the 
system development over the years) 
 
¾ Has your behaviour/practice been changed by the system?  If so, in what way? 
 
¾ How is the audit trail used?  What do you think of the fact that there is an audit 
trail of everything that every system user does?  Do you think it makes 
mistakes more visible? (explore issues of accountability)   
 
¾ Have you had experience with paper-based systems?  If yes, do you think the 
system makes you think more or less about what you do compared to the 
paper-based system? (prompts: are things sometimes too easy?  Or does it 
encourage people to think, to “ engage the brain”? 
 
¾ Have you ever felt constrained in what you want to do by the system?  (explore 
dosing flexibility; timing of doses etc) 
 
¾ Has the system ever pushed you do make a certain decision? (prompt: ever 
had to do something that was against your professional judgement?) 
 
¾ Has the system affected the amount of time you spend with patients? (if no 
experience of other system, ask if system helps or hinders time for direct 
patient contact) 
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¾ Has the system affected the amount of time you spend with other health care 
professionals? (prompts: better or worse relationships compared to using a 
paper-based system. If no knowledge of other system, ask if system helps or 
hinders time for direct patient contact) 
 
¾ Who is more in control – you or the computer? 
 
¾ Does the system make you feel safer? 
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Annex Biii  The Queen’s Hospital Burton Patient Opinion    
             Survey 
 
 
Ward 
 
Interview number 
 
Interviewer checklist 
 
Patient consent form signed?      
 
Prn medication prescribed ? 
 
Give details……………………………………………………… 
 
Has patient actually received any prn doses?   Yes No 
 
First ever hospital admission?     Yes   No 
 
Previous admission to THIS hospital since 1996?              Yes   No  
 
Previous admission to ANOTHER hospital since 1996?             Yes     No 
 
 
We are seeking the views of patients about the computerised prescription and 
medication administration system which operates on this ward.  We would like to know 
about your current experiences of receiving medication, and how these compare with 
other hospitals you may have visited. 
I would be very grateful if you could spare 15 or so minutes of your time while I ask you 
a series of questions.  
 Please feel free to give your honest opinion, as your answers will be treated in a 
confidential manner. 
 If you do not want to answer a particular question, then just say so. 
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Q. 1 Speaking from your experience on the ward, what is your general impression of 
the system for prescribing and administering medicines? 
  
Q. 2 As you may know, nurses on this ward currently give routine medication to each 
patient as follows. 
Four times a day they wheel the ‘drug trolley’  to your bedside and read your bar-code. 
The computer on the trolley shows all the medicines you have been prescribed. The 
nurses select your medication from the ‘drug trolley’ before handing them over to you.  
They then make an entry in the computer to show that the medicine has been given.  
This is what we call the ‘drug round’. 
A. If you were asked to indicate your satisfaction with the system I have just 
described, how would you rate it on the following scale? 
 
Very satisfied  Indifferent   Very unsatisfied 
 ⏐__________⏐__________⏐__________⏐__________⏐  
 ☺  .  / 
 
 
B. Probe:  Do you have any other comments to make about this, perhaps give a 
reason for the above rating? 
 
Q.3  Sometimes people might not want to take a particular medicine, for example 
because they felt it did not suit them, or that they did not need it.  While you’ve been in 
hospital, have you ever said “no thanks” when a nurse gives you a medicine to take? 
 Yes   
 No   
 Don’t know   
 
B. The computer on the drug trolley allows the nurse to record the reason why a dose 
has been missed.  Were you aware of this option? 
 Yes   
 No  
 Don’t know 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C. What do you think about such a system? 
 
  
Q. 4 When required, nurses can also administer medication outside the scheduled 
‘drug round’. For example, if a patient has been prescribed a pain killer, this can be 
given out when the patient is in pain instead of waiting for the ‘drug round’ time. 
 
A. Were you aware of this system? 
 Yes   
 No   
 Don’t know   
B. Have you been prescribed any ‘when required’ medication? 
 Yes  
 No   
 Don’t know   
 
C.  Have you ever asked for a medication outside the ‘drug round’ ? For example, if 
you were in pain? 
 Yes   
 No   
 Don’t know   
D. How would you rate your satisfaction with this system of giving medication ‘when 
required’, on the following scale? 
Very satisfied  Indifferent   Very unsatisfied 
 ⏐__________⏐__________⏐__________⏐__________⏐  
 ☺  .  / 
 
E. Probe: Do you have any other comments to make about this, perhaps give a reason 
for the above rating? 
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Q. 5 In most other hospitals medicines are listed on a paper “drug chart”. This is often 
kept at the end of the bed. Nurses use the paper chart to record when medicines have 
been given. 
A. Do you have any experience of this paper-based system (as a patient or otherwise)? 
 Yes GO TO Q5B
 No  Go to Q6 
 Don’t know  Go to Q6  
 
B. If yes, probe: Can you tell me more about that? How well did that system work for 
you?  
 
Q. 6 The system works as follows.  Details of all medication are written on a paper drug 
chart which is usually kept at the end of the bed, so anyone can look at it. This paper 
chart shows everyone involved in your care which medicines you are on now, and what 
you have had since coming into hospital.  
When the nurse reaches your bedside, he or she would read the drug chart and select 
your medication from the drug trolley. They would then give you your medicine, and 
initial a box on your drug chart to show that it has been taken. 
A. What do you think of such a system? 
 
 
B. Do you have any reservations about that system? 
 
 
C. Do you think that such a system would have had any advantages over the current 
computerised system? 
If yes, probe 
 
  
D. With a paper chart, the nurses are still able to give ‘when required’ medication 
outside the scheduled ‘drug round’. What effect, if any, do you think the computerised 
system has had on the way nurses administer ‘when required’ medication?  
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Q7. Now I’d like to ask you a few questions about your medicines 
 
A. How many medicines are you actually having at the moment? 
(This is really just an ice-breaker so don’t spend too long on it. Interviewee may 
describe them by name; if so, record verbatim, but do not try spend time probing!) 
 
 
B. Have you discussed your medicines with anyone since you have been in hospital?  
 
 Yes   
    
 No Go to Q8  
    
 Don’t know  Go to Q8  
IF YES probe: Who did you talk to? What sort of things did you ask? 
  
 
Q8. Do you have things that you would like to ask about your medicines?  
         Yes  
         No Go to Q9 
If yes, probe what things  
Ask: Do you want me to tell someone about this?  
 
Q. 9 This ward has been using computers for prescribing and administering  medicines 
for quite a while now .  
A. How would you feel if this ward changed to using a paper-based system ? 
 
Very happy  Indifferent   Very unhappy 
 ⏐__________⏐__________⏐__________⏐__________⏐  
 ☺  .  / 
 
B. Do you have any other comments to make, perhaps give a reason for above rating? 
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Q. 10 Some people say this is a “paperless” hospital because it uses computers for so 
many things. As a patient, how do you feel about that? 
Probe: Are computers a good or a bad thing?  
 
Q11.  Are there any questions you’d like to ask  the hospital about how the computer 
system works? 
 
Q12. Apart from the system for  medicines, have you noticed any other uses of 
computers in this hospital? 
Probe:  What have they noticed? How did it affect them?  
I am now going to ask you a few  standard questions: 
Q. 13 How long have you been in hospital ? 
 
Q. 14 Is this your first time as an inpatient in a hospital? 
 Yes Go to Q16 
 No Go To Q15 
 Don’t know   
 
Q 15.  The LAST time you were in hospital, were you prescribed medicines to take 
home with you? 
 Yes  
 No Go To Q16 
 Don’t know 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A. IF YES: What can you remember about that? 
Probe: How long did it take for you to get your medicines? Were they ready when you 
wanted to leave hospital? 
 
B. What did you do when you needed a further supply? 
 
Q. 16 Finally, may I check your age? 
 21-25   
 26-30   
 31-40  
 41-50  
 51-60   
 61-70   
 >70   
 
 
Thank you very much for talking to me 
Reassure on confidentiality 
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Annex Biv  Medication errors with EP:  Two views of the same 
picture 
 
Qualitative data on staff perception of errors has been claimed to provide weaker 
evidence than quantitative counts of actual errors 97. The QHB study allowed us to 
compare the “error picture” provided by these two different approaches: interviews and 
structured clinical review of patient notes. 
 
Qualitative data The primary aim of the staff interviews was to explore the impact of a 
whole-hospital EP system on working practices not to document examples of  specific 
medication errors.  However, it became apparent during the charting and analysis of 
interview transcripts that talking about the perceived benefits and drawbacks of EP had 
generated many accounts of specific errors which “could” or “might” happen, and also 
descriptions of near misses which had been made by other people. Nobody described 
an error they had made themselves, and there were no clear reports of actual harm. 
 
The accounts covered the full drugs use process: including patient movement in and 
out of the EP system, and the types of incident described reflect the respondent’s role. 
Junior doctors (who do most of the prescribing) and pharmacy staff (who supply the 
drugs and review most of the orders) reported the widest range of incidents. Nurses 
focused on drug administration and were generally cautious in their responses.  
 
Quantitative data The retrospective review of patient notes has already been 
described. (Chapter 5) In this, prescribing errors were classified on where they 
occurred in the drug use process, and also on the prescribing stage (admission, 
inpatient, discharge). A small subset of records was also reviewed for administration 
errors. All error records had a short text description containing information on the drug, 
dose, and clinical situation. 
 
Data comparison Interview transcripts were searched systematically for accounts of 
medication incidents, both actual and hypothetical. A classification scheme was 
developed through iterative review of individual reports and applied to the text 
descriptions contained in the post-EP quantitative data sets (see Table 47)  
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Comparative analysis 
Both methods covered the full drug use process but the range of drugs involved was 
wider in incidents identified from records Interviewees often described incidents without 
mentioning the specific drugs involved. Warfarin was frequently mentioned in 
interviews, but anticoagulant errors detected in the review involved low molecular 
weight heparin, not warfarin. Insulin and intravenous fluids were two other frequently 
mentioned drugs. 
 
Both methods identified decision support issues (drug allergy warnings;  use of 
contraindicated drugs) although  records review unsurprisingly contained much more 
detail on clinical need and drug knowledge (cautions and interactions with other 
medication).  
 
Interview data provided more detail on the process of drug and dose selection by the 
prescriber, and identified two possible EP-specific errors: prescribing contraindicated 
drugs which were “hidden” in multiple drug order sets. and menu picking or scrolling 
errors for selecting patients, drugs and doses .It was not possible to tell if picking wrong  
drug  or strength from menu was purely a scrolling error, or  whether the  prescriber did 
not know what the correct choice should be. Interviews with junior doctors suggested 
that some “cry for help” prescribing might occur. With paper systems they just 
“scribbled at the end” when they didn’t know a drug name and hoped the nurses or 
pharmacy would query it; with EP they knew the new order would be checked by 
pharmacy. 
 
Interviews were also a rich source of information on reasons for delays or non-
administration of medicines linked to the system for scheduling administration times. 
They also identified that urgent “stat” orders and some as required (prn) medicines 
were missed because they “fell off the screen”.  In patient interviews we found some 
patients who didn’t know they had been prescribed prn drugs, and had never received 
them. Review of administration records produced a less detailed picture, but identified 
supply failure (dose omission because the drug not available on ward) which was not 
mentioned in interviews. 
 
The majority of incidents described by staff (and detected in records review) were close 
analogies of things that also happen with paper charts (see following page for details). 
In interviews, screen views, notably the inability to “see the whole picture” appeared to 
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be mainly a problem for those relatively new to the system, (and much less of a 
problem than in the recent USA study 14 by Koppel et al) 
 
The overall picture provided by the two approaches is similar in scope, but has logical 
differences in focus. Qualitative data identified all types of error identified in the 
retrospective notes review. The method also identified two “EP-specific” errors which 
were not detected (and probably could not be) by record review, and provided  
 
Table 47: Comparing medication incidents identified in interviews and by records 
review 
 
 
more detail on the process of prescribing and administering drugs on the wards. The 
data took considerably less time to collect, so associated staff costs were much lower. 
However this needs to be offset against transcribing and analysis costs. 
 
So is one method really better than the other?   If we are looking for evidence to help 
decide what to do next (as opposed to proving that X is better than Y) then interviews 
tailored to address policy-makers questions could offer better research value than the 
more labour-intensive records review, particularly if the study site is remote from the 
research contractors usual workplace.  
 
 
 
 PRESCRIBING ADMINISTRATION  Non-EP 
interface 
Data  source Clin 
need 
Select 
Record 
Select Drug Select Dose Select 
Form 
Dose omission EP record Monitor Adm Disch 
   Choice Pick 
from 
menu 
Dose 
Or 
strength 
Freq Dose 
duplicn 
 Stats/prns Reg Rx Admin    
Junior 
doctors 
 D D  D D D D D D  D D D D 
Senior 
doctors 
D  D        D D D  D 
Nurses     D    D D  D D   
Pharmacy 
staff 
 D  D D D D D  D D D D D  
Record 
review 
D  D  D D D D  D D D D D D 
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Comparison of medication incidents in interviews and record review 
 
Clinical need As might be expected, record review provided a wider range of examples where 
the need for  treatment, review or investigation had not been met. Cases included antibiotic 
therapy for  MRSA, potassium supplementation  in a hypokalaemic asthmatic, hyponatraemia 
with fluoxetine,  statins, salbutamol, insulin and oxygen. Interviews provided one example: 
neglecting to prescribe antibiotic cover for a patient with heart valve disease. 
 
Patient selection A case where medicines had been prescribed for the wrong patient  because 
the cursor was still scrolling down the list of inpatients when the enter key was pressed  was 
described in a pharmacy interview. Junior doctors also described near misses, and said that this 
error could happen “because you are not going to the bedside”. Calling up  the wrong outpatient 
record by entering the patient name rather than their hospital number was also mentioned. 
No cases of prescribing to the wrong patient were detected in the record review 
 
Drug selection a) drug choice Knowledge-based errors identified in record review included a 
potentially clinically significant interaction between phenytoin and an antibiotic; use of acitretin in 
renal impairment and prescribing of a penicillin to a patient recorded as query allergic. 
Interviews with doctors mentioned lack of  penicillin allergy warnings. The prescribing to an 
asthmatic of a non-steroidal analgesic drug as part of a post-operative “order set” was also 
described. Both record review and interviews identified  unintentional drug duplication by 
prescribing paracetamol, and  a paracetamol-containing combination product. b) menu picking 
Pharmacy staff described cases where doctors had ordered the next drug on the lookup menu. 
Drugs included methotrexate instead of methotrimeprazine (“I don’t think she would have 
[hand]written the wrong one”) and ethamsylate instead of ethambutol. This type of error was not 
identified by record review 
 
Dose selection Wrong doses, product strengths and dosing frequencies  were identified in both 
interviews and notes review. However the drugs involved were different. Interviews primarily 
cited warfarin and specialist paediatric drugs while errors identified in reviews involved sodium 
valproate, low molecular weight heparin and different paediatric drugs. Dose frequency errors 
frequently involved the lack of a daily limit on “as required” analgesics and anti-emetics, 
reflecting the inflexibility of EP for this type of drug order. Interviews generated two examples of  
possible dosing frequency errors: a one a week drug prescribed once a day, and drugs for 
Parkinson’s disease. The risk of dose duplication,  where a drug was prescribed orally and by 
other routes to allow nurses flexibility depending on the patient condition was cited both in 
interviews and records review. Formulation selection errors involved enteric coated products 
(prednisolone in interviews; diclofenac in review). 
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Dose omission Give now (stats) and as required (prns) In interviews, junior doctors and nurses 
mentioned that stats and prns could be missed because they came at the end of the patient’s 
drugs list. Frusemide was a specific example of a stat drug which had not been given.  Record 
review did not identify errors concerned with non-administration of this type of drug order. 
Regular medicines  Interviews described how EP dose scheduling could delay the start of  a 
new drug because of the default timings in the system. Some doctors explained how they had 
learned to get round this problem. Difficulties with flexible dose drugs warfarin and insulin were 
also cited. Review of administration records identified several regular drugs (including 
antibiotics and anti-epileptics) which had not been given because no stock was available on the 
ward.  
 
EP  recording The risk of dose duplication when EP  records were incomplete or not available 
was identified in both interviews and record review. Nurse and doctor interviews described 
being unsure if a patient had received an analgesic dose or not when the system was down and 
there were no records to check. Record review found cases where analgesics and propranolol 
had been prescribed as regular drugs, but no administration records had been made so it was 
not clear if they had been given.  Two interviews described cases where drugs (IV fluids and 
skin products) had been given  but not prescribed on the system, or prescribed  but 
administration not recorded. There was also a report that analgesic doses given in theatre 
(which does not use EP) might be repeated on the ward. Record review identified several cases 
where oxygen had been given but not prescribed on EP. 
 
Monitoring Record review identified  errors involving digoxin in renal impairment and  
aminophylline plasma levels Interviews generated a wider range of situations: warfarin, 
gentamicin, sliding scale insulin ( which is prescribed on paper charts) and electrolyte 
monitoring for patients on IVs.  
 
EP interface  One interview described a case where medicines had been missed off on 
admission. The patient had been  in hospital for 2 months before she told the pharmacist that 
she normally used eyedrops at home. In another interview, a junior doctor spoke of a diabetic 
patient  who had been discharged to a care home with no insulin because the prescriber had 
not put a note on the EP system. Record review found three cases where medication 
(salbutamol, amitriptyline, insulin) was not continued as expected when the patient moved. 
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Annex Bv  Reflections on qualitative methodology 
 
Identifying and recruiting staff respondents 
In this retrospective evaluation, the research team had little prior knowledge of the 
hospital, and did not have access to the names or job titles of key staff. The majority of 
potential staff interviewees were identified and arranged with the help of a key local 
contact, a senior hospital staff member who was a member of the core HIS 
implementation team. At Queen’s hospital, this method worked very well and allowed 
data collection to be completed in 12 person-days.  There was no evidence of bias in 
the selection of interviewees; the people we interviewed had a range of views on EP, 
and the wider issues raised by computerisation. 
 
However this way of recruiting subjects relies heavily on the person selected as the key 
contact. He or she must not only be relatively impartial but also sympathetic to the aims 
of the research, and able and willing to help. We were fortunate; but there is no 
guarantee that this would be the case in every hospital 
  
The are two ways of recruiting staff for an evaluation without the help of a suitable on-
site key contact. The first would be to identify potential subjects from hospital ward or 
department staff lists or telephone directories, then write or telephone. This would 
require access to internal information which is not usually available to the public. The 
second method would be to advertise the evaluation and call for interviewees via 
posters or internal email systems within the hospital. This method was totally 
unsuccessful at Queen’s Hospital but it could well work in another setting. Recruiting 
staff, and scheduling interview times would take longer, and this method would 
probably be less efficient in the use of research time. 
 
Qualitative data on medication errors 
The primary aim of the staff interviews was to explore the impact of a whole-hospital 
EP system on working practices not to document examples of specific medication 
errors.  However, it became apparent during the charting and analysis of interview 
transcripts that talking about the perceived benefits and drawbacks of EP had 
generated many accounts of specific errors which “could” or “might” happen, and also 
descriptions of near misses which had been made by other people. Nobody described 
an error they had made themselves, and there were no clear reports of actual harm. 
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The accounts covered the full drugs use process: including patient movement in and 
out of the EP system, and the types of incident described reflect the respondent’s role. 
Junior doctors (who do most of the prescribing) and pharmacy staff (who supply the 
drugs and review most of the orders) reported the widest range of incidents. Nurses 
focused on drug administration and were generally cautious in their responses.  
 
Qualitative data on staff perception of errors is widely perceived as providing weaker 
evidence than quantitative counts of actual errors 97. The QHB study allowed us to 
compare the “error picture” provided by these two different approaches: interviews and 
structured clinical review of patient notes (see Annex Biv for details) 
 
The overall picture provided by the two approaches was similar in scope, although with 
logical differences in focus. Qualitative data identified all types of error identified in the 
retrospective notes review. The method also identified two “EP-specific” errors which 
were not detected (and probably could not be) by record review, and provided more 
detail on the process of prescribing and administering drugs on the wards. The data 
took considerably less time to collect, so associated staff costs were much lower. 
However this needs to be offset against transcribing and analysis costs. 
 
Conducting interviews with inpatients 
The short interviews we conducted produced a good deal of information on patient 
views of the benefits and concerns of EP. However the interview conditions were 
unsatisfactory, with patients in adjacent beds and nursing staff being able to hear, 
interrupt, and comment on what was being said. Patients were unwell, and some were 
clearly concerned not to appear critical of the people who were caring for them. They 
also had limited experience of any other medicines system. Some negative views were 
elicited, but in general it is likely that  patients told us what they thought the hospital 
wanted to hear. 
 
The HIS enabled inpatients to be screened against our selection criteria before visiting 
the wards. However, this initial list had to be checked by a nurse before we could know 
who was well enough to be approached.  This had to be done on the ward, and took 
staff away from other more pressing duties. Ward sisters were notified that we were 
coming, but the level of co-operation was markedly better when we were introduced 
personally to senior staff by a pharmacist who normally looked after the ward.  
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Ward type            
 
On prn 
medication 
Potentially 
suitable 
Interviewed 
Female surgical 27 15 5 
Acute elderly 22 ? 4 
Acute medical 11 6 3 
Male surgical 8 6 6 
Trauma 27 8 1 
Total 95 > 40 19 
Table 48: Patient  sample frame 
 
Many patients were not actually available, because of examinations, personal care, off-
ward investigations or visits from friends. Much of this non-availability could not be 
predicted in advance.  
 
Having interviews done by hospital staff (as was the case in the prospective arm of the 
study) would probably make the recruitment process easier. However the concerns 
over bias would be greater. 
 
An alternative method could be to use a self-completion questionnaire, given to a larger 
sample of patients on discharge and returned anonymously by post. Issues identified 
could be followed up in focus groups with a sample of respondents. 
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Appendix C.  Issues for the economic evaluation of measures to 
     reduce/avoid errors in the prescribing/administration of   
     medicines on hospital wards 
 
Professor Martin Buxton, Director: Health Economics Research Group, 
Brunel University 
 
 
 
C 1.  Introduction 
 
The push for increased patient safety and the very proper desire to avoid, or at least 
reduce, errors in the prescription and administration of drugs within hospitals has 
lead to the considerable interest in electronic prescription systems.  This study has 
demonstrated, and no doubt others in future will also demonstrate, that such systems 
can reduce errors and increase patient safety but at a cost in terms of capital 
investment and staff time.  It is essential that, prior to major system-wide investments 
in such systems, the cost-effectiveness of these interventions is carefully assessed, 
and thus their opportunity cost, in terms of other health care benefits foregone, is 
determined. 
 
However, the standard approaches to economic evaluation of health-care 
interventions do not necessarily lend themselves to the evaluation of such systems. 
Standard methods of economic evaluation, as, for example, have been well 
developed and tested in the context of NICE, deal relatively well with well-defined, 
static technologies such as drug interventions provided on an individual basis to 
selected patients to directly achieve demonstrable improvements in individual health. 
Electronic prescribing systems have a number of characteristics that raise rather 
different issues.  They typically involve high initial investments and need to be 
applied across large parts, or for maximum efficiency perhaps all, of a hospital.  At 
early stages in their development the capital cost may be uncertain and an 
inaccurate reflection of future costs, either because of initial subsidy by developers or 
because future, larger-scale production would lead to lower costs.  The systems may 
have small but widespread effects on resource use, such as the time of a large 
number of staff.  Most importantly it is difficult to appropriately value the benefits: how 
should we value the avoidance of a “prescribing error”.  Is that not dependent on the 
consequences of that error?   
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Moreover, these prescribing systems are embedded in complex and dynamic 
systems – hospitals – which exhibit a wide range of existing behaviours, patterns of 
working including current handling of prescriptions and resulting error rates.  Even 
when we have established reasonable estimates of the cost-effectiveness of a 
particular implementation, the results may not be transferable or generalisable from 
that context to others. 
 
This Chapter does not provide a formal evaluation of the cost-effectiveness of the 
ServeRx system at Charing Cross Hospital.  Rather, in the light of the analysis of the 
“clinical” evaluation of that implementation, it reviews the main issues that will arise in 
future economic evaluations and indicates some of the problems that will have to be 
addressed and the approaches that may be useful in doing so. 
 
The Chapter focuses on the following issues:  
 
• Identifying, measuring and valuing the net costs of the intervention; 
• Identifying, measuring and valuing the main benefits of the intervention; 
• Implications for sample size and study design; 
• Generalisability of results and the need for modelling alternative future 
scenarios; 
• Conclusions and recommendations for future research. 
 
 
 
C 2.   Identifying, measuring and valuing the net costs of the intervention 
 
 
In estimating the costs of implementing a system we need naturally to consider both 
the one-off “capital costs” (associated with purchase and installation), the continuing 
direct running costs (including system management and maintenance) and the cost-
impacts in terms of time of the staff who use the system or whose work is affected by 
it. 
 
At early stages in the development of a new technology such as this, there may be 
difficulty in establishing the real cost of the investment.  Systems may be provided on 
a non-commercial basis as test beds or as part of the producer’s development 
process.  Whilst there should be information on the contract price for the investment, 
the development process may well be collaborative and this initial contract price may 
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reflect expectations by the supplying company of the value of the specialist or 
managerial expertise that will be provided by staff at the development site.   Even if 
there is no expectation of input to the commercial development process, such expert 
time will still be required in implementing a major development of this sort.  This 
implies that, as well as information on the capital cost of the system and its 
installation, data will need to be collected to estimate the main time inputs from those 
involved in the planning and implementation of the project. 
 
Capital costs will need to be amortised over an appropriate period: that is the 
estimated useful life-time of the capital.  There may be little direct experience on 
which to base this estimate.  With new systems, in a rapidly developing market, 
obsolescence may well occur well before the equipment would otherwise need 
replacement. Or developmental systems may fail without producer capability to 
maintain them.  Given that uncertainty, sensitivity of the cost-effectiveness to 
assumed length of useful life will need to be established. 
 
As regards running costs of the system, this study has demonstrated how the 
difference in time taken by medical, pharmacy and nursing staff can be estimated.  
However, the valuation of small differences in time taken by staff may be more 
problematic.  Whilst these could simply be costed at a marginal hourly rate for the 
staff concerned, it may be more meaningful to use diaries, or qualitative techniques, 
to try to establish what activities are displaced or curtailed as a result, particularly on 
wards where the staff time-complement is relatively fixed.  Such an approach would 
indicate what are the direct opportunity costs of any extra time involved. The 
opportunity costs might be viewed as highly valuable, for example if the amount of 
time spent on direct patient care were negatively affected, or they might be rather 
lowly valued, if it were seen as drawing on otherwise unproductive time. 
 
All these costs need to be expressed in terms of some unit of “activity” or “outcome”.  
The next section considers the best ways to value the benefits of error reduction.   
However, if these benefits are not valued then it may make sense to estimate a cost-
effectiveness ratio of the additional cost per extra error avoided.  However, if the 
benefits of error reduction are valued then it would be better to estimate costs and 
the valued “benefits” per some standardised unit of activity – probably per (thousand) 
patient day(s).  Data on patient days in the relevant wards should be readily 
available. 
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C 3.   Identifying, measuring and valuing the main benefits of the 
intervention 
 
Whilst it is clear that all stakeholders value a reduction in errors, it is not clear how 
these errors avoided should most appropriately be valued.  But, if we are to assess 
the cost-effectiveness of investing in error reduction, then the value we place on 
reducing the errors is fundamental.  Two rather different approaches might be 
adopted. The first is to attempt to estimate an “intrinsic value” of avoiding an error.  
The second is to estimate the value based on the present value of the undesired 
course of events avoided.  Each of these is considered in more detail below. 
 
However before considering the underlying concept behind the value placed on an 
error, it is important to consider precisely how errors are defined. 
 
What constitutes an error? 
Errors were defined in this study as:  
 
‘a prescribing decision or prescription-writing process that results in an 
unintentional, significant: (i) reduction in the probability of treatment being 
timely and effective or (ii) increase in the risk of harm, when compared to 
generally accepted practice.  Prescribing without taking into account the 
patient’s clinical status, failure to communicate essential information and 
transcribing errors (from one prescription to another) were all considered 
prescribing errors.  However, failures to adhere to standards such as 
prescribing guidelines or the drug’s product licence, were not considered 
errors if this reflected accepted practice.’ 31 
 
This definition is used by the Department of Health 30.   It is important to note that the 
definition refers to a “significant”, but significant is undefined, “reduction in the 
probability” of timely/effective treatment or “increase in the risk of harm”.  In other 
words, actual “disbenefit” may not have occurred.  Whilst this may be an appropriate 
overall definition of errors, it is a definition that includes a range of circumstances that 
would have very different clinical implications. 
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This issue is partially dealt with by attributing a “clinical significance score”  to errors 
identified. This is based on a reproducible, validated scoring system for the clinical 
significance of medication administration errors.  Errors were assessed on a scale of 
0 (no harm) to 10 (death) by 5 independent judges, the mean of their ratings being 
used 36,37. However, such definitions are not intended to accurately represent a 
classification of what is economically important, where economic importance may 
stem from one or both of two factors:  a significant cost impact, for example, by 
leading to an extension of length of stay, or a significant health impact on the patient, 
for example by prolonging the period of recovery or producing serious side effects. 
 
Intrinsic value of error reduction 
Some stakeholders may well value error “reduction” per se.  However, it would be 
irrational to be prepared to spend unlimited amounts simply to reduce errors.  Using 
resources in this way has an opportunity cost to the NHS, which can easily be 
exemplified in terms of what might be achieved by spending the same sums on new 
expensive drugs or on the provision of additional capacity to reduce patient waiting 
times.  But whilst this value is clearly finite, stakeholders might adopt a view that this 
value in avoiding prescribing errors is independent of the particular implications, or 
consequences, of the errors.  This approach would imply that the value of avoiding 
any error is the same and independent of the severity of that error.  Certainly, some 
of the rhetoric around error reduction appears to be consistent with this view.  If this 
is the case, then it should be possible to elicit from groups of stakeholders (patients, 
nurses, pharmacists, hospital managers, politicians) the value they place on error 
reduction. This elicitation might be undertaken using contingent valuation methods or 
stated preference techniques. 
 
However, it is unlikely that these values would be independent of an assumption 
about the consequences of an error, and in undertaking the elicitation the danger is 
that respondents incorporate an implicit assumption or view as to what are the 
implications of the errors they are valuing.  And these assumptions will vary between 
respondents.  However, this issue could be studied experimentally. 
 
Consequential value of error reduction 
It seems more probable that for most stakeholders the value they place on errors 
would vary with their perceptions of the severity or clinical significance.  The 
avoidance of a minor error, say in dosage within the normal prescribing range which 
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was not likely to impact on the patient, would be less highly valued than the 
avoidance of a error in the actual drug prescribed which might be potentially fatal. 
 
If the values placed on errors do vary with the significance of the error, then it may be 
more appropriate to estimate directly the consequential value of errors avoided rather 
than to seek stakeholders’ perceptions of that value.  Logically such consequential 
values might be expressed as the net present value (NPV) of the additional health 
resource usage plus the health loss (QALY reduction) resulting from the error.  Whilst 
this may be conceptually clear, the process of estimation of such values is highly 
speculative. 
 
In most cases, what is observed in a study of error reduction are instances where a 
defined error occurred but was quickly noted and rectified shortly afterwards.  The 
very process of identifying errors in a study is likely to lead to the avoidance of their 
major consequences, for the severity of the consequences depends on how speedily 
an error is noticed and corrective action taken. Thus, we rarely have, in a study such 
as the prospective evaluation of ServeRx, observations of uncorrected errors.  There 
is a substantial literature on the use of clinical judgement to assess both the 
consequences of identified and corrected errors and of assessing the avoidability 
(through error reduction) of severe adverse events, particularly deaths.   
 
Fundamentally, the problem is that we cannot observe the counterfactual, that is to 
say: “What would have happened in a particular patient circumstance if an error that 
was avoided had not been avoided, or an error that did occur had not occurred.”  Any 
attempt to estimate this is hindered by the problem of the huge between patient/case 
variability in the outcomes and circumstances, and the difficulty of predicting events 
“down-stream” of the error. 
 
Nevertheless, these values remain fundamental to any serious attempts to assess 
the cost-effectiveness of error reduction systems and a substantial research effort to 
begin to attempt to estimate the NPV of such errors is urgently required, but will 
probably need to be undertaken as a separate exercise.  The development in this 
study of a method of detecting prescribing errors from the patients’ notes gives an 
indication of how this could be done, and provides some information from which a 
sample size can be calculated. 
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C 4.   Implications for sample size and study design 
 
The principal implication of there being very different valuations for different types of 
error is that for an economic evaluation we need robust assessment of the rates of 
reduction of errors of different potential magnitude.  But generally studies are 
powered (as in this case) to provide accurate estimates of overall rates of error 
reduction.  The problem is akin to that which arises in many cardiac studies, where, 
to achieve an adequate event rate a number of different cardiac events (ranging 
perhaps from angina to fatal acute myocardial infarction) are aggregated in a 
combined endpoint.  But as they are clearly not “valued” equally they need to be 
disaggregated for purposes of economic evaluation.  However, cardiac studies often 
do not provide sufficiently robust estimates of the rarer, but economically most 
significant, events. 
 
This issue is illustrated in the data from prospective evaluation of ServeRx.  Whilst 
the rates of prescribing error fell overall (from 3.8% of all medication orders written to 
2.0%: p=0.0004), and the mean severity of the errors hardly changed  (4.2 pre, 4.6 
post: p=0.24) the percentage of these errors adjudged to be of “major” potential 
clinical significance rose from 3% (3)  to 12% (6).   Whilst this difference in rates was 
not statistically significant, the study was not powered to show differences in sub-
groups of errors.  Were such a difference to persist in a larger sample, it might well 
be of economic significance, and could conceivably mean that the estimated NPV of 
errors increased after the introduction of the ServeRx system.  The problem here is 
that relatively rare events, the frequency of which are not well characterised by small 
studies, may be much more important economically than the common (more minor) 
errors that from the bulk of the events observed. 
 
This suggests that for robust economic evaluation much larger sample sizes may be 
necessary. The alternative possibility is that it might be possible, from careful review 
of data from a range of such studies to establish, generalisable proportional 
frequencies for different types of error, so that it might be possible to estimate long-
term/large-sample rates for major errors from the frequency of minor errors.  Whilst 
such a possibility is highly attractive, the recent report on the use of Heinrich ratios 80 
in this way suggests it would be unsuccessful.  It also seems rather unlikely that 
generalisable patterns will emerge from studies in different settings.  The issue of 
generalisability is discussed below. 
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C 5.   Generalisability of results and the need for modelling alternative 
future scenarios 
 
Any single study such as the prospective evaluation of ServeRx, although important 
as an assessment of a particular application of computerised prescribing technology, 
may not be readily generalisable.  What is observed is the product of a complex 
interaction between a particular early implementation of a specific proprietary version 
of the technology, interacting with, and compared to, particular patterns of working, 
prescribing and administration arrangements, and explicit (and implicit) operational 
protocols by a range of staff of varying skill/ability trialled on one ward within a 
particular hospital in the context of a particular non-random subset of the hospital’s 
patients.  The results are the product of these very specific circumstances and may 
or may not reflect what might be achieved, if any one or more of the circumstances 
were different.  Therefore extreme caution should be exercised in assuming that the 
results from this study (clinical or economic) can be applied to different 
circumstances, even one as close as a different ward at the same institution. 
 
This would be true of any single setting study, and, but for the unlikely possibility of a 
huge multi-centre study of various variants of the technology applied in a variety of 
settings, the evidence-base is likely to accumulate from a small but growing number 
of one-off studies.  It therefore becomes essential that such studies provide all the 
key information (using consistent definitions and methods) to enable comparisons to 
be made and major differences and similarities established and potentially explained. 
 
This also means that, for the purposes of using evidence from this and other studies 
to estimate the cost-effectiveness of future potential applications, a decision 
analytical framework is required that can draw on and synthesise data from the full 
range of observed experience, where necessary incorporating appropriate 
judgements as to the effect of different circumstances on the likely results. 
 
 
C 6.  Conclusions and recommendations for future research 
 
This study provides some important indications of the possibilities and challenges for 
undertaking a formal economic evaluation of an electronic prescribing system.  As 
regards cost estimation, it emphasises the need to realistically estimate the initial 
costs which need to include not just the capital costs of the system and its 
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installation, but also the costs of the time of key staff involved in the development of 
the system/implementation of the project.  Measurements undertaken in this study 
show that it is feasible to estimate the time implications for staff involved in tasks 
associated with prescribing/administration of medication, but this report emphasises 
that it may be more appropriate to establish the actual opportunity cost of marginal 
changes in staff time, rather than simply cost at a standard cost per hour.  
Nevertheless, costing of the system itself is not particularly problematic. 
 
Much more difficult is the appropriate valuation of the errors avoided.  Two 
approaches have been identified, and both merit further exploration.  It needs to be 
established whether key stakeholders have a concept of an “intrinsic” value for error 
reduction, or whether a “consequential” valuation is more appropriate.  If the latter, 
then a substantial programme of work is needed to establish a robust method of 
valuation and provide mean estimates of the value of avoiding different types of error. 
 
The implication of the value of error avoidance varying with the significance of the 
errors implies that we need robust estimates of the reduction in error rates for 
different types of errors, particularly for significant errors which, because of their 
relative rarity, are not well characterised in relatively small studies.  It needs to be 
explored whether it is possible to use aggregated experience or alternative data-
bases to establish robust and generalisable ratios of different types of error that 
occur in different settings. 
 
The problem of lack of generalisability of individual studies needs to be recognised 
and for the purposes of estimation of the cost-effectiveness of future implementations  
a decision-analytic framework will need to be used that can incorporate parameter 
values from studies of particular past implementations such as this as well as 
estimates of the value of avoiding different types of error.  For this to be achieved 
requires that all such studies collect a set of consistently-defined key parameters that 
can be used in modelling.  This study provides a starting point to define such a 
standard data-set. 
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Appendix D. Statistical issues in the evaluation of electronic 
   prescribing 
 
Dr. James Carpenter, Medical Statistics Unit, London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine 
 
 
D 1. Introduction 
 
With the increased interest in various forms of electronic prescription systems in hospitals, 
in the near future there are likely to be a number of studies, similar to those reported in this 
research project, to compare these systems with each other and with existing procedures. 
Such studies raise a number of statistical issues, both in the study design and the analysis. 
Informed by the practical experience with this project, and further reflections, we discuss 
some of these issues below and consider how they can be addressed. The aim is to give 
practical guidance for the effective design and analysis of such studies. 
 
   The aim of these studies is to understand the effect of introducing new prescription 
systems. The “gold standard” tool for establishing cause and effect in medicine is the 
randomised trial. By randomising the intervention to the units (i.e. wards in hospitals) 
randomisation seeks to ensure that the units receiving the intervention differ, on average, 
only in the intervention given, not in any other way. This ensures that effects can be 
confidently attributed to the intervention, rather than to any other systematic differences 
between units which happen to occur concurrently with the intervention and thus confound 
the intervention effect. 
 
While a randomised study should be carried out to conclusively demonstrate the benefit of 
any system before its widespread adoption in the health service, we recognise that in the 
early stages it is not possible to perform randomised studies, usually because the 
interventions are being piloted in individual wards in a hospital. 
 
Nevertheless, it is important to keep the “gold-standard” of randomisation in mind when 
planning these smaller studies. Specifically, we should always be on the lookout for 
possible systematic changes which occur concurrently with the intervention and whose 
effects may falsely be attributed to the intervention. While non-randomised studies can 
never rule out such biases, steps can be taken to minimise them.  
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Data arising from such studies also present particular issues for analysis. In particular, data 
are often discrete (being counts of errors of one form or another) and are also correlated. 
The correlation arises because each patient typically receives a number of prescriptions, 
and prescriptions are more likely to be similar within a patient than between a patient. This 
gives rise to so called multilevel data, where observations (prescriptions) are nested within 
patients. In turn, patients can be viewed as nested within surgical teams, within wards, and 
within hospitals. Failure to allow for this correlation can lead to bias in the estimation of an 
effect, and also over confidence in the precision or variability of any estimated effect. Both 
these errors can lead to misleading conclusions being drawn. 
 
The plan for the remainder of this article is as follows. Section D.2 describes issues in the 
design of these studies, looking both at possible biases and how to avoid them, and how to 
choose sample sizes likely to give meaningful conclusions. Section D.3 elaborates on the 
analysis of the resulting data. We discuss some of the implications in Section D.4. 
 
D 2. Design issues 
 
We have already touched on the importance of any study so the effects can be confidently 
attributed to the intervention. In order to do this, it is worth noticing how possible biases may 
occur. First, it is necessary to have a “control” group who do not receive the intervention. It 
is not sufficient to compare the results of applying the new procedure to a ward with 
documented levels of prescription errors from other studies at other times. The differences 
between patients and staff, and their resultant effect on the chance of prescription errors, 
make the results meaningless. 
 
Having agreed that a control group is required, we need to think how best to choose it. The 
two factors most likely to change over time, and affect error rates, are the staff and the 
patient case mix. Further, the fact that staff are aware they are under observation is likely to 
result in atypical behaviour, which may reduce or increase the number of errors. Again, the 
introduction of a new system will involve training staff, and the possible presence of 
additional support staff (for example an extra pharmacist on the ward to help with the 
system). Both these have the potential to affect error rates.  
 
Ideal study design 
To address these concerns, we propose that the ideal study design for the investigation of a 
new treatment is a randomised cross over design carried out at the ward level. Suppose we 
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have 2N wards where the electronic prescribing could be used. A possible design is 
detailed in Figure 25 below. Half the wards are randomly selected to receive the new 
system, and half to carry on as usual. Then, after say six months, when the new system has 
bedded in, both are observed. Then, the prescription procedures are swapped. Again, a 
period of time, say six months, elapses before further observations are made. 
 
 
 
Although this design is more costly, and awkward for staff who have to revert to their 
original practice after using the intervention, it goes a long way to reducing potential biases. 
Wards are randomised to receive the intervention, not selected on the basis of past 
performance or willingness to try a new system. The same staff, on the same mix of 
patients, are observed operating both systems. Wards are observed over the same periods, 
so any variation over the year (e.g. due to seasonal change in patient case mix) is likely to 
be similar. This design has an additional advantage because there is likely to be marked 
variation in error rates, and the types of error, between wards. Thus, as each ward uses 
both systems, the effect of the system can be estimated in each ward, and fewer wards will 
be required in the study. 
2N wards available to take part in study 
RANDOMISE 
 
N wards carry on with 
existing practice; after 6 
months, they are 
observed. 
 
N wards introduce new 
system. After it has 
bedded down for 6 
months, they are 
observed. 
Wards move over to new 
system. After it has 
bedded down for 6 
months, they are 
observed. 
 
Wards revert to old 
system. After 6 months, 
they are observed. 
Figure 25: Possible design for cross over study of electronic prescribing 
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If, however, it is not thought practical to use this design, an alternative is a simpler two 
group randomised study, as shown in Figure 26. This does not have the advantage of the 
“cross-over” design where each ward gets both systems; therefore more (possibly 
considerably more) wards will be needed. However, it preserves the key aspect of 
randomisation and also matches the observation period for the new intervention and control 
group. 
 
 
 
 
 
Non-randomised designs 
Here we discuss alternative designs where, for one reason or another, a randomised design 
is not possible. However, if experience from clinical trials is a guide (and there is no reason 
to suppose it will not be) even the best non-randomised studies can be seriously 
misleading, as biases occur in many, often unexpected, ways 98  
 
The aim in a non-randomised study is to try and re-capture what randomisation guarantees: 
that the intervention and control group differ only in which prescription method they use, so 
any effect can be attributed to the intervention.  
 
This motivates the following guidelines 
2N wards available to take part in study 
RANDOMISE 
 
N wards carry on with 
existing practice; after 6 
months, they are 
observed. 
 
N wards introduce new 
system. After it has 
bedded down for 6 
months, they are 
observed. 
Figure26:Design for randomised two group study of electronic prescribing 
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1. A ward should act as its own control 
Differences between wards, in terms of case mix, staffing, staff procedures are likely 
to be substantial, and difficult to quantify, so comparisons with retrospective data from 
other wards and other hospitals will render the conclusions very unreliable. 
2. Staffing  
Similar staffing levels and, if possible, staff should be used for the control and 
intervention phase. In particular, if the intervention requires, e.g., an extra pharmacist 
on the ward, they should also be available for the control period. 
3. Systems should be observed after they have bedded down, to enable a reliable 
estimate of the error rate. 
4. Observation of the control and intervention should be at a similar time of year. 
This helps reduce the effect of biases resulting from the time of year. 
5. Subject to these two points, observation times should be as close together as possible. 
6. Analyses should take account of patient data and type of prescription, staff loads, 
expertise and process, and sufficient information should be collected to make this 
possible.  
It may be that certain kinds of prescription are more common to error and more likely 
to be used with certain kinds of patient. 
 
In summary, these point to a design based around the observation of wards, before and 
after the intervention, set up to address the points raised above. Using control data from 
different hospitals or wards, especially from some time in the past, is best avoided.  
 
Sample size  
Having established the design, the next question concerns the sample size. The choice of 
sample size is determined by frequency of the outcome (prescribing error of one sort or 
another), its variability, and the size of a practically relevant reduction we want to be 
confident of picking up. In addition, as patients have repeat prescriptions, we need to take 
account of the relative size of between and within patient variability in prescribing errors.  
 
Thus, in order to get a reasonable idea of a suitable sample size, a fair amount of 
information is required; however reliable estimates of the frequency and variability of 
prescribing errors is hard to come by. It therefore makes sense to look at how the sample 
size required varies with these quantities. Taken together with budgetary constraints, an 
appropriate sample size can then be arrived at. 
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Here, we first give formulae for calculating the sample size, and then illustrate its use. The 
idea is to provide a starting point for future calculations. 
 
To use the formula, besides specifying the proportion of prescription errors in the control 
and intervention group, and the average number of prescriptions per patient, some 
statistical quantities need to be specified. For a fuller, non-technical, description of these, 
the reader is referred to the Encyclopaedic Companion to Biostatistics 99. The first is size. In 
our context, this is the chance that our study detects a difference between the prescription 
error rates between the control and intervention groups when, in truth, none exists. 
Typically this is chosen in the region of 1/20 or 5%. The second is the power. This is the 
probability that our study detects a difference in the prescription error rates between the 
control and intervention groups when, in truth, there is a difference1. Typically, this is 
chosen in the region of 9/10 or 90%.  
 
   Lastly, we need to specify the proportion of the total variability in prescription errors that is 
due to variation between patients (between 0 and 100%). We call this proportion ;ρ  it is 
usually referred to as the intra-class correlation coefficient (ICC). A value of 100% means 
that if someone has a single prescription error, all their prescriptions are errors. Conversely, 
a value of 0 means that prescription errors do not “cluster” within patients at all. While it is to 
be hoped that ρ  is small, in practice, whether because of the complexity of a patient’s 
illness, or some other combination of reasons, errors will cluster. While in health care 
settings ρ  is typically less than 10%, in small clusters (here, the number of prescriptions on 
an individual) it may rise considerably, though it is still typically < 30% 100.  
 
Now suppose we are carrying out a within ward comparison, such as described at the end 
of the previous section. Let pC be the proportion of prescription errors in the control group 
(expressed as percentage) and pI the proportion of prescription errors in the intervention 
group. Further, let a be the average number of prescriptions per patient, α  be the size, β  
the power and ρ  the ICC (see previous paragraph). Then the number of patients needed in 
each group is given by: 
 
                                                 
1 We assume that the detected difference is in the same direction as the true difference. 
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where ),( βαf  is found from Table 49. 
 
  ,β probability we detect a difference when, in truth, there is a 
difference 
  95% 90% 80% 50% 
α , probability we  10% 10.8 8.6 6.2 2.7 
detect a difference  5% 13.0 10.5 7.9 3.8 
when, in truth,  2% 15.8 13.0 10.0 5.4 
none exists 1% 17.8 14.9 11.7 6.6 
 
Table 49: Values of ),( βαf  
 
Note that, following Pocock (p. 127)101 our formula is based on a normal approximation 
(adjusting for clustering102), and alternative approaches might give slightly larger sample 
sizes. Our formula is for two sided tests. 
 
   To illustrate our approach, if we hypothesise that the prescription errors in the control group 
run at 8%, electronic prescribing will reduce this by 50% (to 4%), %5=ρ , %5=α , 
%10=β  and a = 10, then the number of patients in each group is 
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Thus we would need 107 patients in our control group and 107 in our intervention group. 
 
Using this formula repeatedly, we can obtain tables showing how the sample size varies with 
the ICC, the size and power, the reduction in prescription error rate and the typical number of 
prescriptions per patient. For example, Table 50 below shows how the number of patients 
required in each group varies with ρ  equal to 5%, 15% and 25%. We see how critical the 
value of ρ  is to the sample size. 
 
   Lastly, if we are able to use several wards, then, in the absence of any further information, 
it makes sense to choose an equal number of patients from each ward. Note, though, that 
there are likely to be quite large differences between wards, because of their different case 
mix. As a rough guide, if the between ward ICC is η %, and there are w wards, the number 
of patients n calculated using the formula above should be replaced by 
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 Consideration would have to be given to further increasing the 
number of patients if wards from different hospitals were used, and the between hospital 
ICC was thought to be non-negligible. 
 
 Intra class correlation, ρ  
Percentage error rate 
in  
control and 
intervention groups 
5% 15% 25% 
5%; 2% 114 184 254 
5%, 3% 292 473 653 
5%, 4% 1308 2120 2931 
 %,5=α  %,90=β  a = 10. 
 
Table 50: Sample sizes for various ICC values, calculated using the formula above. 
 
 
 
D 3. Analysis issues  
 
Hierarchical nature of the data 
   As discussed in the introduction, data arising from studying prescribing errors are 
hierarchical, or multilevel. This results from each patient having typically 10 prescriptions 
over the course of their stay in hospital, and each ward containing a number of patients. 
Prescriptions on individual patients are more similar than those on different patients. 
Likewise, patients in an individual ward are more similar, in terms of their prescriptions, 
than patients on different wards. Thus we can view prescriptions (level 1) as nested within 
patients (level 2)in turn nested within wards (level 3), thus building up a multilevel 
hierarchy.  
 
   It is now widely known that the analysis of such multilevel data cannot proceed under the 
traditional assumption that each observation (here prescription) is independent. Failure to 
acknowledge the within patient and within ward similarities results in the estimated effect of 
interventions being to precise (so that p-values are too small) and can result in biases in 
the estimated effects 103. 
 
Biases result, for example, if a particular patient, who is fairly rare, is prone to both a long 
stay and a particularly high chance of prescribing error. In this case, an analysis that 
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ignores the multilevel structure will have an upwardly biased estimate of the prescribing 
error rate. Conversely, a multilevel analysis will adjust for the fact we have a single patient 
with a lot of repeat prescriptions. One can similarly think of other scenarios which will bias 
traditional analyses in either direction.  
 
In the light of this, traditional summaries using contingency tables and means should only 
be used for descriptive purposes. Definite conclusions should not be based on chi-square 
tests/t-tests based on such summaries. Instead, a multilevel mode or generalised 
estimating equation (GEE) approach should be used to account for the multilevel structure.  
 
The difference between multilevel and generalised estimating equations is discussed by 
Carpenter103. In this context, we capture the effect of the intervention by estimating the ratio 
of the odds of a prescribing error when using the intervention system versus when using 
the control system (odds ratio, henceforth OR). An OR obtained using a GEE directly 
estimates the OR that would be expected over the whole population of patients if the 
intervention was adopted. This is known as a population averaged estimate. Conversely, a 
multilevel model estimates the OR of an individual. The effect of averaging is to shrink 
ORs; thus population averaged ORs are generally less than those from multilevel models. 
The significance  (p-values) of population averaged ORs may also be slightly reduced. 
Note, though, that this distinction between GEEs and multilevel models only holds for 
discrete data. For continuous data, the ORs have the same (population averaged) 
meaning. 
 
It is worth noting that population averaged ORs can be recovered from multilevel ORs, 
although this is not automatic in standard software104. An advantage of multilevel modelling 
is that it enables the sources of variability to be modelled. Further, while most software for 
GEEs allows only a two-level hierarchy, data from prescription errors may well have at 
least three levels. This is not a problem for multilevel models, though. 
 
Form of model 
When modelling prescription errors, we can choose between a logistic model and a 
Poisson model. The logistic approach models each prescription as a binary variable, which 
is 0 if the prescription is correct and 1 for an error, say. Then, if i indexes people and j 
prescriptions we model  )1(Pr logit =ijY as a function of covariates. The estimated 
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coefficients are then (log) odds ratios, for example the (log) odds ratio of a prescription 
error under the new system versus the old system. 
 
An alternative is to adopt a Poisson model. Here, for each individual, we count the total 
number of prescription errors, say Pi over the total observation time (either the physical 
time for that person, or some measure of the time “at risk” from prescription error). If we 
denote this ti, then a Poisson approach models .covariates)log()log( += ii tP  Here )log( it  
is an offset (with fixed coefficient of 1) and the estimated coefficients are now (log) risk 
ratios, for example the (log) risk ratio of a prescription error under the new system versus 
the old system. 
 
   Of the two approaches, the first may be preferable, as there is no natural “observation time” 
in the hospital setting, especially if we are only studying each patient during ward rounds. 
However, in other settings, such as monitoring prescription errors in care homes, the 
Poisson approach may prove useful. In any case, providing prescription errors are 
relatively rare, the risk ratios and odds ratios will be similar. 
 
 
Adjusting for covariates 
We have already noted that, without the protection of randomisation, it is important to 
measure patient and ward/process specific variables that might vary between occasions 
and adjust for these in the analysis. Important patient level variables should reflect the 
severity of their illness; ward and process level variables reflect the staffing levels, training 
and experience of the staff. Additional variables could include time of year, or other 
surrogates for variation in case mix and process. 
 
A useful precursor to adjusting for these variables in an analysis is to use them to examine 
how closely the control and intervention group agree. We define a variable, say Ii, to be 1 if 
person i is in the new intervention group and 0 if not. We then perform a logistic regression 
of I on the variables listed above. If all is well, there should be relatively weak association 
between the above variables and I, reflecting the fact that there is little to distinguish the 
control and intervention group (besides the intervention). In other words, the propensity of a 
patient to be in the intervention group does not depend on these variables. A useful check 
is to obtain the fitted probabilities from the logistic model for I, and plot a histogram, using 
different colours/symbols to differentiate the fitted probabilities from the intervention and 
control groups. If the two distributions overlap, this confirms the propensity of a patient to 
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be in the intervention group is similar to their propensity to be in the control group. 
However, if they are very different, the propensity to be in the control group depends on the 
case mix/process variables, and the  control group is quite different from the intervention 
group. In this case, the analysis of the effect of the intervention must be interpreted very 
cautiously. 
 
In effect, this “propensity score”105 for being in the intervention group is a way of formally 
checking that the groups are compatible. Strictly, since the only thing different between 
individuals with the same propensity score is whether or not they were actually in the 
intervention group, we should compare the effect of the intervention on individuals with the 
same propensity score. Usually, an approximation to this is done. We divide individuals into 
5 groups, based on quintiles of propensity score, and calculate the effect of the intervention 
in each, then combine. In practice this is most easily done by including propensity score 
(split into quintiles) as a covariate in the logistic or Poisson analysis, described above. 
 
   There are two potential advantages of propensity105 score analysis. First, if it were possible 
to measure and include in the propensity model all the relevant variables, then the 
propensity score analysis would give the “correct” answer — i.e. the same answer as a 
randomised study. However, we can never be sure of this in practice. The second 
advantage is that the propensity score model (i.e. the logistic model for I) can include far 
more terms than we would want to adjust for in the model that estimates the effect of the 
intervention. This is because there is less need to worry about over fitting propensity 
models. 
 
In summary, a propensity score analysis has two models. First we fit the logistic model to 
the variable I, and calculate the resulting fitted probabilities, termed propensity, to be in the 
intervention group. Then we fit the “model of interest” (which estimates the effect of the 
intervention) adjusting for propensity score. The adjustment for propensity score usually 
involves categorising the fitted probabilities into quintiles, and fitting a factor with a different 
level for each quintile. 
 
  Propensity scores versus traditional covariate adjustment approach 
   Propensity score analyses do not give estimates of the effect of the covariates on the 
outcome (apart from intervention) as they are all subsumed into the propensity score. For 
this reason, and as a check on the propensity analysis, having established the compatibility 
of the control and intervention patients using a propensity score, one can then adopt the 
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usual strategy of adjusting for important patient/process/environment covariates directly in 
the intervention model. Such a covariate adjusted analysis may be more informative. 
Statistically (in terms of bias and precision of estimated intervention effects) the relative 
merits of the two approaches are not yet properly understood.  
 
 
D 4. Discussion 
 
   We set out to explore statistical aspects of studying the effects of electronic prescribing on 
prescription errors. The two aspects where statistical issues will impact on the quality of the 
research are study design and analysis.  
Regarding study design, if possible randomisation should be used to ensure “cause” 
(electronic prescribing) can be definitively linked to any “effect” (hopefully reduced 
prescription error). A randomised study should certainly be used before the widespread 
adoption of any single electronic prescription package. In practice, we realise that for many 
smaller studies, randomisation may not be practical (although it remains highly desirable). 
For such cases, informed by the ideal randomised study, we highlighted factors that should 
be taken account of in the design. We further went on to describe methods for choosing an 
appropriate sample size, deriving an appropriate formula and illustrating its implementation. 
 
The analysis of data from such studies needs to take into account the hierarchical structure 
of the data, using multilevel modelling or generalised estimating equations. This is because 
patients have typically 10 prescriptions during their stay, yet the length of stay, severity of 
illness and hence number of prescriptions can vary widely. Failure to take into account this 
patient level information (eg by analysing the data using contingency tables) could be 
misleading, as the conclusions are vulnerable to bias from atypical patients. Secondly, we 
discussed the relative merits of a logistic versus a Poisson model for data (the latter giving 
rise to risk ratios, rather than odds ratios). In practice, we prefer a logistic approach. 
Thirdly, we described how “propensity score” methods can be used, in the absence of 
randomisation, to provide a check on the similarity between the control and intervention 
groups. If the intervention and control groups are found to differ substantially, estimated 
effects of intervention will be unreliable. Lastly, we outlined how the propensity score can 
be used in the model for estimating the effect of intervention. 
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   In conclusion, we note that considerably more could be said regarding all the aspects 
described above. In particular we have not addressed the practical/budgetary constraints 
that often feature largely in study design, nor the technical details of the analysis. 
Nevertheless, we hope the issues discussed, based on experience to date,  will prove a 
useful starting point for future research in this area. 
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Appendix E. Clinical decision support features of the two       
     systems studied 
 
E.1 Introduction 
 
This Chapter discusses the clinical decision support capabilities of the two electronic 
prescribing systems studied, highlighting the elements of decision support that are 
possible with each system, and those that are actually in use. 
 
The relevant objective for this part of the study was: 
 
• To describe the decision support software in each system, and assess 
aspects of it. 
 
E.2 Defining decision support 
 
While a commonly used phrase, there are few definitions of decision support that are 
specific to electronic prescribing in secondary care.  We therefore adopted Teich et 
al’s 106 definition and list of examples, as applied to electronic prescribing in US 
primary care.  Decision support was broadly defined as providing clinicians or 
patients with clinical knowledge to enhance patient care 107. This was taken to include 
reactive alerts and reminders (such as for drug allergies and interactions), structured 
order forms, pick lists and patient-specific dose checking, proactive guideline support 
to prevent errors of omission, medication reference information, and any other 
knowledge-driven interventions that can promote safety, education, communication, 
or improved quality of care 106. 
 
We also considered a hierarchy of decision support in relation to secondary care 
electronic prescribing, as proposed by Bates (reported by Franklin)108 (Figure 27). 
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Increasing 
importance 
in reduction 
of medication 
errors 
 
 
♦ requirement for complete medication orders 
♦ default doses 
♦ drug-allergy checking 
♦ drug-drug interactions 
♦ checking doses against renal function 
♦ checking doses against patient’s age (if elderly) 
♦ drug – laboratory result checking 
♦ dose ceilings 
 
 
Increasing 
complexity of 
introduction 
Figure 27: Hierarchy of types of decision support, as proposed by Bates (as 
reported by Franklin, 2003) 
 
Finally, there are also other elements commonly understood to comprise decision 
support in the context of electronic prescribing for UK hospital inpatients.  These 
include: 
• Use of a drug dictionary to avoid the need for free text entries; 
• Provision of dosing advice, such as a link to drug monographs or the 
electronic British National Formulary; 
• Links to the hospital’s patient administration system so that patient details 
are automatically entered; 
• Formulary control; 
• Creation of discharge prescriptions without further transcription of inpatient 
medication orders. 
 
For the purposes of this chapter, we considered all of these elements. We did not 
include recording the reasons for non-administration of doses, or other aspects of 
information transfer that are standard practice with paper-based systems. 
 
 
E 3 Methods 
 
Following our observations and interviews with key stakeholders, we summarised the 
decision support capabilities of each system according to the elements presented 
above.  We considered whether or not each aspect was possible within the system, 
as well as whether or not it was in use at the time of the study. 
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E 4 Results 
 
Results are summarised in Table 51. 
 
ServeRx, Charing 
Cross Hospital 
Meditech, Queen’s 
Hospital Type of decision support 
Possible? In use? Possible?  In use? 
Link to hospital patient 
administration system 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Drug dictionary Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Requirement for complete 
medication orders 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Formulary guidance or 
control 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Direct creation of 
discharge prescriptions 
No* - Yes Yes 
Default doses Yes Yes Yes Some 
Drug-allergy checking Yes No Yes No 
Drug-drug interactions Yes No Yes Some  
Dose ceilings No - Yes For selected 
drugs 
Checking doses against 
renal function 
No - Yes No 
Checking doses against 
patient’s age (for elderly or 
paediatric patients) 
No - Yes For selected  
neonatal 
drugs 
Drug – laboratory result 
checking 
No - Yes No 
Drug monographs No - Yes Yes 
Guideline support No - No -  
Table 51: Summary of the decision support available and actually in use for 
each system.  
* Creation of discharge prescriptions was not possible with the ServeRx version in place at 
the time of the study, but was possible and used in practice following installation of a 
subsequent version. 
 
Links to patient administration system 
Both systems were linked to the patient administration system, allowing patient 
names, hospital numbers and basic demographic information to be downloaded to 
the electronic prescribing system. The Meditech system at Queen’s Hospital also 
allowed links between the prescribing system and laboratory data; this was not 
possible with the ServeRx system. 
 
Provision of a drug dictionary and requirement for complete medication orders 
Both systems provided a drug dictionary to ensure that drug names were specified 
correctly, and required all medication order fields to be entered.  At both sites, the 
drug database supplied by First Data Bank Europe was used. The Meditech system 
also had a “look up” index which allows prescribers to enter any brand or generic 
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name and then be presented with a list of available preparations. With the ServeRx 
system, it was possible to prescribe dosage forms that could not be given by the 
route specified (for example, vancomycin capsules to be administered intravenously). 
At Queen’s Hospital the pharmacy department had linked drugs with possible routes 
of administration, so that the system would not allow prescribing by an inappropriate 
route. 
 
Formulary guidance 
At Charing Cross Hospital, prescribers were guided towards selection of products 
that were in the Trust’s formulary, and preferably, those in stock on the study ward.  
When searching for a drug product, prescribers were first presented with a list of 
products that were stocked on the ward.  If required, a prescriber can then choose to 
look at the list of all drugs in the Trust’s formulary, and then if needed, the list of all 
products in the drug dictionary.  
 
Formulary control at Queen’s Hospital was more stringent. Non-formulary drugs did 
not appear on the default drop-down pick lists; junior doctors had to ask pharmacy 
staff how they could be prescribed. 
 
Creation of discharge prescriptions 
Creation of discharge prescriptions was not possible with the version of ServeRx in 
use at the time of the study.  A subsequent version of the software did allow this 
feature, which was then routinely used.  This feature allowed selection of those drugs 
which were to be prescribed on discharge, which then appeared on a printout 
resembling the Trust’s standard discharge prescription / discharge summary. The 
printed discharge prescription was then signed by the prescriber, checked by a 
pharmacist and dispensed in the pharmacy department as for paper-based 
prescriptions.   
 
The procedure for creating discharge prescriptions in the Meditech system has been 
described in Chapter 2. Drugs required at discharge were marked (*) by the 
prescriber and at pre-determined times during the day, all of the marked prescriptions 
were printed in the pharmacy for dispensing.  As for inpatient medication orders, 
these discharge prescriptions were considered to have been electronically “signed”. 
Details of discharge medication were exported into the discharge summary that is 
sent to a patient’s general practitioner. 
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Default doses and dose ceilings 
At Charing Cross Hospital, default doses were set up by the pharmacy computer 
services team for the majority of products that were prescribed to be given regularly. 
However, it was not possible to set default doses for drugs prescribed less often that 
once daily, and it was therefore not possible to set the default frequency for oral 
methotrexate to be once weekly, for example. There was also a problem with drugs 
prescribed to be given “when required”, as the system’s default dosing frequency 
was one-hourly. This could not be amended locally and is not appropriate for the 
majority of drugs; medical staff training therefore had to include the importance of 
amending this field.  There were no dose ceilings. 
 
At Queen’s Hospital, default doses and dosing frequencies were set by the pharmacy 
team for specific drugs when the general consensus was that they would be useful. 
The number of drugs controlled in this way was relatively small; one example was the 
proton pump inhibitor lansoprazole.  Maximum dose warnings were set for some 
neonatal and paediatric drugs. All defaults could be over-ridden; the system allowed 
full audit of all such decisions.  It was also possible for doses to be individualised on 
a weight or surface area basis. However this facility was not in general use, partly 
because the necessary physiological data was not often entered into the patient 
record. 
 
Drug - allergy checking 
While the ServeRx system at Charing Cross Hospital was theoretically capable of 
allergy checking, this feature was not activated and was not in use at the time of the 
study. The main reason for this was that the system did not carry out drug-allergy 
checking until prescribed drugs were deployed (usually by nursing staff) to specific 
drug round times.  Since this often occurred some time after the prescribing act, 
particularly if hand-held computers were used, any warnings would have had to be 
dealt with by nursing staff, which was not considered appropriate.  Additional 
problems were also encountered, but these could probably have been resolved. First, 
the proposed use of allergy checking software opened up a debate about the level of 
cross-sensitivity at which an allergy warning should operate. For example, if a patient 
with a documented penicillin allergy was prescribed a cephalosporin, stake-holders 
were of divided opinions as to whether a warning should appear. Second, there were 
concerns about the deskilling of prescribers, who would also be required to prescribe 
on wards that did not operate electronic prescribing.  Third, there was a problem with 
allergies that were entered in error and then removed, as these still appeared on the 
system.  Finally, allergies had to be entered in relation to a specific product (for 
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example, penicillin V tablets 250mg) and it was not possible to enter an allergy to a 
group of drugs (for example, penicillins). The system did crosscheck across the 
group of drugs, but the format of allergy entry did not make this clear.  
 
At Queen’s Hospital, drug and other allergy information was required to be entered 
into the Meditech system on admission, and staff could check the allergy record for 
an individual patient. The system could automatically check orders for drugs and 
foodstuffs (including those which are ingredients in pharmaceutical products) against 
this allergy record. However again, this facility was not switched on, and doctors 
spoke of their lack of confidence in the accuracy of allergy reports obtained from 
patients on admission. As for Charing Cross, there were also concerns about being 
unnecessarily constrained in the choice of antibiotics. 
 
Drug-drug interactions 
This facility was possible within the ServeRx system, but was not activated at 
Charing Cross Hospital.  This was for the same reason as for drug-allergy checking, 
as any warnings only appeared on deployment of medication by nursing staff.  There 
were also concerns over duplication warnings as the same drug is often intentionally 
prescribed twice.  Examples included analgesics prescribed in a low dose regularly 
with extra doses prescribed ‘when required’, and prescriptions for drugs such as 
levothyroxine 150 micrograms which had to be prescribed as two separate orders for 
100 microgram and 50 microgram tablets.  Finally, the warning messages were not in 
plan English and felt to be unhelpful.  Rewording the warnings was possible but 
would have required a great deal of work.  
 
The Meditech system automatically screened for drug interactions using a third-party 
database from First Data Bank. This was customised by pharmacy staff so that only 
clinically significant interactions, as defined by the British National Formulary, were 
presented to prescribers.  Prescribing a drug that interacted with one on the patient’s 
current list produced a red box warning. If the prescriber still wished to prescribe, 
then s/he could override the warning. This decision, and the identity of the prescriber,  
was recorded by the system. Pharmacists screening prescription orders could check 
all possible interactions, no matter how trivial. 
 
Checking against patient’s age, renal function and laboratory data  
These facilities were not possible with ServeRx as there was no link to test results. 
 
  
269
Although electronic prescribing at Queen’s Hospital was part of the Hospital 
Information System, the system did not carry out automatic checks, for example for 
renal function; this was instead part of the clinical check which pharmacist made for 
all new orders. There was a “magic key” which took users straight from a prescribing 
screen into pathology tests and other investigations. It was also possible for doses to 
be individualised on a weight basis, which was used to check the doses of certain 
neonatal drugs. 
 
Drug monographs and guideline support 
The ServeRx system did not incorporate drug monographs or guideline support, 
although such information is available separately via the trust’s intranet.  In contrast,  
the Meditech electronic prescribing system incorporated a full set of drug 
monographs, as part of the package provided by First Data Bank Europe.  Local 
guidelines and policies written by Trust staff were also included. 
 
E 5 Discussion 
 
While the common perception of clinical decision support relates to specific features 
such as drug-allergy and drug-drug interactions, we took a wider view and included a 
range of other features.   
 
We found that both systems studied offered various elements of decision support, but 
at both sites, many potential features were not enabled.   This was for a variety of 
reasons, including a deliberate policy to ensure that staff (particularly junior doctors) 
did not become deskilled in prescribing.   Queen’s Hospital has taken a cautious 
approach to implementing decision support features, concerned not to automate 
aspects of clinical decision-making, but also not to overload staff with warnings, for 
example, on interacting drugs 91. The view of key stakeholders was that the Meditech 
system best supported clinical staff by providing rapid access to all information about 
a patient. 
 
However, a common theme in our qualitative work at Charing Cross (but not at 
Queen’s Hospital) was that staff assumed that an electronic prescribing system 
would have features such as allergy checking enabled. They may have been less 
vigilant in their prescribing behaviour as a result; this is an example of how new 
errors could be created following the introduction of EP.  At Queen’s Hospital, allergy 
checking was a thorny issue with both doctors and pharmacists. New prescribers 
  
270
were explicitly informed in writing during training that the system would not check 
doses and allergies, and that it was their responsibility to do this.  
 
At both sites, one company (First Data Bank) was used to provide the data files for 
drugs and their properties.  First Data Bank is currently the only possible supplier; 
there is no British National Formulary-compatible product.  
 
Decision support seems to be derived from what is possible rather than what is 
needed. Queen’s Hospital stakeholders told us that they had the basics of what they 
needed, but could do much more if they had the resources.  The pharmacy 
department has managed to do some developmental work, (for example, neonatal 
dose checking) in-house but did not have the resources to do more. 
 
There are specific potential advantages if electronic prescribing can be linked to 
laboratory data; for example, linking an order for an antibiotic with a check on the 
patient’s microbiology test results.  This is possible with the Meditech system, but 
would require significant software changes, which would cost money and take staff 
time.  However, of the eight cases of harm found in the retrospective studies across 
the two sites, arguably all of them would have been either avoided or detected more 
quickly if there had been drug-drug interaction checking, automated dose checking in 
renal impairment, or alerts when drugs caused a measurement, such as INR, to go 
outside normal range. 
 
Most features considered decision support in the EP community are really decision 
removal or reduction.  These features ensure that drugs chosen are on the formulary 
and are prescribed in strengths and dose forms that exist in the hospital.  These are 
important functions, and contribute to safety and economy, however they are not 
really helping prescribers in a reasoned decision making process.  There is an 
important debate to be entered into as to the extent to which EP should force the 
correct action, and the extent to which it should enhance decision making by an 
individual or care team. 
 
E 6 Conclusion 
 
We found that both systems offered a range of decision support features, but notably, 
many of the features were deliberately not activated. Most features were actually 
decision removal or reduction.  Concerns about automating aspects of clinical 
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decision-making and producing “warning fatigue” in prescribers contributed to this 
situation.  The whole area of decision support for prescribing requires a substantial 
amount of work to get it to meet expectations. 
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                Appendix F.   Retrospective Review Form (Chapter 3) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONFIDENTIAL 
 
 
MEDICATION ERROR REVIEW FORM   
 
for  
 
Retrospective Case Record Review 
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Data sources available. 
 
 
Please identify if the following are present for the study period:    1 = Yes  2 = No   3 = N/A or not required               
 
1. Initial medical assessment  
 
 
2. Medical progress notes  
 
 
3. Nursing/midwifery progress 
    notes   
   
 
4.  Laboratory/Pathology reports     
 
 
5. Prescription records:      Present?  Page no.s missing 
            
          Prescription Report 
 
          Administrations Report  –  
          Medications, Vital signs, Physician instructions 
 
          Transfer Prescription Record (Summary) 
 
          ServeRx computer record of stopped medication 
 
          Current medication chart 
 
          Medication chart (from previous ward) 
 
  
6.  Discharge summary  
 
 
7.  Other (give details)  
  
 
 
____________________________________________________ 
 
____________________________________________________ 
 
____________________________________________________ 
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Stage A:   PATIENT INFORMATION AND BACKGROUND TO ERROR. 
 
A1 REVIEWER INFORMATION.           
  
Date of Review:                                                               Time Commenced Review: 
                                 d        d       m        m        y       y 
 
Hospital number:                       Time Review Finished:    
                  
 
 
   
A2 PATIENT INFORMATION. 
 
Pre ServeRx      Post ServeRx 
 
 Date of Admission:         Admission to 8North:  
 Date of Discharge:           Discharge/transfer: 
       or Date of Death d d m m y  y  from 8N                       d        d        m       m       y       y 
Reason for admission and relevant background  
_____________________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
Date of Birth                                                     Age (on admission to 8N,yrs)                        Sex   M/F 
                                    d        d        m       m       y        y 
Weight (Kg)                                   Est?       Height            ft          inches    Obese?   Yes          No  
IBW (Complete if pt obese)   
 
Creatinine (μmol/L)                 Date that serum creatinine was measured 
Creatinine clearance  (ml/min)                         Dialysis? _______________         d        d       m       m       y        y 
 
Does the patient have hepatic impairment?                         Yes    No   ?          
If yes, please give details of relevant liver function tests: 
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
Is the patient pregnant?  Yes  No 
Is the patient breastfeeding?  Yes  No 
Does the patient have any allergies?  Yes  No 
If yes, please give details: 
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
(use 24 hour clock)
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A3  CO-MORBIDITIES.   
Please tick all of the following co-morbidities that apply to this patient   or  No co-morbidities 
            Not known 
Cardio-vascular 
 Coronary artery disease 
 Peripheral vascular disease 
 Cardiac insufficiency or dysrhythmia  
 Hypertension 
 Other (specify) 
Respiratory  
 Asthma 
 COPD (chronic obstructive pulmonary disease) 
 Other serious lung problem (e.g. severe tuberculous 
  scarring, pneumonectomy) (specify) _____________ 
Gastro-intenstinal  
 Chronic or recurrent dyspepsia 
 Inflammatory bowel disease  Crohn’s / colitis 
 Chronic liver disorder 
 Other (specify) 
Endocrine 
 Diabetes - type________________________ 
 Endocrine disorder (e.g. thyroid, adrenal)  
 (specify) ______________________________ 
Neurological 
 Epilepsy 
 Stroke 
 Parkinson’s 
 Dementia 
 Other serious neurological disorders (e.g. MS, 
   MND) (specify) 
Renal 
 Chronic renal disease 
 Other (specify) 
Haematological 
 Anaemia 
 Leukaemia 
 Lymphoma 
 Other (specify) _________________________ 
Existing cancer 
 Specify ______________________________ 
Psychiatric 
 Schizophrenia 
 Affective disorder 
 Other (specify)________________________ 
Psychosocial 
 Alcoholism 
 Drug abuse 
 Smoker 
 Homeless 
 Other (specify)________________________ 
Infection 
 AIDS 
 Chronic infection (e.g. Hep C, MRSA)  
 (specify)_____________________________ 
Bone/joint disorders 
 Osteoporosis 
 Severe rheumatoid arthritis 
 Severe osteoarthritis 
 Other (specify)_______________ 
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Disability 
 Wheel chair bound 
 Blind 
 
 
Deaf 
Learning difficulty 
 Other (specify)________________________ 
Trauma 
 Multiple Traumas (e.g. RTA) 
Nutritional status 
 Obese 
 Cachetic 
 Other (specify) ________________________ 
Other co-morbidity 
 Specify ______________________________ 
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A4 SPECIALTY CARING FOR PATIENT. 
 
GENERAL  0 uncertain  1 Accident & Emergency (A&E)  2  General Intensive Care 
 
3  Anaesthesiology   10  Obstetrics  17  Urological Surgery 
4  Cardiac Surgery   11  Orthopaedic Surgery  18  ENT Surgery 
 5  Colon/Rectal Surgery  12  Paediatric Surgery   19  Eye Surgery 
 6  General Surgery   13  Plastic Surgery   20  Other (specify) __________ 
 7  Gynaecology   14  Thoracic Surgery          _______________________ 
 8  Hepato-biliary Surgery  15  Vascular Surgery          _______________________ 
 
S 
U 
R 
G 
E 
R 
Y 
 9  Neurosurgery   16  Upper GI Surgery   
 
 21  Cardiology (incl. CCU)  30  Internal Medicine   38  Physical Medicine 
 22  Dermatology           (not otherwise classified)  39  Psychiatry 
 23  Endocrinology   31  Medical Oncology   40  Pulmonary Disease  
 24  Family Practice   32  Medical Ophthalmology  41  Radiation Therapy 
 25  Gastroenterology   33  Neonatology  42  Radiology 
 26  Geriatrics (care of the elderly)  34  Nephrology   43  Rehabilitation Unit   
 27  Haematology  35  Neurology   44  Rheumatology  
 28  Immunology and Allergy  36  Pathology  45  Other (specify) ________ 
 
M 
E 
D 
I 
C 
I 
N 
E 
 29  Infectious Disease   37  Paediatrics        ___________________ 
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 A5.  CURRENT MEDICATION  
 Please list all the medication that the patient is currently prescribed 
 
Prescribing stage 
Medication name 
Strength Route Dosage 
regimen 
No. of 
medication 
orders 
Prescribing on admission 
STAT 
 
REG 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PRN 
 
 
 
IVI 
 
    
Prescribing during stay 
STAT 
 
REG 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PRN 
 
 
 
 
IVI 
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 A5.  CURRENT MEDICATION (cont.) 
 Please list all the medication that the patient is currently prescribed 
 
Prescribing stage 
Medication name 
Strength Route Dosage 
regimen 
No. of 
medication 
orders 
Transcribing onto ServeRx 
STAT 
 
REG 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PRN 
 
IVI 
    
Writing TTA 
STAT 
 
 
REG 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PRN 
 
 
 
 
 
IVI 
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CHECKLIST FOR REVIEWING NOTES FOR POTENTIAL ERRORS. 
 
 
1. Medical clerking. 
 
Read initial medical clerking and medical progress notes.  Check entries from pharmacist or nurse. m 
 
 
2. Drug history. 
 
Check drug history on admission and identify any omissions from the drug charts.  m 
Also check for any GP’s prescribing errors continued on admission.  m 
 
 
3. Check drug chart. 
 
A. Any administration omissions?  m 
 
B.  Any prescription errors?  Check the following:  m 
-  Appropriate doses, watch for… 
- Drugs with a narrow therapeutic index 
- Drugs requiring dose adjustment in renal or hepatic impairment. 
-  Contra-indications 
- Check allergies 
-  Completeness of prescription (signed, dated, dose, drug name, delivery route, no 
abbreviations or Latin names) 
-  Drug interactions 
- Including diluents for IV infusions 
-  Correct formulation 
 
C. Any drugs stopped?  Why were they stopped?  m 
 
D. Are each of the drugs required?  m 
 
E. Check the lab results for signs of toxicity.  m 
 
F. Any co-prescribing required?  m 
 
G. Any drugs that patient should be on but not prescribed?  m 
 
H. Are all drugs transcribed correctly? 
- when rewriting a patient’s drug chart  m 
- when writing a patient’s discharge medication  m 
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B1 a. Error no:……  
 
1.  Demographic details of the error            Date that error occurred   
                                                          d      d     m     m     y      y 
Type of error: 
 
Prescribing       Dispensing                 Administration    
Type of prescribing error      Type of dispensing error 
q Prescribing error       q Content error 
 Prescribing error - by a pharmacist    q Labelling error    
Prescribing stage       Type of administration error 
 
 Prescribing on admission     q Omission - unavailability 
   Prescribing during stay     q Omission - other 
   Transcribing onto ServeRx     Extra dose 
   Re-writing drug chart       Selection of drug 
   Writing TTA       Wrong dose 
Stage of drug use process      Wrong formulation 
   Need for drug       Unordered drug 
   Selection of drug       Other 
   Selection of dose 
   Selection of formulation 
   Supply 
   Monitoring 
   Counsel/educate 
  
2.  Description of the error – including drug name, formulation, dose, frequency and route 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
Did the patient receive any doses of the 
drug before the error was corrected? 
q No 
q Yes:                doses 
q Don’t know 
N/A
Stage B: ERROR DETAILS 
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B1 b. Additional treatment as a result of the error 
 
Did harm occur as a result of the error? Yes     No    Not known    
If yes, please provide details below: 
    __________________________________________________________________________________ 
    __________________________________________________________________________________ 
    __________________________________________________________________________________ 
    __________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
What additional procedures (medical or surgical procedures, including any unnecessary 
investigations) were performed as a result of the error? 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
What additional medications (including intravenous fluids and blood transfusion) were administered 
as a result of the error?  
___________________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
What additional treatment (e.g. physiotherapy, counselling) was given as a result of the error? 
___________________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Was there an increase in length of stay as a result of the error?  If so, please give details. 
_____________________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Did the patient have to be transferred to a different ward as a result of the error?  If so, please give 
details. 
_____________________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
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Appendix G  Trigger tool review (Chapter 3) 
            
                
 
Drug chart data 
Chart not present q
Present? Error? Code UK trigger Potential problem 
identified Y N Y N 
Notes  
T1 Chlorphenamine / loratadine / 
hydrocortisone 
Hypersensitivity reaction of 
drug effect 
     
T2 Vitamin K (phytomenadione) Over-anticoagulation with 
warfarin 
     
T3 Flumazenil Over-sedation with 
benzodiazepines 
     
T4 Droperidol, ondansetron, 
promethazine, hydroxyzine, 
prochlorperazine, 
metoclopramide, cyclizine, 
granisetron or domperidone 
Nausea/emesis related to 
drug use 
     
T5 Naloxone Over-sedation with narcotic      
T6 Anti-diarrhoeals: loperamide, 
diphenoxylate, codeine or co-
phenotrope 
Adverse drug event      
T7 calcium resonium Hyperkalaemia related to 
renal impairment or drug 
effect 
     
T22 Unexpected medication stop 
 
Adverse drug event      
 
 
 
 
Patient notes data 
Notes not present q
Present? Error? Code UK trigger Process identified 
Y N Y N 
Notes 
T20 Over-sedation, lethargy, falls, 
hypotension 
Related to overuse of 
medication 
     
T21 Rash Drug related/adverse drug 
event 
     
T23 Transfer to higher level of care, 
such as ITU or CCU 
Adverse event      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Reviewer Date of review 
Time started Time finished 
Patient’s hospital number Date of birth 
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Biochemical / haematological / microbiological data 
Lab data not present q
Present? Error? Code Original trigger Process identified 
Y N Not 
done
Y N 
Notes 
T8 APTT > 3 Over-anticoagulation with 
heparin 
      
T9 INR >6 Over-anticoagulation with 
warfarin 
      
T10 WBC < 3 x 109 /L  Neutropenia related to drug 
or disease 
      
T11 Serum glucose < 2.8 mmol/L Hypoglycaemia related to 
insulin use or excessively 
rapid titration with oral 
antidiabetics 
      
T12 Rising serum creatinine 
?doubling 
? 30% increase in serum 
creatinine since admission 
Renal insufficiency related to 
drug use 
      
T13 Clostridium difficile positive 
stool 
Exposure to antibiotics       
T14 Digoxin level >2mcg/L Toxic digoxin level       
T15 Lidocaine level > 5ng/ml Toxic lidocaine level       
T16 Gentamicin or tobramycin levels 
peak >10mg/L, trough >2mg/L.  
Toxic levels of antibiotics       
T17 Amikacin levels peak >30mg/L, 
trough >10mg/L 
Toxic levels of antibiotics       
T18 Vancomycin level >26mg/L Toxic levels of antibiotics       
T19 Theophylline level >20mg/L Toxic levels of drugs       
 
 
For Positive Triggers identified with associated errors 
Code Error report no. (from retrospective review form) 
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Appendix H. Types of medication orders written during the pre- and   
post-ServeRx prescribing error data collection periods (Chapter 4) 
 
Number of medication items written for each type of medication order 
Prescribing stage 
Once only Regular PRN IV TTA Total % total 
On admission 56 267 76 90 - 489 20.0 
During stay 148 319 216 501 - 1184 48.3 
Re-writing chart 24 276 99 - - 399 16.3 
TTA - - - - 378 378 15.4 
Total 228  862 391 591 378 2450 - 
% of total 9.3 35.2 16.0 24.1 15.4 - 100.0 
 Extrapolated number of medication orders written during the pre-ServeRx study period.   
PRN = “When required” medication; IV = intravenous; TTA = discharge medication 
 
Number of medication items written for each type of medication order 
Prescribing stage 
Once only Regular PRN IV TTA Total % total 
On admission 58 198 61 94 - 411 17.4 
During stay 201 493 137 488 - 1319 56.1 
Transcribing onto 
ServeRx 
0 318 143 - - 461 19.6 
TTA - - - - 162 162 6.9 
Total 259 1009 341 582 162 2353 - 
% of total 11.0 42.9 14.5 24.7 6.9 - 100.0 
Extrapolated number of medication orders written during the post-ServeRx study period.  PRN 
= “When required” medication; IV = intravenous; TTA = discharge medication 
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Appendix I.  Detailed work sampling results (Chapter 4) 
Doctor Nurse Other  Patient Self Total Task 
 
No. % Hr No. % Hr No. % Hr No. % Hr No. % Hr No. % Hr 
Change in therapy/monitoring 1 0.38 0:02:02 3 1.14 0:06:06 - n/a n/a - n/a n/a 6 2.27 0:12:13 10 3.79 0:20:21 
Giving advice/information 3 1.14 0:06:06 3 1.14 0:06:06 - n/a n/a 9 3.41 0:18:19 10 3.79 0:20:21 25 9.47 0:50:53 
Information gathering 9 3.41 0:18:19 4 1.52 0:08:09 - n/a n/a 7 2.65 0:14:15 19 7.20 0:38:41 39 14.77 1:19:23 
Looking for Charts - n/a n/a 1 0.38 0:02:02 - n/a n/a 1 0.38 0:02:02 6 2.27 0:12:13 8 3.03 0:16:17 
Non-Productive 1 0.38 0:02:02 7 2.65 0:14:15 5 1.89 0:10:11 - n/a n/a 3 1.14 0:06:06 16 6.06 0:32:34 
Other 1 0.38 0:02:02 - n/a n/a - n/a n/a - n/a n/a 7 2.65 0:14:15 8 3.03 0:16:17 
Patients’ Own Drugs 2 0.76 0:04:04 - n/a n/a 1 0.38 0:02:02 9 3.41 0:18:19 2 0.76 0:04:04 14 5.30 0:28:30 
Prescription annotation - n/a n/a - n/a n/a - n/a n/a - n/a n/a 24 9.09 0:48:51 24 9.09 0:48:51 
Prescription monitoring - n/a n/a 1 0.38 0:02:02 1 0.38 0:02:02 - n/a n/a 39 14.77 1:19:23 41 15.53 1:23:27 
Supply - n/a n/a 19 7.20 0:38:41 - n/a n/a - n/a n/a 41 15.53 1:23:27 60 22.73 2:02:08 
Travel - n/a n/a - n/a n/a - n/a n/a - n/a n/a 19 7.20 0:38:41 19 7.20 0:38:41 
Total 17 6.44 0:34:36 38 14.39 1:17:21 7 2.65 0:14:15 26 9.85 0:52:55 176 66.67 5:58:15 264 100 8:57:23 
Detailed work sampling results pre-ServeRx.  
No observations were made during which the ward pharmacist was in contact with the pharmacy department; this column is therefore omitted for 
clarity. 
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Doctor Nurse Other  Patient Pharmacy Self Total Task 
 
No. % Hr No. % Hr No. % Hr No. % Hr No % Hr No. % Hr No. % Hr 
Change in 
therapy/monitoring 
 16 3.86 0:31:18 -  n/a  n/a  -  n/a  n/a 2 0.48 0:03:55  - n/a n/a  10 2.42 0:19:34  28 6.76 0:54:47 
Giving 
advice/information 
 26 6.28 0:50:52 9 2.17 0:17:37  8   
1.93 
0:15:39 35 8.45 1:08:29  1  
0.24 
0:01
:57 
- n/a n/a 79 19.08 2:34:34 
Information gathering  5 1.21 0:09:47  7 1.69 0:13:42 2 0.48 0:03:55  8 1.93 0:15:39  2 0.48 0:03
:55 
38 9.18 1:14::21 62 14.98 2:01:18 
Looking for Charts  - n/a n/a  -  n/a   n/a -   n/a  n/a  -  n/a n/a - n/a n/a  - n/a n/a - n/a n/a 
Non-Productive 5 1.21 0:09:47  7 1.69 0:13:42  8 1.93 0:15:39  1 0.24 0:01:57  2 0.48 0:03
:55 
21 5.07 0:41:05  44 10.63 1:26:05 
Other  -  n/a n/a - n/a  n/a  - n/a n/a  - n/a n/a  - n/a n/a  3  0.72 0:05:52 - n/a n/a 
Patients’ Own Drugs  -  n/a n/a  - n/a  n/a  -  n/a  n/a -  n/a  n/a - n/a n/a  - n/a n/a  - n/a n/a 
Prescription 
annotation 
3  0.72 0:05:52  1 0.24  0:01:57 - n/a n/a  2 0.48 0:03:55 - n/a n/a  26 6.28 0:50:52  32 7.73 1:02:37 
Prescription 
monitoring 
 1  0.24 0:01:57  1 0.24 0:01:57  -  n/a  n/a -  n/a  n/a  4 0.97 0:07
:50 
 87 21.01 2:50:13  93 22.46 3:01:57 
Supply - n/a n/a  1  .24 0:01:57  - n/a n/a  - n/a n/a   2 0.48 0:03
:55 
53 12.80 1:43:42  56 13.53 1:49:34 
Travel  - n/a  n/a  -  n/a  n/a  -  n/a n/a - n/a  n/a  - n/a n/a 17 4.11 0:33:16  17 4.11 0:33:16 
Total  56 13.53 1:49:34  26 6.28 0:50:52  18 4.35 0:35:13  48 11.59 1:33:55 11 2.66 0:21
:31 
255 61.59 8:18:55 414 100 13:30:00 
Detailed work sampling results post-ServeRx  
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Appendix J.  Analysis of types of prescribing error (Chapter 6) 
 
 
 
Methods used to identify errors 
Type of error Pharmacist 
alone 
RRF 
alone 
Pharmacist 
and RRF 
Spont. 
report alone 
Total errors 
detected 
Need for drug 
Omission from drug 
history 
6 23 0 0 29 
Omission from TTA  
 
0 11 0 0 11 
Other omission 
 
1 5 0 0 6 
Duplication of drug 
 
2 0 0 0 2 
No indication for 
drug 
0 0 0 0 0 
Select specific drug 
Drug incorrect 
 
1 3 0 0 4 
Select drug dose 
Dose incorrect 
 
17 28 6 0 51 
Select formulation 
Formulation 
incorrect 
1 2 0 0 3 
Give instructions for product supply 
Sign and date 
prescription 
0 2 0 1 3 
Specify correct 
strength and form 
6 6 1 0 13 
Give administration instructions 
Route incorrect 
 
0 4 0 0 4 
Other 
administration  
7 2 0 0 9 
TOTAL 
(% of all errors) 
41 
(30.4%) 
86 
(63.7%)
7 
(5.2%) 
1 
(0.7%) 
135 
(100%) 
Comparison of prescribing errors identified using each method or combination 
of methods, presented according to type of error, for the pre-ServeRx cohort.  
RRF = Retrospective Review Form. TTA = discharge prescription.  
No errors were detected using the trigger tool 
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Methods used to identify errors 
Type of error Pharmacist 
alone 
RRF 
alone 
Pharmacist 
and RRF 
Spont. 
report alone 
Total errors 
detected 
Need for drug 
Omission from drug 
history 
2 19 0 0 21 
Omission from TTA  
 
1 11 0 0 12 
Other omission 
 
1 11 0 0 12 
Duplication of drug 
 
2 2 1 0 5 
No indication for 
drug 
4 1 0 0 5 
Select specific drug 
Drug incorrect 
 
0 6* 0 1 7 
Select drug dose 
Dose incorrect 
 
9 38* 5 0 52 
Select formulation 
Formulation 
incorrect 
1 1 1 0 2 
Give instructions for product supply 
Sign and date 
prescription 
0 0 0 0 0 
Specify correct 
strength 
0 1 0 0 1 
Give administration instructions 
Route incorrect 
 
0 4 1 0 5 
Other 
administration  
1 2 1 0 5 
TOTAL  
(% of all errors) 
21 
(16.5%) 
96 
(75.6%)
9 
(7.1%) 
1 
(0.8%) 
127 
(100%) 
Comparison of prescribing errors identified using each method or combination 
of methods, presented according to type of error, for the post-ServeRx cohort.  
RRF = Retrospective Review Form. TTA = discharge prescription 
* In each case, one of these errors was identified by the trigger tool method as well 
as the RRF.  
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Appendix K. UK studies evaluating electronic prescribing systems in hospital inpatients (Chapter 8) 
 
Ref Setting System Outcome measures Study design Key results 
Cavell et 
al (1997) 
20-bed 
general 
medical 
ward 
Not stated 
- ?decision 
support 
- eRx but paper 
MAR 
-  
1) Medication administration 
errors (using observation) 
 
Comparison with 
31-bed medical 
ward at different 
site 
1) 5.5% of 1,295 doses had error with eRx; 
5.7% of 1,206 doses at control site.  No 
statistically significant difference. 
 
 
Evans et 
al (1998) 
ICU at John 
Radcliffe, 
Oxford 
CareVue (ICU 
package) 
- flags doses 
outside ref 
range 
- eRx & eMAR 
1) Pharmacist audit of 
adherence to prescribing 
standards 
2) Time taken to prescribe 
3) Time taken to document 
administration 
3 week audit 
pre and post 
(one month 
after) 
1) IV fluids 64% of 194 correct before; 48% 
of 255 after.  IVIs 48% of 284 correct 
before; 32% of 247 after.  Intermittent 
drugs 90% of 706 before, 90% of 723 
after. No statistical analysis.  
2) 20 sec before; 55 sec after (“n” not given – 
may be one drug?) 
3) 2 sec before; 21 sec after (“n” not given – 
may be one drug?) 
Fowlie et 
al (2000) 
[abstract] 
36-bed 
orthopaedic 
ward, 
Scotland 
Pharmakon 
- “on-line Rx 
support” 
- eRx & eMAR 
1) Prescribing errors 
(methods and definitions not 
given) 
2) Medication administration 
errors (using observation) 
Pre and post (1 
month post and  
1 year post) 
1) 7.4% of 2238 IP orders had errors pre, 
7.0% of 2153 at 1 month, 4.7%* of 2030 
at one year.  7.5% of 826 TTA had errors 
pre, 7.7% of 634 at 1 month, 5.9% of 
1658 at 1 year.   
2) 9.0% of 3364 doses had errors pre, 6.0%* 
of 3334 doses at 1 month, 5.4%* of 2805 
at 1 year. 
*  confidence intervals do not overlap pre 
Nighting
ale et al 
(2000) 
64-bed 
renal unit, 
Birmingham 
In-house system 
- Various 
decision 
support 
- eRx & eMAR 
1) Attempted medication 
orders cancelled by 
system 
2) Proportion of warning 
messages over-written 
3) Users comparison of 
system with previous  
Descriptive 
study post 
implementation 
Descriptive study post implementation 
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Ref Setting System Outcome measures Study design Key results 
Almond 
et al 
(2002) 
33-bed 
renal / 
medical 
ward, 
Southend 
Medichain 
- Decision 
support 
- eRx & eMAR 
 
1) Review of prescriptions 
for prescribing errors 
(interventions?) 
2) Time taken to do drug 
rounds 
3) Percentage of successful 
administrations (?MAEs) 
(observation pre, 
according to system 
post?) 
4) Timing of ward 
pharmacist 
5) Stock management 
(methods not clear in paper) 
- 3 month data 
collection 
- pre and post 
(immediately 
post?) 
- respiratory 
ward used as 
control ward 
1) “pattern did not change “ (no results given) 
2) Time doubled(no results given) 
3) 90% of 1169 doses successful pre, 95% 
of 18,357 post 
4) (no results given) 
5) (no results given) 
 
Anton et 
al (2004) 
64-bed 
renal unit, 
Birmingham 
In-house system 
- Various 
decision 
support 
- eRx & eMAR 
1) Number of warning 
messages generated and 
proportion overridden; 
comparison between 
grades and familiarity 
with system 
Descriptive 
study post 
implementation 
1) New doctors generated fewer warning 
messages after 3 weeks, senior doctors 
more likely to ignore warning messages 
 
Marriot 
et al 
(2004) 
[abstract] 
Queens 
Hospital 
Burton 
Meditech 
- eRx & eMAR 
- ?decision 
support 
 
1) Pharmacists’ 
interventions 
3 months data; 
comparison with 
hospital using 
paper system 
1) 763 interventions (0.05/FCE) with paper 
system; 2512 interventions (0.2/FCE) with 
eRx system.  Different types intervention 
– monitoring of therapy with eRx system / 
therapy selection and prescribing with 
paper system 
Shulman 
et al 
(2005) 
22-bed ICU, 
University 
College 
Hospital 
QS 5.6 CIS (US 
system) 
- no decision 
support 
 
1) Prescribing errors as 
recorded by ward 
pharmacist 
6 months before 
and 
intermittently 
during 9 month 
period after  
1) 6.7% pre and 4.8% post (p = 0.04; chi 
square test). Post data varied over time, 
with higher error rate 10 weeks after 
introduction; lower error rates by 25 
weeks. New types of serious error. 
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Comments: 
- no study has used a comprehensive range of outcome measures 
- descriptive and not statistically powered 
- some of the outcome measures used are “weak” 
- one of most promising studies (Fowlie et al) only in abstract form and limited detail 
 
 
 
 
